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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

RUN OF THE MINE: MINERS, FARMERS, AND THE NON-UNION SPIRIT
OF THE GILDED AGE, 1886-1896
“Run of the Mine” examines why workers refused to join unions in the late
nineteenth century. Through a focus on the men and women involved in the southern
Midwest coal industry who quit or did not join unions, this dissertation analyzes the
economic, geographic, and racial factors that contributed to workers’ attitudes toward
national unions like the United Mine Workers of America (UMW). It argues that the
fluidity between rural industries that allowed residents to work in multiple occupations
throughout the year dramatically shaped worker expectations for their unions. This
occupational fluidity that allowed miners to farm and farmers to mine coincided with
farmer and worker stockholding, futures market speculations, cooperative endeavors, and
strikebreaking efforts that complicated workplace relationships and muddled local union
goals. Taken together, these factors caused workers to craft their own concepts of
unionism that did not always fit with national union agendas. Workers’ disinterest in
formal unions, then, did not come from an apathy toward unionism, but from a belief that
unions did not offer the surest means to attain their economic, political, and social needs.
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“Organization is simply a means to an end and not the end itself….”
--“Old Residenter,” Indiana coal miner
United Mine Worker’s Journal, May 26, 1892
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Shadows of Canaan

Over three hundred and fifty thousand guests roamed the lavish Columbian
Exposition buildings in a city that stood in the middle of wilderness. Not twenty years
after its infamous fire, Chicago rose from the ashes become a bustling metropolis, “the
City of Aladdin’s palaces,” a beacon of modernity in the heart of a “primeval” muddy
prairie. It seemed illogical that untamed countryside could sustain a city of such stylish
vibrancy, but this was part of the “magic” Chicago offered, and in 1893, it enchanted the
entire world. 1
Jack was one of the thousands captivated by the 1893 World’s Fair. 2 For the first
time in Fair history, planners dedicated an entire building to the source of the “White
City’s”—and the world’s—rapid industrial growth. The building itself was a symbol of
modernity, “mark[ing] an era in roof construction,” with its steel cantilever trusses
holding a glass ceiling over the building’s central hall exhibits. Intricate relief carvings of
men with picks and drills adorned the building’s outer walls that dwarfed Jack as he
approached. Craning his neck to take in the enormity of the mammoth building, he saw
two female figures carved out of the rock above the ninety-foot tall central archway. Each
woman held out mine lanterns as if to illuminate the single word etched in stone between
them: “MINING.” 3

1

Trumbull White and William Igleheart, The World’s Columbian Exposition, Chicago, 1893 (Philadelphia:
International Publishing Company, 1893), 13.
2
“Jack,” letter to the editor, “A Castigation,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893.
3
Frederick Skiff, “Mines,” in White and Igleheart, World’s Columbian Exposition, 240.

1

The building celebrated all facets of the wealth nature offered the modern world.
Gold, silver, diamonds, rubies, salt, metals, and ores, all prized for their monetary value,
pulled in thousands of patrons excited to see the precious materials literally piled in
displays that took up

Figure 1.1 “World's Columbian Exposition: Mining Building, Chicago, United
States, 1893,” S03i2231l01, Goodyear Collection, Brooklyn Museum, Brooklyn, New
York.

two floors and a basement level. Jack, however, came to see the other material
prominently displayed in the mines building not for its high monetary value, but for its
abundance that made it exceptionally cheap. To Jack’s delight, in order to see the Statue
of Liberty carved out of salt guests also viewed an eleven-ton pillar of Great Britain coal.
2

A thirty-foot tall, twenty-three-foot-wide archway of coal served as the entrance to
Kentucky’s Mammoth Cave replica while Cape Colony presented samples of its coal
deposits with the 40,000 diamonds its attendants cut and polished as patrons watched.
Amid the statues of silver and pyramids of gold stood dozens of coal columns, samples,
and seams shipped from all over the world. Everywhere the guests looked to see the
splendor of the new age they saw coal as well. 4
Dusty, dirty, and remarkably brittle compared to the other items displayed in the
Mines Building, coal nevertheless was the crucial material needed to fuel the Gilded Age.
Chicago could not become the nation’s “Second City” without the coal-powered railroads
that connected its factories and companies to the rural periphery and the eastern urban
centers. It fueled the engines that carried both exhibits and patrons across oceans and
prairies to the Exposition’s fairgrounds. Perhaps most importantly, it made the coke used
in the steel mills to forge the metal that undergirded nearly every aspect of the modern
age. Cheap coal made cheap steel that allowed the railroads to stretch farther and more
affordably than it had on iron rails. It made steel-infused farm equipment cheaper,
allowing farmers who could afford the investment an opportunity to cultivate and harvest
larger crop yields. It connected local markets to larger, more competitive ones via
railways and steamship lines that stretched across the nation and world. 5

4

White and Igleheart, World’s Columbian Exposition, 239-262; R.A.F. Penrose, Jr., “Notes on the State
Exhibits in the Mines and Mining Building at the World’s Exposition, Chicago,” The Journal of Geology,
1:5 (Jul.-Aug., 1893) 457-470; “Montana’s Silver Statue,” NYT, May 31,1893; “Infanta at the Fair,” EC,
June 8, 1893; “The Spell Broken,” DISJ, August 25, 1893;.Benjamin Cummings Turman, History of the
World’s Fair: Being a Complete Description of the World’s Columbian Exposition from its Inception
(Chicago: Mammoth Publishing Company 1893) p. 345-347; John J. Flinn, Official Guide to the World’s
Columbian Exposition in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, May 1 to October 26, 1893 by Authority of
the United States of America (Chicago: The Columbian Guide Company, 1893) 117, 256; Tim O’Malley,
letter to the editor, “Tim Concludes,” UMWJ, October 26, 1893.
5
On the importance of coal in the late nineteenth century see Sean P. Adams, “Promotion, Competition,
Captivity: The Political Economy of Coal,” Journal of Policy History, 18:1 (2006): p. 74:95.

3

Such developments rapidly changed how materials were produced and consumed.
By 1893, many expected that it would not be long before all farm equipment would be
made of steel and mining could be done with efficient “labor saving machinery.” Indeed,
although machine miners only comprised fourteen percent of the Illinois mining force,
they produced twenty-five percent of the state’s total coal output. Still, farms, mines, and
railroads often lagged in the mechanization of the era compared to other industries, with
nothing replacing the usefulness of a hickory plow on the Kansas plains or the skilled
blow of a human hand hammering a damp and jagged rock face. The labor did not
change, but the scale and availability of it did. Established coal operations expanded or
opened new mines in developing regions. Meanwhile, formerly secluded mines became
connected through railway lines so that by 1893, mines from Pennsylvania to Illinois
competed to sell their coal in Chicago. The days of isolated local markets were fading
and in its wake arose a new age of limitless capabilities that came from mining cheaper
coal at a faster rate. 6
Like much of Gilded Age society, the Fair celebrated this surplus of goods and
how easily they were accessed. It created a world of wealth concentrated in centers that
displayed their opulence prominently for all to see, not just at the Columbian Exposition,
but in cities throughout the world. Ornamental coal, like hundreds of other raw materials
6

The amount of production in machine mines compared to the non-machine mines was not wholly due to
the speed of mining technology. Rather, machine mines were only profitable in mines where coal extraction
required the least amount of effort, causing even hand mines in machine mining districts to produce more
coal than mines with harder rock or thinner coal veins. The Brown Coal Mining Machine,” EMJ,
September 17, 1892; “A New Invention,” NLT, July 20, 1878; Andrew Roy, “Ohio Institute of Mining
Engineers,” CTJ, June 17, 1891; “Steel Head Frame at Collieries,” CTJ, December 16, 1891; Illinois BLS,
Statistics of Coal in Illinois, 1893: Twelfth Annual Report, A Supplemental Report of the State Bureau of
Labor Statistics Containing the Tenth Annual Reports of the State Inspectors of Mines (Springfield, IL:
H.W. Rokker,1894), XXI-XXX1, 155-6; Frederick Skiff in Trumbull and Igleheart, 261; Keith Dix, What’s
a Coal Miner to Do?: The Mechanization of Coal Mining (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988),
6.

4

arranged and presented as art at the Fair and elsewhere became a way to demonstrate
wealth and modernity, to boast of abundance so great it could be displayed rather than
consumed. “Sioux City [Iowa] will have a corn palace at the World’s fair; Yankton, Dak.,
a cement palace; Hutchinson [Kansas] a salt palace, and Newton [Kansas] when she gets
her four sorghum mills to running will doubtless

Figure 1.2 The Ottumwa, Iowa, Coal Palace. “Opened by ‘Our Carter,’” CDT,
September 15, 1891.

build one of molasses candy,” the Topeka State Journal quipped, prompting newspapers
throughout eastern Kansas to joke that their cities would build a palace of coal. 7
Such a claim was only partially in jest. Amid much fanfare, President Benjamin
Harrison attended the first opening of a two-story coal palace in Ottumwa, Iowa. The 325
by 215-foot wooden building was gilded with polished Iowa coal with the inside full of
7

“The Only Corn Palace,” Sioux Valley [Correctionville, IA] News, September 4, 1890; “Sioux City,” TSJ,
April 1, 1890 (quote); “Leavenworth a Coal Palace,” The Leavenworth [Kansas] Times, April 3, 1890;
“Osage City a Coal Palace,” OFCP, April 10, 1890; “A Coal Palace,” reprinted from the Pittsburg
[Kansas] Smelter in The Leavenworth [Kansas]Times, April 18, 1890; “The Flax Palace,” The Des Moines
Register, September 1, 1891.

5

displays exhibiting the region’s farm surplus and manufactured products. Streator,
Illinois, East St. Louis, and Brazil, Indiana, erected their own palaces celebrating the
abundant “black diamonds” that came from their soil. 8
These displays of opulence highlighted two very different worlds centered on the
wealth generated by surplus. One world, witnessed by Jack in Chicago, gained its wealth
by not only being proximate to raw materials, but also by the means to use them for
profit. The other world was also witnessed by Jack, in the Illinois mines he where worked
just outside the city. There, rural “producers,” or those who provided the materials
consumed elsewhere, lived and labored in a world surrounded by the surplus and wealth
urban centers prized. In the southern Midwest coalfields of western Kentucky,
southwestern Indiana, Illinois, southern Iowa, northern Missouri, and eastern Kansas, this
surplus created a veritable “Canaan,” full not only of the “cheap coal” the Fair celebrated,
but seas of inexpensive grain.
But Canaan’s prosperity did not extend to all who lived within its borders. To
those who produced this abundant wealth, “cheap coal” and “cheap grain” had an entirely
different meaning. As organizers planned the Mining Building’s marvelous displays of
coal that would not be burned, a miner three hundred miles from the fairgrounds worked
to loosen a five-ton block of coal from the southeastern Kansas soil to be placed on
exhibit. Due to his mine’s conditions and the size of the piece, no machine could be used

8

Although Harrison and other guests toured it in 1890, the Ottumwa Palace was not officially completed
until September 1891. “The President’s Trip,” The Humboldt [Iowa] Republican, October 9, 1890; “A Coal
Palace,” OCFP, January 2, 1890; “Ottumwa’s Coal Palace,” The [Hawarden, IA] Independent, February 6,
1890; “We see it announced,” The [Humeston, IA] New Era, February 12, 1890; “Iowa’s Coal Palace,”
Davenport [Iowa] Daily Republican, September 17, 1890; “Ottumwa Coal Palace,” Logansport PharosTribune, August 11, 1891; “Ottumwa’s Pride To Open,” Des Moines Register, September 15, 1891;
“Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “A Coal Palace,” UMWJ, June 23, 1892; “Willing Hands,” letter to
the editor, “Welcome,” UMWJ, June 30, 1892; “No Coal Palace for Them,” Pittsburgh [Pennsylvania]
Dispatch, June 17, 1890.

6

to mine the coal so the miner extracted it by hand. Such a technique had remained
unchanged for decades, but the wages the miner received had declined. The miner had
agreed to extract the block in exchange for eleven dollars, which he would split with his
assistant, and a keg of beer to be given to the extra men needed to hoist the massive block
to the surface intact. But after the miner spent days carefully extracting the piece,

Figure 1.1 Southern Midwest Coal Producing Counties 1890-1893 Map adapted from
nationatlas.gov/mapmaker. Accessed January 11, 2014.

he received only five dollars for his toil. Keeping his word when his employer did not,
the miner split the five dollars with his assistant and purchased the promised beer out of
his own earnings. 9
Jack’s and the Kansas miner’s experiences demonstrated two ways in which these
two worlds of wealth met. To a coal miner like Jack, the Mines Building was a source of
9

L.A. Quellmalz to Lorenzo D. Lewelling, July 29, 1893, LDLP, Box 3, Folder 8, KSHS.

7

both pride and vexation, symbolizing the astonishing wealth he produced but could not
obtain. “It is a pity
that every miner could not have been able to visit the mines building in the World’s fair,”
the frustrated miner wrote to the United Mine Workers’ Journal. He wanted all miners to
see that their products were needed and their labors unappreciated. It did not seem fair,
one Illinois mine laborer’s wife agreed. The nation depended upon the miners’ labors
“and yet,” she grumbled, “the miner today is thought very little above the brute.” 10
The Kansas miner’s story seemed to confirm the validity of the wife’s claim, yet
his experience demonstrated a second way these worlds of wealth met. The need to
maintain this abundance caused companies to over-invest in raw material production,
lowering material prices, making it impossible to pay their workers like the Kansas miner
the wages they were promised. Indeed, after spending over $30,000 to construct its palace
of coal, the owners of the Ottumwa, Iowa, Coal Palace were forced to sell “Ottumwa’s
Pride” at public auction for $3,000 barely one year after its official opening. 11 Coal was
at the heart of progress, but, as the Mines Building demonstrated, it was pumped out of
nearly every corner of the earth, shipped further, and in greater volumes than the
burgeoning industrial societies could consume. Coal was everywhere and, like the miner,
it was undervalued. 12

10

“A Mine Workers’ Wife” letter to the editor, “A Miner’s Wife,” UMWJ, December 22, 1892.
“Ottumwa’s Pride to Open,” Des Moines Register, September 15, 189; “Coal Palace,” The Des Moines
Register, December 2, 1891.
12
Edward Atkinson, a businessman and industrialist commissioned by President Grover Cleveland to
investigate the state of financial centers in Europe reported that the global trade values of coal in relation to
Germany had fallen from 27.46 Marks per kilo in 1873 to 11.88 Marks in 1886. In comparison, wheat fell
from 25.94 Marks to 15.06 Marks in that same period. Edward Atkinson, “Report Made by Edward
Atkinson… Upon the Present Status of Bimetalism in Europe, October 1887,” 50th Congress, 1st Session,
Senate Executive Document No. 34 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887) p. 229, 244, 275;
Tim O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Tim Concludes,” UMWJ, October 26, 1893; “Jack,” letter to the editor,
11

8

Rural producers like Jack, the Kansas miner, and the miner’s wife were well
aware of these forces that continually increased coal and crop production while the
products’ monetary value continued to decline, despite their necessity in the industrial
age. It was why Jack wanted every miner in the world to visit the Fair to see not only the
world’s dependence on the producer’s toil, but “the power he holds if he only would use
it.” 13 But most miners did not use the power Jack described. In fact, as Jack wandered the
exhibits of the 1893 World’s Fair, the “mine workers’ union,” officially known as the
United Mine Workers of America (UMW) was barely three years old and nearly dead.
Farmers’ Alliances and other rural producer organizations were husks of the once vibrant
organizations that seemed to hold such promise in the mid-1880s throughout the South
and Midwest. Workers simply were not interested in organization, Illinois mine worker
organizer Pat Donnelly observed. “There is no reason in God’s World why Illinois mine
workers should have less than 10,000 members in a union,” he wrote of the 30,000
miners who labored in his home state in 1893. 14 But instead of 10,000 members, Illinois
had less than 3,000. 15
What caused this lack of interest in organization? This is the question this
dissertation seeks to answer. Farmers and miners throughout the southern Midwest
coalfields of western Kentucky, southwestern Indiana, Illinois, southern Iowa, northern
Missouri, and eastern Kansas were all exploited. Miners were seldom paid regularly or in
cash, were forced to shop at company-owned stores, and compelled to rent company
homes or purchase their own. Farmers, facing high taxes, high mortgages, and low crop
“A Castigation,” UMWJ, November 9, 1893 “A Mine Worker’s Wife” letter to the editor, “A Miner’s
Wife,” UMWJ, December 22, 1892.
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profits did not fare any better. As the nation faced the greatest economic depression in its
history, miners and farmers alike were debt-ridden and hard-pressed to make ends meet.
But instead of organizing into an “Industrial Crusade” that Donnelly and dozens of other
farm and labor leaders advocated, the nation’s potential “producer army” remained
overwhelmingly uninterested in the cause. 16
Historians have long acknowledged this inability to unite, but disagree over how
tight bonds were between farmers and laborers, as well as the reasons for their
organizational failures in the late nineteenth century. Lawrence Goodwyn claimed that
organized labor was too weak and undeveloped to create a movement culture that would
allow workers to ally with Populist farmers. Robert McMath and others disagreed,
noting the vibrancy of organized labor and its involvement in similar farmer-labor
coalitions in the years leading up to the Populist push. Such a legacy prompted Matthew
Hild to argue that farmers and laborers did form a strong alliance, but that this alliance
could not overcome the other factors that inhibited movement, namely the pervasive
racism that undermined Populist strength. 17
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Such sentiments not only undermined the strength of farmer-labor alliances, but,
as many historians of farmer and labor movements have claimed, also weakened
individual farm and labor organizations. Gwendolyn Mink and others have observed that
the growing diversity among workers made it increasingly difficult for wage earners to
unite as a solid oppositional force. Similar sentiments fractured farmers’ organizations
and caused black farmers to form their own independent Colored Alliance when the
Farmers’ Alliances forbid black membership. 18
These issues were compounded by additional factors that sapped union strength.
The well-documented competition between labor leaders regarding whether trades,
industrial, or labor unions would best care for workers’ needs further divided an already
comparatively small rank and file. Robert Weir and others likewise noted that divisions
within single organizations further crippled their effectiveness. 19 Meanwhile, the also

18
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well-documented employer and government hostility toward labor and agricultural
organizations crushed both union and cooperative alike. 20
Historians such as Bruce Laurie, Richard Oestreicher, and others have argued that
these factors inhibited more than organizational effectiveness. The limitations created
through workers’ ethnic divides, simplification of trades, organizational infighting, and
employer or government hostility also affected what members and union leaders believed
they could achieve. Organizations adopted a method of what Laurie called “prudential
unionism,” that made goals more conservative than they had been in the past. Likewise,
Oestreicher found that those who joined organizations expecting major gains became
disillusioned when the orders fell short of their expectations. This awareness of obstacles
preventing union success created what sociologist Kim Voss called a “cognitive
encumbrance” that caused workers to lose faith in labor organizing and abandon their
orders. 21
Recent scholars, however, tend to see this period as one not necessarily of union
decline, but of business and labor organizations learning how to function in a new
industrial age. Although they acknowledged the limitations unions faced, the instability
of a new industrialized market system dependent upon trade networks and transport upset
old ways, creating a kind of instability in market negotiations that gave workers such as
20
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miners, considerable bargaining power. Richard White, Andrew Arnold, and others have
demonstrated that workers, far from powerless, inserted themselves into the ongoing
power struggle between coal operators and railroaders for control of the coal industry. In
the process, they helped shape business negotiations and labor relationships that laid the
foundation for modern day business and labor dealings. 22
Taken together, the studies of union decline as well as unions’ place in a changing
market structure demonstrate both the weaknesses and strengths of organized labor in the
Gilded Age. Still, the overwhelming focus on organized workers has greatly narrowed
our understanding of what working class life looked like in industrializing America,
implying that only organized workers embodied the spirit of working class reform. Nonorganized workers, then, become an anomaly. If organization was the only way to protest
low wages and poor working conditions, most Gilded Age workers would seem to have
accepted defeat, became complacent in poverty, and did not try to improve their
conditions. These conclusions trickle into the work of contemporary journalists, activists,
and scholars who observe that despite living in a “Second Gilded Age,” union numbers
remain low. Workers, they claim, “vote against their interests” in elections, seemingly
tricked, either by their employers or political party platforms, into supporting candidates
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who care little for the working class. 23 Such assessments imply that workers, both in the
first Gilded Age and today, are easily misled, apathetic to the problems they face, and are
not capable of discerning what is best for them or their families. 24
But Jack’s experience at the World’s Fair indicates otherwise. Far from unaware
of the global forces on Gilded Age industry and economics, this coal miner from Illinois
understood quite readily that the coal he mined sat beside coal from all over the world. 25
All of it, from the Pennsylvania samples to those from New South Wales were shipped
easily to Chicago, a city far removed from oceanic ports. More importantly, Jack knew
that although to most patrons the samples presented all looked to same, very important
differences affected their worth. Some industries found Pennsylvania anthracite more
useful than the softer bituminous coal mined nearly everywhere else in the United States.
Even among bituminous coals, the materials fused in with the coal, how fast it burned,
and the amount of smoke it produced when burning created a graduated scale of qualities
that affected the value. 26 These factors were complicated by other logistical concerns
such as the amount of labor needed to mine the coal and the cost of shipping it to market,
creating a “scale” that dictated how much coal miners earned for mining in a particular
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region. Such distinctions had always existed within the coal industry, but Jack and miners
throughout the nation understood that the market that placed their coal side by side and in
competition with other regions also pitted miners in a competition with each other. Those
who mined coal for the lowest prices would produce the cheapest coal, allowing their
mines to sell more. Mines that sold the most could afford to stay open full time yearround, ensuring miners steady work, even if it was for a depreciated wage.
But not all miners were affected by the national market in the same way. As
Illinois, Indiana, and western Kentucky were pulled into competition with Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and West Virginia, other mining regions, such as the railroad-owned mines in
Missouri and Kansas were only indirectly affected by market competition. Their
concerns, which were distinct from those competing for national markets, caused an eastwest divide to become more pronounced in unionizing efforts. As organizers focused on
creating a national pay scale in the competitive districts, miners west of the Mississippi
did not see how such efforts met their immediate needs. Miners in Indiana’s “block” coal
field voiced similar cries of neglect. As a type of coal more valuable than typical
bituminous coal mined elsewhere in the southern Midwest, block coal miners’ wages and
concerns differed from those in the rest of the competitive district. Despite its differences,
however, the block field was classified as part of the Indiana bituminous district and, like
Missouri and Kansas, was often forced to accept UMW wage terms that applied more to
bituminous mines in the competitive fields than to those west of the Mississippi or the
mines of Clay County, Indiana. As a result, in different ways, the national coal market
dictated nearly every aspect of the mining industry even if a region’s coal did not enter
the competitive market.
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Labor organizers claimed that this connection between regions and miners
demanded that all mine workers from West Virginia to Kansas work together. If miners
could organize into a national “union,” they could regulate wages and working
conditions. But such a term can be misleading. Although late-nineteenth century workers
used the term “union” freely, their understanding of unionism differed greatly from the
unionism that grew in the twentieth century. Like many fraternal organizations of the
period, groups like the Knights of Labor and Patrons of Husbandry fused moral
understandings with their understandings of how society should function, allowing these
orders to be as much fraternal and social clubs as they were laborer organizations. In
addition to committing to overarching goals like abolishing the wage system and
establishing cooperatives, Knights were to abstain from alcohol and quoted Biblical
scripture in meetings. In the workplace, they observed “honest principles” of not stealing
or undercutting fellow workers and working together for the collective good. Such moral
components carried over into other farmer and laborer organizations as well.
Organizations like the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers, the National
Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers or the Farmers’ Alliances all professed
moral and at times even religious conviction to their tenets. Consequently, a moral
obligation undergirded union affiliation so that to organizers and dedicated organized
rank and file workers a true “union man” was not only a member of a labor organization,
but also one who lived and labored with moral conviction. Conversely, when organizers
or rank and file members identified someone as “non-union,” their claim implied that the
worker rejected union membership and its principles. To go against the union, then, was
to act immorally.
27
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But in the late nineteenth century, national unions tended to be more abstract and
feeble than the ideologies they claimed to embody. Often, national labor organizations
were barely functioning orders with more ambition than strength. Leadership, though
claiming authority over the rank and file masses were seldom more than figureheads who
preached the ideologies of labor unionism with few practical means to implement.28
As national labor leaders waged a war with labor ideology, many workers, both
outside and in organization ranks, held a more complicated yet pragmatic view of
unionism. Although the coal market operated on a national scale, wages and working
conditions were still dramatically influenced by regional issues such as unique mining
conditions in each mine, or a mine’s specific cost to ship its coal to market.
Consequently, local organizers, pit committees, checkweighmen, and other local leaders
who represented the miners’ interest in the workplace influenced miners’ decisions more
than the national organizations. These pit committees and checkweighmen were not
always union leaders, but simply experienced miners well-known and respected in the
mining community. As a result, union involvement was already a secondary factor in
negotiations between miners and boss. Most miners saw organization as one of many
ways to take care of themselves and their families. Whereas labor leaders stressed the
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importance of year-round union membership and dedication to protect miners from wage
decline or lax enforcement of labor legislation, many workers saw membership as a tool
to secure immediate goals. For miners, this caused union numbers to increase in April
and May when yearly wage contracts were signed and strikes were most likely to occur.
These part-time members as well as those who refused to join the union entirely rejected
the notion that the only “good men” were those who resided in union ranks. They were
quick to point out that, despite leaders’ claims, union membership did not denote
“honest” labor. Rather, plenty of union members disregarded the “honest principles” they
professed or rejected leader orders. Likewise, “good men” upheld “honest labor
principles” without ever joining union ranks. Such instances prompted many local
organizers to insist that hundreds of workers had the “spirit of unionism” even if they did
not carry its card. 29
Perhaps not surprisingly, the distinction between union and non-union grew
increasingly muddled as market competition intensified in the final decades of the
nineteenth century. One mine labor organizer noted that the miners were like unsorted or
“mine run” coal, a pressurized mix of slate, clay, and silt, fused with the coal as it was
pulled from the earth. They were “run of the mine” men, the organizer explained, because
like the coal they extracted, their identities were muddled and blurred together, leading
them to seemingly contradictory actions. 30 They advocated dependence as they clamored
for freedom, professed notions of honor and dignity while describing themselves as
29

“Wigs, The Kid,” letter to the editor, “Mining Notes,” UMWJ, January 4, 1894; M. Commesky, letter to
the editor, “From Indiana,” UMWJ, April 23, 1891; Dan McLaughlin, letter to the editor, “From the
Districts,” UMJW, September 24, 1891; “Dhroleen,” letter to the editor, “Indian Territory,” UMWJ,
October 20, 1892; George Gorham Groat, An Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1916), 455-458.
30
Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “Report from Linton, Ind.,” United Mine Workers’ Journal, May 28,
1891.

18

unhuman, claimed to be moral when breaking strikes, and expressed an unyielding hope
for their futures even as they proclaimed their despair.

Blind Spots
Historians have long noted the radicalism inherent in late nineteenth an early
twentieth century organizations. 31 Such a focus on the most radical adherents to unions,
however, may make analyses of labor organizations cleaner and much less messy, but it
ultimately misconstrues nature of late nineteenth century working class life, creating
substantial blind spots in studies of late nineteenth century organizing. First, this attention
to worker radicalism, particularly through union or political mobilization, reflects a
tendency to select and extract aspects of working class life without considering the
variegated nature of workers’ identities. Laborers who do not fit the worker radicalism
mold, such as those who rejected labor organizations or who openly opposed labor
legislation are frequently overlooked. Only the workers most dedicated to labor
organizing are examined. By allowing only the most dedicated and radical voices to
speak for the entire working class, our understanding of labor becomes skewed and,
given the faith in organizing espoused by these workers, organizational failure becomes
more difficult to explain. Emphasis on the radical minority makes it seem larger and
more vibrant so that membership surges appear higher and membership decline to appear
more dramatic than it actually was.
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This exclusive focus on labor organization members leads to a second blind spot
in studies of labor organizing. While examining membership numbers or dues rates to
monitor how membership grew or shrank in a given period can be useful, it can also
make the organization appear more steadfast than it truly was. High membership or high
dues are frequently taken to indicate a kind of worker “solidarity” that presumably came
from common experiences binding workers together while low numbers or low dues
payments indicate “fragmentation” or growing differences between workers that
eventually dissolves worker bonds and the organization that supports them. 32 In a general
sense, this assessment is correct, but it also overstates the commitment and cohesion of
union members whose “membership” was always tentative and conditional. Such
analyses leave little room for rank and file members who were dissatisfied with
organizational leadership, disobeyed organizational orders, or behaved contrary to its
advocated principles. Without examining the fragmentation that was endemic among the
rank and file, the organization appears more solid and united than it truly was, creating a
larger disparity between organized and non-organized workers.
Finally, focusing only on organized members often causes scholars to examine
one specific organization or industry rather than placing the organization in a broader
context both within the labor movement as well as society. As Matthew Hild has shown,
this exclusive focus on one industry or organization has caused historians to create a false
dichotomy between farmer and labor organizing and political efforts. 33 Connections
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between occupations or organizations forged outside the meeting hall are therefore
hidden, skewing our understanding of how rank and file workers interacted with each
other and the organizations that claimed to represent their interests. For the thousands of
farmers who worked in the mines during the winter months, these intersections were a
critical part of life, even though they seldom called themselves “miners” and rarely joined
the miners’ organizations year-round.
“Run of the Mine” seeks to restore the messiness and confusion within late
nineteenth century organizing efforts by examining all aspects associated with it instead
of focusing on organizations or their most devoted members. In particular, this
dissertation considers the hundreds of thousands of workers who remained outside
organizational ranks and those within the ranks that questioned organizational tactics,
leadership, and decisions. Looking beyond those who carried union cards reveals that a
wider range of working class mobilization existed and that was part of a more complex
working class life and culture than historians usually describe. It pulls together workers in
seemingly disparate industries, such as farming and mining and includes groups like
strikebreakers, stockholders, mine managers, and small business owners whose worlds
overlapped in complicated ways.
This wider scope also pulls in actions of rural workers’ wives who were seldom
union members themselves, regardless of their husbands’ union affiliations. Because
women like miners’ wives could not work in the mines, they could not join industrial
unions like those in the mining industry. Until unions formed auxiliaries in the twentieth
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century, these women had no official relationship with their husbands’ unions. 34 As such,
historians have been slow to recognize women’s contributions to the development or
failure of male-dominated unions in the late-nineteenth century. Like traditional labor
studies, examinations of workers’ wives tend to imply that wives’ union activism began
only with official organizational affiliation in the twentieth century, overlooking wives’
constant but informal involvement decades earlier.
The few scholars that have considered nineteenth century workers’ wives largely
depict them as followers rather than forceful decision-makers. They highlight supportive
actions such as taunting strikebreakers and seldom offer examples of independent or
sustained involvement in the late-nineteenth century labor movement. Consequently,
even in this literature, wives only rallied during periods of strife and were uninvolved in
union decisions. 35
As historians of farmers’ movements have observed, however, distinctions
between “public” and “domestic” spheres were not as clear as this scholarship implies.
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Rural wives were intimately involved in family financial affairs, often helping earn
income and save money. For farm wives, this allowed them to join and participate in
organizations like the Grange and Farmers’ Alliances. 36 These women gave lectures at
Grange and Alliance meetings, voted on organizational matters, and as Julie Roy Jeffery
observed, regularly voiced their opinions in newspapers like the Progressive Farmer. 37
Such interest in activities typically associated with the “male sphere” also carried over
into national politics. Although most women could not vote in the late-nineteenth
century, wives and daughters took an active interest in political affairs, campaigning for
their candidates of choice, debating political questions in local newspapers, and even
wrote to political figureheads to help shape campaign agendas. 38 Elsa Berkley Brown
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likewise found that newly enfranchised black working class families decided together
which way to cast the husband’s vote in elections. 39
These instances indicate that women retained a degree of influence in both
politics and labor despite not officially having a right to vote or a job title separate from
their husbands. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, rural wage earner wives like miners’ wives
also participated in union decisions even though they were officially barred from
membership. Although they never entered the coal mine, wives were intimately aware of
the workplace issues and wage problems that affected the mining industry. To them,
mining, like farming, was a lifestyle that pulled in all members of the family. Miners’ and
farmers’ wives, were responsible for helping family finances, allowing them to call
themselves “miners” without touching a pick. As a result, wives in both industries took
an interest in labor organizing and helped their husbands decide whether or not to join.
Those who cast their lot with the labor organization readily wrote to organizational
newspapers like the National Labor Tribune or United Mine Workers Journal,
participating in debates. Moreover, their forcefully expressed opinions about
organizational affairs were entertained as valid and valued proposals from members of
these organizations, allowing women to shape union actions and agendas without ever
entering the meeting hall. In light of this, the bold women typically cast as anomalies in
the male political world such as Annie Diggs, Mary Lease, or Mary Harris “Mother”
Jones are more typical than previously understood. Consequently, no study of labor
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organizing is complete without careful consideration of wives’ contribution to
organizational decisions.
Because the trade newspapers typically gave equal voice to women and people of
color, they became a forum that allowed a freer discussion of thoughts and opinions than
likely would have been tolerated in other arenas where physical differences were more
apparent. Although women, immigrant, and black writers frequently identified
themselves as such in their letters, these differences mattered less when their letters
appeared in the newspaper. 40 Instead, most tended to treat the letters as though all the
writers were white and male unless discussing issues of race and immigration. This
essentially allowed conversations to flow across divisions of race and gender as
participants discussed the most pressing problems of the mining industry and the miners’
organizations. Due to the anonymity associated with late-nineteenth century letter writers,
it is not always possible to discern whether writers were male or female, black or white.
When possible, I distinguish between men and women writers simply because men
typically had the firsthand experience in describing workplace conditions or events that
transpired during a union meeting whereas wives’ reports could only be hearsay.
Similarly, because black, immigrant, and native-born white miners’ experiences and
grievances with their employers and union leaders were similar, I do not identify miner
ethnicity in most chapters. This is because regardless of their ethnicity, the letter writers’
complaints come from their experiences as miners first and foremost and they speak on
behalf of the entire industry, regardless of ethnic background. The exception to this is
when miners clearly speak on behalf of one particular ethnicity or voice concerns and
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experiences clearly related to their identities as black or immigrant miners. In these cases
where ethnic background is relevant, I identify a miner’s race or ethnicity.
Such inclusion in a union forum make newspapers a valuable source in
understanding non-unionism in the late nineteenth century. Like many other industries,
coal miners’ and their labor organizations relied on newspapers to report information
quickly and reliably to a population of workers spread across the rural countryside. State
organizers and leaders frequently maintained official columns in the National Labor
Tribune and United Mine Workers’ Journal that reported organizing success and failure,
meeting minutes, and topics up for debate at national meetings. For miners wishing to
locate better paying work, letters to the editors of labor newspapers like the National
Labor Tribune or United Mine Workers’ Journal provided a way for miners to report
wages and working conditions in their mines, whether the boss was fair, or whether the
mine was on strike. Such information proved valuable to miners who traveled from mine
to mine searching for work, but also allowed miners to voice their grievances and use the
newspaper columns to carry on nationwide discussions of how to remedy their common
problems.
Such a forum for airing grievances, however, was not limited to miners frustrated
with wages or working conditions. They also used the newspapers to discuss problems
within their own labor organizations. Workers upset with officers or wished to see change
in union structure frequently wrote to these same newspapers to discuss how to resolve
organizational problems as well as those of the workplace. This trend, which had existed
since the 1870s as miners’ organizations formed and faltered, continued when the United
Mine Workers established its Journal in 1891. By then, miners had developed a
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longstanding mistrust for labor leadership that grew particularly strong as UMW officers
also served as the editors of the organization’s official organ. To remedy this, UMW
officers and Journal editors insisted on a strict promise to publish all letters submitted to
the newspaper, regardless of how critical they were of the miners’ organization. 41 Such
an effort, designed to build the miners’ trust for the organization, made the Journal a
unique place for members and non-members to voice their frustrations against the UMW,
its leaders, and its policies. Consequently, the letters printed in the pages of these labor
papers are integral to understanding how and why rank-and-file support for workers’
organizations like the UMW broke down in the Gilded Age.
This study focuses on the coal industry in the rural southern Midwest states of
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas for several reasons. Contrary to popular
conceptions of industry, most of the Gilded Age industrial workforce lived and worked in
regions that were more rural than urban. Mining, railroad work, sawmills, turpentine
making, and much of the metalmaking industries all took place in rural regions, meaning
that most Gilded Age industrial workers resided and worked in small towns scattered
throughout the countryside. 42 Secondly, although the southern Midwest was deeply tied
both to the national competitive coal market and the railroad industry, few histories
consider the region’s mining history. In this region, mining often took place beside—or
under—farm fields, allowing labor organizing to coincide with the farm organization
efforts that swept portions of the southern Midwest in the 1890s. Third, as Gilded Age
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prices declined, coal was often at the head of this decline, forcing prices in other
industries down as well. While this was ideal for industrialists desiring cheap steel and
consumers who wanted more affordable products, it also continually pulled down miners’
wages. By 1896, coal miners made roughly sixty-eight percent of what the average
manufactory worker earned. 43 If any industry had the grievances to bind a workforce
together in a solid labor organization, coal would be among the likeliest of candidates. In
addition, although it was extremely dangerous work and often demanded precision and
care, coal mining was largely semi-skilled labor learned on the job without prior
experience. Coal mining therefore better reflects the 1880s and 1890s workforce that
grew increasingly unskilled rather than the skilled workers frequently examined in labor
studies. The fact that coal mining was unskilled/semi-skilled labor also eliminated some
of the unionbusting tactics employers used. Anyone who wanted to mine coal could do so
without any prior training or experience, learning the trade as they performed it.
Employers or “operators” paid the same wage regardless of skill or ethnicity so that all
workers shared the same experiences, dangers, and earnings with no stratification as
appeared in many other industries to thwart worker organizations. 44
All of these factors should have helped create a strong miners’ union, and in some
respects, historians have claimed that it did. When the Knights of Labor mining trade
assembly merged with the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers to
form United Mine Workers (UMW) formed in January 1890, the new miners’
43
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organization claimed to have over 34,000 in its ranks. Historians of the organization cite
this number and frequently jump forward to the late 1890s when the UMW made its first
major gains as a labor organization under the direction of UMW President and former
Illinois miner John Mitchell. Those that do consider the period focus more on union
leadership learning the importance of “disciplining union members.” 45 Such claims
imply that the UMW was numerically strong, but that the rank and file simply lacked the
discipline to obey leadership. But the trouble the UMW faced extended beyond leaders’
inability to control their ranks and miners’ actions in the late nineteenth century were
caused by far more than a lack of discipline. Rather, most of the nation’s miners
remained outside the organization and still more abandoned the union when membership
proved unbeneficial. By 1892, the UMW was in a steep decline that only continued
despite organizer efforts to revive the order.

Examining the Non-Union Spirit
This dissertation also examines why a strong coalition of mine workers never
formed in the nineteenth century. Pulling primarily from mine workers’ and wives’ own
letters, it explores the lives and decisions rural workers made, giving careful attention to
the factors that influenced whether a mining family supported the miners’ unions. As a
result, this dissertation puts forward four main arguments. First and foremost, it argues
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that distinctions between farmer, business owner, investor, wage earner, and wife were
not as separate as scholars have implied. Rather, these identities overlapped considerably
in the late nineteenth century in ways that directly impacted family life, incomes, and
behavior. Second, it demonstrates that workers were well aware of the economic forces
that dictated work conditions and wages as well as what successful collective action
could potentially achieve. Third, it maintains that worker rejection of formal unions did
not denote a dislike for union principle. Instead, workers and wives formed their own
objectives and concepts of unionism that did not always fit with union agendas or
allowed them to affiliate with two seemingly different unions simultaneously.
Consequently, the divisions emphasized between organizations like the Knights of Labor
and the American Federation of Labor were more important to union leadership than to
the rank and file. Finally, this dissertation argues that workers failed to join unions not
because they were apathetic about their conditions or disillusioned with unionism, but
because they believed that the labor organizations did not adequately address their most
pressing needs and desires.
To present these key points, I examine five events that did not happen. A national
union that never united, union miners who failed to strike, a planned strike that never
occurred, a union that failed to accept all who carried membership cards, and a putative
victory that looked more like defeat are the focal points of the five chapters that comprise
this work. Each non-event highlights a distinct aspect that contributed to worker rejection
of labor organizations or decisions to disobey union leader orders. The next chapter offers
a brief overview of late nineteenth century business and producer responses to it. It shows
that producer concerns that figures with authority were deceiving average people and
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taking advantage of them ultimately generated mistrust for labor leadership. Although
leaders in the Knights of Labor and the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers
insisted that these problems would fade when the two organizations merged into a single
national miners’ union, these concerns of fraud and deception ultimately caused workers
to reject the new order so that despite much fanfare and promise of cooperation, the
united miners’ union did not form.
The third chapter looks more closely at the rural workers’ world. Although they
criticized the hypocrisy and greed of businessmen, investors, politicians, and ministers
who took advantage of workers, many of these workers committed the very acts they
condemned. This chapter examines the overlap between farmers, miners, and investing,
demonstrating that miners not only understood business concepts of profit, but that
looking out for one’s own interest was infectious. Workers, like businessmen, often set
aside union principles when it was more advantageous to break a strike or work for less
pay than the union demanded. While union leaders were supposed to push for higher
wages for workers, such pushes did not always occur. This chapter ends with an
examination of an instance where after encouraging miners to strike for higher wages,
labor leaders backed away from their claims and told miners to accept a wage reduction.
As non-union miners went on strike for an “honest wage,” organized miners, under leader
orders broke the strike. As a result, lines between “union” and “non-union” became
blurred.
Chapter Four continues with this theme of worker dissatisfaction with a close
examination of the effects of a strike that never occurred. Despite constant campaigning
and advertising for a nationwide strike for the eight-hour workday set to begin on May 1,
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1891, union officers called off the strike at the last minute, claiming that the newly
formed United Mine Workers (UMW) was too weak to achieve its goal. The following
months marked the beginning of steep membership decline that came not from miners’
disillusion with unionism in general, but a firm belief that UMW leaders had “backslid”
from the principles they were supposed to uphold. As a result, miners throughout the
nation not only left the UMW, but formed new miners’ organizations that rivaled the
national order. Although labor leaders insisted that those who turned their backs to the
UMW were the true “backsliders,” the workers’ actions indicated that their faith in
unionism did not waver even if their faith in labor organizers did.
While Chapter Four examines those who turned their back to major labor
organizations, Chapter Five focuses on the workers who claimed national unions like the
UMW turned their backs to them. Although organizations like the Knights of Labor and
United Mine Workers claimed to accept workers of all races, religions, and ethnic
backgrounds, such inclusion never truly occurred. This chapter therefore explores those
who were on the fringes of labor organizing, who did not completely fit with the white
male miner profile. Black, non-native-English-speaking miners, farmers who worked in
the mines, and miners’ wives who did not work in the mines were associated with the
miners’ unions in ways different from the white males who dominated the order. This
chapter examines the grievances unique to these outlier groups, giving careful attention to
how factors of ethnicity affected worker expectations for the unions that claimed to
represent their interests. Careful examination of labor legislation pursued by groups like
the UMW indicate that despite their claims for inclusion, native-English-speaking whitedominated labor organizations were uninterested in promoting racial and ethnic equality
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in the workplace or society. This disregard for racial and ethnic concerns pushed many
black and non-English-speaking miners away from the order and at times caused them to
form their own rival unions. Such instances show that white women and white farmers
were more accepted by the miners’ orders than the non-white and non-native-Englishspeaking miners of the trade.
The sixth chapter turns away from the workplace and looks at workers’
understanding of union leaders’ responsibilities and dedication to the workers’ interests.
It focuses specifically on the outcome of the 1894 bituminous miners’ strike when over
100,000 bituminous coal miners set down their tools in hopes of earning a higher wage.
With UMW membership only measuring 13,000 at the time of the strike, union officials
and miners alike marveled at the turnout that almost entirely shut down bituminous coal
production. The massive numbers caused both miner and organizer to believe that victory
was certain, but as farmers and other workers entered the mines to fill the national coal
demand, UMW leaders ended the strike and settled for a wage less than what the miners
desired. Miners questioned leader dedication to the workers’ cause. Although leaders
insisted that the small wage increase the workers secured was still a victory, the miners
disagreed. This chapter, then, examines the outcome of a strike victory that appeared on
paper, but not in the mines. As charges of UMW leader corruption surfaced, organized
miners overthrew their leadership in an effort to “purify” their decaying union. Their
efforts coincided with other organizations’ efforts to revive their own orders, which
ultimately led to the Knights of Labor ending its alliance with the UMW, and prompted
union miners, along with workers in other industries, to form a new organization that
would rival the Knights. While leaders of these fracturing orders fought over the
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remaining scraps of their failing unions, thousands of workers questioned why they
should join an organization more interested in fighting other labor organizations than
improving workers’ lives. As a result, as union leaders “sold out” the miners’ interests,
workers turned in their union cards, believing they had a better chance of taking care of
their families without it.
In the end worker rejection of unions or union leadership is neither a sign of
unwillingness to care for “their interests” nor unique to the Gilded Age. Rather, the “nonunion spirit” that ran rampant in southern Midwest mines reflected a disconnection
between labor organizations and the rank and file they represented that can be found in
all industries an in all time periods, including the present day. What follows is a story of
those, like Jack, who worked in and was worked by the worlds of wealth that fueled the
Gilded Age. But it is also a story of hope and despair, of community and division, and of
union and non-union that are mixed and fused together in ways that cannot be separated.
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Chapter Two
Imposters: Markets, Deception, and the 1888 Union Merger

Edgar Simpson had just sat down to supper when the alarm whistle pierced the
quiet Kansas countryside. The thirty-two-year-old iron smelter froze. Having worked as a
coal and metal miner in Colorado and Kansas before joining the smelting trade, he knew
the alarm signaled an accident at one of the mines. Within minutes, a young boy, running
over a mile and a quarter through sleet and freezing rain, had burst into Simpson’s home
and exclaimed “that mine number 2 had blown up and everybody in it.” Upon hearing the
news, Simpson ran to join the rescue effort. Without breathing a word, he “got up and got
my pit coat and… struck out for number 2.” 1
It was already dusk when Simpson reached Frontenac Mine No. 2 a half an hour
after the explosion, but as he peered through the sleet and rain, he stood in awe of the
chaos. The November 1888 explosion tore through the earth, creating rifts in the soil. It
blew out the fan house, moving it two feet from its foundation. It shattered the hoist and
shot out blazing timbers, which lay smoldering around the shaft. Haggard wives stood
planted with their children by the shaft despite the winter storm, screaming for someone
to enter the mine while local men and miners from nearby towns worked frantically to
clear airways and rig a new hoist. 2
Everyone knew the mine’s breathable air was running out, but it still took
Simpson and the other rescuers hours to reach the bottom of the shaft. Enduring the
1
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searing heat, smoke, and mine gas, the party worked until three in the morning, moving
methodically down the mine track replacing timbers, clearing air passages, and searching
rooms for survivors. 3 Amid the debris, Simpson discovered the charred body of John
Baptiste Labecq, burned beyond recognition. 4 The thirty-one-year-old miner’s hair was
“singed to a crisp; the flesh singed to a crisp.” But to Simpson, the most memorable
damage was caused by Labecq’s poorly-fit clothing. His shirt, Simpson explained, “was
too short for him and it left a band of flesh exposed between it and his pants.” While
Labecq’s ill-fitting clothing always made labor in the mines more difficult, it had
especially distressing effects in the explosion. In the blast that melted dinner pails and
soldering, Labecq’s unprotected skin burned instantly. Not realizing this, Simpson tried
to move the miner by grabbing what he mistook as Labecq’s leather belt “and the flesh
came off in my hands.” 5
The circumstances that created Labecq’s “belt” demonstrated how national
markets, company authority, and unsafe working conditions had an impact on every
aspect of a miner’s life. Rural mines like Frontenac No. 2 were often spread apart for
miles, making it difficult for mine inspectors to check mines or enforce mining laws. 6
Mine owners took advantage of the lax law enforcement and decreased production costs
by ignoring safety protocol like wetting dry mines to prevent coal dust from hanging in
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the air. 7 To lower wages they hired inexperienced miners, such as Jimmy Wilson. The
seventeen-year-old farmer’s son was hired as a mule driver, but when the company
ordered the mine to increase production, the mine boss put Wilson to work digging coal. 8
During the evening blast to loosen the coal, Wilson packed his “shot” improperly. His
blast backfired, ignited the coal dust in the dry mine, and shot fire down the corridors. It
incinerated Labecq’s flesh that was exposed because the company store he was
compelled to shop at did not sell properly-fitting clothing he could afford. Lacodia
Labecq later identified her husband’s charred body by this peculiar burn, but she, like
many wives, could not afford a proper burial. 9 Instead, John Labecq and many of the
other fifty-six men and boys killed in the explosion were buried in an unmarked mass
grave. 10
The company, then, dictated not only how Labecq worked but also how he lived
and died. In their efforts to increase profits, companies discounted miners’ safety and
lives, turning them into replaceable parts. Employers used company stores, debt, and a
host of other techniques, forcing miners to risk their lives for company gain.
Many of those who labored in the mines saw this treatment as part of a larger
problem that plagued the nation. They were members of an enormous body of
“producers” who toiled to provide the wealth that went to someone else. As coal and crop
7
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prices fell, miner and farmer earnings decreased drastically. Meantime, they watched
their employers, bankers, merchants, and stockholders grow wealthier. Thousands of
farmers and laborers throughout the southern Midwest understood that they were little
more than “slaves.” In their employers’ eyes, they became “brutes,” “things,” and “mice”
whose lives were expendable. 11
But, like Labecq’s belt, the way things seemed was not as they actually were.
Edgar Simpson understood this when he grabbed for a leather belt and instead felt the
miner’s flesh tear away from his body. The miner’s bare skin showed the company’s
disregard for his life and demonstrated on a fundamental level how grotesque and
disturbing this relationship between employer and employee was. Employers and much
of Gilded Age upper and middle class society may have regarded the poorer classes as
immoral and untrustworthy beings, but producers saw themselves as honorable and
upright. Men and women such as those who spent the long, wintry night at the Frontenac
shaft stood in stark contrast to their employers. Instead of working for profit, men like
Simpson walked away from their supper and spent days rescuing his neighbors while
miners from other towns sacrificed their own pay and risked their lives for men they had
never met.
The producers of Frontenac believed they were the ones who lived upright lives in
a selfish world. They were the ones with hearts, souls, and morals whereas their
employers and the rest of society were the true heartless beings who gambled, lied, and
stole simply to earn more money faster. Such a revelation prompted the Christian
Advocate to call for missionaries to “Christianize the upper masses” rather than focus
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solely on converting the lower classes to Christianity. “If religion is a good thing to make
a servant submissive, why is it not a good thing to make an employer human?” the editors
asked. “If the Christian religion will… prevent miners from deeds of violence, why will it
not also cause mine owners to treat their men as men?” 12
Historians have been careful to highlight the common religious and moral rhetoric
that mobilized producers and earned sympathy and support from middle class
constituents. 13 Less is known about how average farmers and workers understood and
applied these thoughts to their daily lives. For thousands of rural producers like Labecq
or those who viewed and buried his body, the moral injustice they witnessed was far from
rhetorical. To them, the exploitive relationship between those who produced the nation’s
wealth and those who benefited from it was morally wrong and unconstitutional. They
couched their grievances in moral and political terms that continually reaffirmed their
identities as moral citizens and human beings entitled to kindness and fair treatment
rather than disposable tools that had no souls to save.
These beliefs resonated among laborers in multiple occupations who were not
only frustrated with poor treatment, but understood that these conditions would continue
as long as market competition increased. Still, even though organizers emphasized these
points in their speeches, their words were not enough to convince producers to unite and
confront their common foes. Instead, many producers applied their misgivings for
leadership to labor leaders as well, questioning whether they truly cared about the
workers as they claimed. Even as the Frontenac miners buried their dead, two
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organizations vied to be the sole defender of the miners’ interests: the Knights of Labor
and the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers (NFM). As leaders fought to
kill their opposing order, miners found good evidence that worker concerns were
secondary to union survival and demanded that the war between unions stop.
Yet, when leaders of the two orders finally decided to put aside differences and
merge into a single union as their rank and file demanded, thousands of union miners
refused to join. The two unions’ failure to merge was the first in a series of un-makings of
a national movement in the coal industry. This false start came not from workers’ apathy
toward unionism, but from their belief that labor leadership was another facet of Gilded
Age fraud, akin to deceitful businessmen, corrupt politicians, selfish employers, and
money-loving ministers who acknowledged the nation’s producers only enough to exploit
them.

Deceptive Markets
To many rural producers, deceit ran rampant through Gilded Age business and
was epitomized by men like Charles J. Devlin. Born around 1853 to Irish immigrants in
northern Illinois, Devlin grew up in poverty. His mother, Bridget, worked as a
washerwoman and raised her son and his eleven-year-old sister alone. Devlin was
arrested for larceny as a teenager and spent the early years of adulthood in the Illinois
State Penitentiary. Upon his release, he began working as a clerk for a coal company. 14
He climbed the ladder to manager and in 1884, with the financial support of his father-in14
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law, Devlin founded the Spring Valley Coal Company, the start to a vast and wealthy
coal-powered empire. 15 By 1896, Devlin lived in Topeka, Kansas, but his authority in the
coal industry spanned from Illinois to New Mexico and included the Frontenac mine that
exploded in 1888. His influence reached into board rooms in St. Louis and Chicago, New
York City and Boston. The twenty-six companies he owned or managed in the mining,
railroad, real estate, and banking industries made him a millionaire, but his methods of
earning his fortune were not always transparent. 16 Rather, Devlin’s life reflected a
broader trend within Gilded Age business where false fronts, false markets, and false
products generated millions of real dollars.
Devlin’s rise from criminal to coal baron was not due solely to hard work, owning
major corporations, or even savvy investing. Rather, it came from the railroads, eastern
businessmen, and government financers who needed a manager to look after their
companies and investments in rural and western lands. In addition to his father-in-law’s
funds, Devlin received subsidies from local businessmen and railroad operators seeking
to develop Spring Valley. Journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd claimed that several local
railroads worked with Devlin’s Spring Valley Coal Company to control the city’s
development and ensure their businesses received the greatest profits. This growth, Lloyd
asserted, only came with hushed agreements for “special freight rates needed to enable
the ‘enterprise’ to steal the business of its competitors.”17 More importantly, although he
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was one of its founders, Devlin was not the primary shareholder of the Spring Valley
Coal Company. He managed the mines, but Devlin answered to eastern stockholders such
as Democratic Pennsylvania Congressman William L. Scott, who was more than an
investor and politician. His interests tied him to multiple regions and industries, making
him a shipping magnate, New York Stock Exchange operator, railroader, bank president,
and racehorse breeder. To miners, however, he was a “coal king” with mines in
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Illinois, including the Spring Valley Coal Company. 18
Devlin served as Scott’s manager and continued this relationship with other investors
when he moved west and started a new coal company affiliated with the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad (ATSF). There he amassed a fortune while managing the
Devlin Coal Company along with several other coal companies affiliated with the ATSF
railroad. 19
Devlin’s relationship with his employers reflects a critical trend often neglected in
histories of Gilded Age politics and investment. Historians investigating these areas often
focus on the changes taking place at the state and national level. Railroad expansion not
only transformed product shipment and markets, but also opened new doors for investing,
connecting railroaders, mine owners, stockholders, bankers, merchants, and government
officials in complex webs that spanned across multiple states. As Richard White noted in
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many instances, this web was often controlled by the same individuals under a host of
complex business and investment fronts that failed more often than they flourished. 20
Less is known about how these failing fronts operated on the ground level.
Managers like Devlin were integral to Gilded Age investment, handling businesses and
accounts in the rural countryside for employers that lived in urban centers hundreds of
miles away. In cases like the mines Devlin managed for Scott and the ATSF, individual
mines or mining companies were small parts of a larger whole that often teetered on the
edge of bankruptcy. 21 Devlin’s multiple companies were little more than shoddy entities
that moved property between each other to avoid expenses and bankruptcies. 22
Consequently, when the Frontenac miners’ families settled with the Cherokee and
Pittsburg Coal Company eight years after the 1888 explosion, Devlin overdrew the coal
company’s account. Within days, ATSF board members and accountants shuffled funds
to float the Cherokee and Pittsburg $40,000, most of which originated from the ATSF’s
“surplus cash.” 23 When a similar need for cash occurred in 1905, however, the ATSF did
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not come to Devlin’s aid. As the manager, Devlin was responsible for several indebted
companies, nearly four million dollars of missing government and corporate money, and
at least four bank closings in three states. After filing for bankruptcy, Devlin was placed
under investigation and died of a stroke before his case was settled. 24
Although historians have observed how major corporations overextended
themselves and often failed, Devlin’s experience showed that this happened to companies
more often than was publicly known. Despite his close relationship with the railroad, the
ATSF was not implicated and seldom even mentioned in the news stories regarding the
scandal. Even by 1907, two years after Devlin’s failure and death, the investigation had
not untangled the web of Devlin’s business connections and a 1910 article in FUEL
remembered Devlin as a coal magnate who singlehandedly developed the western
coalfields. 25 In reality, he was a railroad employee whose coal interests depended on the
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ATSF. His companies, moreover, appear as isolated entities when they were actually
small parts of vast corporate holdings that spanned the nation.
This national expansion was critical to the coal industry. Unlike other industries
where a handful of corporations dominated the trade, no single corporation had a hold on
the market. Most nineteenth century coal mines in the southern Midwest were hand
mines, or mines that required little industrial equipment and low upfront cost. As long as
a landowner had a means to reach the coal and hoist it out, his coal was as good and as
cheaply produced as the largest mine enterprises. This meant that small-scale coal mines
with ten to thirty miners continually cropped up along the countryside. 26 And as railroads
stretched into the countryside, these mines began shipping their coal to urban markets, for
the first time causing Indiana and Illinois mines to compete with those in Ohio and
western Pennsylvania. The sheer number of mine owners and operators made it
impossible for the nation’s coal operators to organize like other industries that would
control prices or keep unions out. Even if some of the biggest coal kings like William
Scott attempted to set a high coal price, other companies underbid them, rendering any
operator organization powerless to raising profits. 27
Still, if they could not corner the coal market, large operators could undersell it.
By underpricing coal, companies landed more contracts with urban coal dealers and
consumers so that the increased volume of their coal sold absorbed the cut in profit. 28
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Mine owners with vast holdings like William Scott who owned dozens of mines could
shut down a mine or region, relying on other holdings for revenue until mining became
more profitable. In doing so, they could drive out single-mine owners who could not
afford to run their mines with such low profit margins. The result, however, created a
competitive and overstocked national coal market as companies battled for the lowest
prices that would steal coal contracts from competitors. 29
Although farm labor is seldom classified with industrial operations, farmers faced
a similar problem. Like coal, the crops they produced were sold in nationwide markets
that were flooded by the 1880s. Enormous farms consisting of hundreds of thousands of
acres, such as the bonanza farms in the Dakotas, turned farming into a corporatized
industry. These farms, often owned by landowners who lived in the east, were divided
and sub-divided into tracts worked by hundreds of farm laborers who earned daily wages
and were managed by foremen. Similar to miners in company towns, these workers lived
in company-owned boarding houses and some shopped at company stores. The scale of
production enabled bonanza wheat farms to sell their grain at a substantially lower price
than smaller farmers, affecting grain prices throughout the nation. The Missouri Bureau
of Agriculture found that these farms were one of the primary factors in declining grain
prices. Wheat, which averaged $1.14 in Chicago in 1882 fell to $.85 in 1889. Corn and
oat prices during the same period were cut in half. 30 But production only increased. By
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1892, the US Secretary of Agriculture reported that wheat production in the Dakotas
alone surpassed the entire national output just fifty years earlier. 31
Unlike other industries that produced finished products whose surpluses could be
shipped to other regions or countries, farmers’ and coal operators’ products were
produced in nearly every industrializing country more cheaply than ever before. 32 David
A. Wells, an economist and free-trade advocate, claimed this fact combined with the
rapidly expanding railroads in North America, Australia, Argentina, Russia, and India
created an intensifying global market with prices and sales that hinged on a region’s
ability to ship their products by land or sea affordably. 33 According to historian Chester
McArthur Destler, this dynamic “served to stimulate economic expansion until world
markets were glutted with both agricultural and industrial products.”34
Few industries were more competitive than the global wheat market. By the1880s,
the United States exported roughly one third of its wheat crop each year, primarily to
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and Egypt dramatically increased their production in the 1880s and sold their crops at
lower prices than US farmers could afford. Between 1868 and 1887, India increased its
wheat production from 558,852 bushels to 41,558,765 bushels. This escalation was
mirrored in wheat-producing nations throughout the world, all competing to sell their
grain to Europe. In an 1887 study of global wheat cultivation, the statistician to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture reasoned that European immigration to South America would
only intensify the “wheat culture” in Argentina and Chile. Such a “stimulation of the
industry” would dramatically increase competition. Wheat prices, which were governed
by the global market, would steadily decline. 35
But such a decline was not as visible at the New York Produce Exchange,
Chicago Board of Trade, and the dozens of other trading centers throughout the United
States and Europe. Despite the growing agricultural crisis in the fields, traders a world
away bought and sold wheat and other crops before they were ever harvested. The new
kind of trading, known as “futures” markets was a kind of market speculation and trade
that gambled on the expected value of future crops without any products physically
changing hands. 36 Like coal companies that formed contracts with businesses promising
to supply coal, dealers in agricultural products like wheat, cotton, hemp, and livestock
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arranged contracts settling prices for goods yet to be produced.37 This allowed merchants
who purchased crops from farmers or farmers’ agents to sell their future products while
prices were high rather than for the market price when the crops were ripe. Doing so
involved investing with money borrowed from banks with interest.38 If the merchant sold
at the right time, his profit absorbed the interest and his investment proved worthwhile. If
he sold at the wrong time his gains would be substantially less, even leaving him in
debt. 39
The risks involved with futures investing and the uncertainties that came from
selling products not yet grown, however, gave many farmers and merchants pause. By the
late 1880s, futures trading had become a major form of trade, but to many, the entire
system seemed dishonest and immoral. “This gambling—I call it gambling—the most
shrewd, subtle system that ever emanated from the brain of man and the most hard to get
at the bottom of. They will bamboozle you out of your senses,” former grain dealer
William Howard argued to a congressional committee investigating futures trading. A
farm agent for Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Minnesota farmers, Howard argued that
futures trading involved more than merchants hedging their purchases. It only protected
merchants when the price of crops went down and therefore encouraged merchants to
manipulate crop prices in order to increase investment returns. “How is it? How is it that
the hog product of the United States has not paid the cost for the last ten years and yet
these [merchants] have grown to be millionaires. How did they do it?” In the constant
37
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fluctuation of prices, Howard claimed, futures stock opened the door for corruption and
wild speculations disproportionate to crop supply. “I say it is the greatest evil that ever
struck the United States of America,” he insisted. “I tried it far enough to see that an
honest man could not make a living at it and I got out.” 40
The notion of evil lurking within the burgeoning economic system indicated a
growing conflict within society between capitalist profit and morality. Because of the
potential for high returns, futures markets reached as far as the global wheat and cotton
trade, from England to India to Chile to Kansas. But farmers like C. Wood Davis of
Kansas believed it injured farmers’ profits and gave businessmen more control over crop
prices than the farmers. To Wood, the physical supply of wheat did not matter as much as
the amount traders anticipated on the exchange floor when they traded “enormous
quantities of fiat or fictitious products.” Everything emanating from the futures sale
seemed fabricated by businessmen who turned a profit without physically owning
anything. 41 Historian Ann Fabian contends these claims of dishonesty and immorality
came out of citizens trying to reconcile not only how hard work was not rewarded, but
also how previously unacceptable practices such as gambling became the norm. Farmers
saw those who won in the futures markets as “modern incarnations of the scheming
gamblers who brought nothing to market but tricks and ruses and crept away with profits
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to which they had no right.” 42 Such an understanding prompted farmer A. M. Burdick to
declare that “[t]hese men who ‘operate’ on the boards of trade (more appropriately called
gambling hells) have no more right to the consideration of honest men than the devil has
to a seat in heaven.” 43
More and more, it seemed, the new industrial age found ways to replace old ways
with new versions that seemed less honest. Like “fictitious” wheat sales, the invention of
a “false butter,” made mostly from tallow and lard leftover from the meatpacking
process, incensed dairy farmers and alarmed consumers who feared that the new
oleomargarine was less wholesome than traditional butter.44 Each of these cases, from
enormous but financially weak corporations quietly branching into multiple industries to
stock trading, to industrialized butter seemed to go against natural and moral ways. They
hurt producers while reaching for profits and fabricated cheaper products that kept the
prices of genuine products lower.
Citizens looked to the government to regulate these practices, to check the
expansion and corruption that seemed to stretch everywhere. Yet, state and federal
governments often overlooked even blatant corruption. Railroads and coal mines
continued to generate profits through loopholes that exempted them from government
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oversight. Railroad mines, for example, were not held to the pay laws other mines were
supposed to follow, allowing mines like Frontenac No. 2 to pay their miners whenever
they saw fit. 45 After years of trying to discern between “gambling,” and futures markets,
the U.S. government declared futures trading legal. They believed that banning them
from the United States would not stop the global futures trade and that the profit from
futures aided the nation’s growth as powerfully as the thousands invested in railroads. 46
Although the Supreme Court ruled that marketing margarine as the equivalent of butter
was “fraudulent” in 1886, the Oleomargarine Act passed that same year declared it was
an honest product as long as it was not colored yellow.47 To the average rural producer,
these changes were part of a dizzying world of dishonesty where invisible empires rose
out of nothing, profits came from pushing prices lower, and success seemed to defy
morality and logic. The government’s willingness to allow these practices seemed to
indicate that business mattered most and the producers were worth little at all.

Inhuman
The business practices inherent in the new market system stood at odds with how
many rural producers believed the nation should function. Thousands in the southern
45
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Midwest remained rooted in a worldview that fused together “Jefferson and Jesus.”
Moral acts such as respecting one’s neighbor, not stealing, not lying, working hard, and
pursuing honesty over corruption, they believed, were the keys to a successful life. 48 Yet,
the new fast-paced market system offered a new alternative for success. Instead of
rewarding labor, the national market rewarded greed, corruption, and gambling while
slighting those who toiled. Efforts to gain higher profits forced debts onto producing
classes, created high interest rates on mortgages, contributed to falling earnings in mining
and agriculture, and cut corners in workplace safety while demanding more work for less
pay. 49
Falling crop prices, combined with shipping costs, taxes, interest, and mortgage
all chipped away at a farmer’s earnings so that, as one Kansas farmer put it, “farming
don’t pay.”
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Each year farmers throughout the South and Midwest were deeper in debt

to banks and local merchants who allowed farmers credit until their crops were harvested.
Because bankers “prefer the interest to the property,” they seldom foreclosed on indebted
farms. Still, thousands of farmers searched for ways to avoid “subsist[ing] as a slave.” 51
The Kansas and Iowa statistics bureaus acknowledged that land tenancy increased not
because of foreclosures, but because it was more lucrative for farmers to sell their farms
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than to farm land they owned. 52 Farmers like Frontenac’s Richard Wilson and his son
Jimmy looked to the mines as a way to supplement their incomes. Others, along with
thousands of unneeded farm hands, entirely abandoned their farms for the mines, iron
works, railroads, and factories. 53
The presence of Jimmy Wilson in Frontenac No. 2, then, was not an anomaly, but
part of a broader trend taking place in rural America as farm profits declined. Far from
remaining committed to a single occupation, rural farmers and laborers flowed from one
occupation to another, searching for better pay. For Jimmy Wilson’s seventeen years of
life before dying in the 1888 explosion, this involved balancing farm and mine work. For
Edgar Simpson who helped search for Wilson’s body, it meant going from the mines to
the iron works, but still keeping his “pit coat” close by. 54 In 1888, neither Wilson nor
Simpson were technically miners, but both were connected to the mines in ways that
allowed them to understand on a personal and powerful level how the market system not
only took producers’ livelihoods, but also their lives.
Few industries showed the growing disregard for workers’ well-being more than
the coal industry. Like other rural industries, miners’ wages were low, but fighting for
higher pay involved challenging more than the mine employer. In an industry governed
by market competition, pushing for higher wages meant potentially losing coal contracts
that provided steady work to neighboring mines that produced coal more cheaply. One
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Indiana miner claimed that these conditions prevented miners from dealing with their
employers “between man and man” and forced them to accept any terms their employees
offered. Missouri miner “A K. of L.” agreed, claiming that “[t]he operators here hardly
realized that the miners were human beings. The company has ruled with an iron rod so
long that they thought when a man went to work for them he had no voice in
anything….” Instead of being equals in society, they asserted, miners were less than men
and cowered to their boss’s demands. 55
This juxtaposition of man and “thing” intensified as industrialization transformed
the way Americans worked. In the legend of John Henry, a “steel drivin’ man” for the
Chesapeake and Ohio railroad in the 1870s out-drilled the latest steam-powered drill.
With a hammer in each hand, Henry drilled fourteen feet while the drill only drove
nine. 56 In swinging two hammers simultaneously, Henry’s skill made him faster and
more efficient than a machine, but it also invited a comparison between the two. 57 He
labored fast, methodologically, and efficient. Henry worked like a machine. For an
instant, he became something other than human. Still, in most versions of the legend,
Henry’s humanity is emphasized. In some ballads, he says, “You know that I’m a man.”
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In others, Henry’s hammers crash to the ground as he falls dead after defeating his steampowered foe.58 Working like a machine drove Henry to his death.
By the late nineteenth century machines had simplified dozens of industries, but
were less useful in workplaces with unreliable working conditions like mines. 59 On level,
dry ground, wide openings, and with the right type of rock or large seams of coal,
machines could fly at unprecedented rates. The holes that machines made were jagged
and kicked up clouds of rock and coal dust as they drilled, but in ideal conditions, they
moved as fast as human hands. On uneven and flooded spaces, hard rock, small coal
seams, and narrow passages, however, human labor remained most efficient. Humanmade holes were smooth, their blows comparatively dustless, and when they mined coal,
men could discern between rock types to extract the coal cleanly. 60 Unlike other
industries, then, the distinct uses between man and machine made the two labor forms
complements to each other instead of competitors. Both were tools used to complete the
same task, used based on which was more efficient in specific conditions. Yet, in sharing
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this job with and in comparing his work to the latest steam-powered contraption, man
became interchangeable with machine. 61
The limitations of mining technology prevented machines from making hand
labor obsolete. 62 For miners then, their conflict with mechanization was less a fight for
their jobs than a fight against being compared to a machine. Northern Illinois miner “Pro
Bono Publico” claimed that the hand miners were “driven from pillar to post to get a
living” due to the competition with machine mines. Because miners were paid according
to the amount of coal they produced rather than earn a flat daily wage, machine miners
could produce more coal than hand miners, increasing their tonnage. But machines did
not work in northern Illinois, Pro Bono Publico explained, “while in southern Illinois the
conditions are reversed.” The mines in the southernmost part of the state were ideal for
machines, allowing them to turn out more coal faster and cheaper so that they could sell
their coal in the Chicago market for lower prices than the northern hand mines. “We are
asked to come down [in wages] and compete with machinery that is producing coal in an
8 foot vein, while we have the human machine and 2 ½ to 3 feet, except in one or two
places,” the miner continued. “Now it is unjust and unreasonable to ask the miners of
northern Illinois to compete. They cannot do it.” 63
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Pro Bono Publico worked like a machine for a machine miner’s wages even
though he worked by hand in his mine, but the devaluation of workers did not end with
wage decline or competition with machines. Illinois miner “Jim” echoed hundreds of
miners’ complaints when he claimed that his mine implemented a “damnable system” of
overcharging for mining supplies and issuing fees. 64 Most mines required miners to
perform extra jobs such as laying railroad track, pumping water out of mines, or propping
up the roof. Commonly known as “dead work,” these tasks took a miner’s time and
energy but did not add to his coal production or pay. 65 In one Kentucky mine, dead work
included prying up rail tracks from old parts of the mine and re-laying them in a new
room. Otherwise, the miners had to push their loaded coal cars across the mine floor from
their rooms to the roadway. “[A] man should have iron track,” miner “Justice” grumbled,
but the company would not furnish it. “Illiterate” and “A Would-Be Knight” described
similar conditions. Their mines saved on mule purchases by having the miners “tram their
own coal instead of mules pulling it.” Still, Illiterate commented bitterly, “even if they
had long ears, [the miners] could not favorably compare with mules,” because unlike
miners, mules “kick when overloaded.” 66 Miner “Jumbo,” complained that his mine
cared more for its mules than its miners. When the safety catch broke on one of its two
cages the company did not fix it, even though the malfunction would kill its riders if the
64
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cage fell. “The north cage is the best,” the miner noted, “and they use it for hoisting and
lowering the mules, and the men have to go on the broken cage.” 67The decision to protect
mules over miners reflected how the competitive market shifted the ways companies
valued their workers. A miner could be replaced at no cost whereas a replacing a dead
mule required additional funds.
In other cases, mines disregarded safety protocol because upkeep was too
expensive. Ignoring regulations like timber spacing, gas monitoring, “sprinkling” dry
mines to keep coal dust down, and proper powder storage saved the company money, but
increased the risk of accidents. Having clear airways was not only essential to proper
mine ventilation, but also offered the surest means of escape in the event of an accident.
Still, mines often neglected their upkeep. One western Kentucky miner reported that the
only way to escape his mine in the event of an accident was for all the miners to climb “a
very narrow winding stairway up which you must crawl on your hands and knees for over
200 feet in the dark with water pouring down like rain upon you.” The distance made it
unlikely that all men would escape, yet in order to have a new airway, the miners had to
dig it for free. 68
Such a precaution would have been valuable to the miners in the Diamond Mine
in Braidwood, Illinois. After an accident flooded the mine, the company refused to dig a
new shaft to drain the water and aid in the rescue. Rescuers instead waded through the
water, taking days longer to search for miners. They pulled out twenty-eight bodies, most
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either drowned or suffocated, but the last six recovered, according to miner Adam
Stewart, “neither drowned nor choked.” Rather, “they starved to death.” Believing the
miners remaining in the mine had suffered the same fate, the company declared the
missing miners dead, abandoned the search, and closed up the mine. For Stewart, who
lost two sons in the mine, this was unthinkable. “I believe it is possible that there may be
live men in the mine yet,” he wrote, noting that miners in other disasters found their way
out of mines weeks after rescuers abandoned the search. The grieving father claimed the
action was a “disgrace to humanity,” and asserted that “[n]o country that claims to be
civilized would have done the same as was done at the Diamond mine.” But many mines
did. Unless a mine was in good enough condition to resume production, companies saw
little point in repairing the mine or locating miners that were likely dead. It was more
economical to entomb the miners and sink a new shaft elsewhere. 69
The sheer number of mine injuries and deaths each year was staggering.
Accidents were so common that state mine inspectors measured mine safety according to
the number of deaths in relation the amount of coal produced. Missouri mine inspector C.
C. Woodson reported that there was “one fatal accident for every 222,347 tons mined” in
his state in 1889, or twelve deaths and twenty-two injuries. Missouri mines fared better
than Kentucky mines that claimed one life for every 156,134 tons that same year, but
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ranked worse than Illinois, which lost one miner for every 263,590 tons. 70 The actual
number of dead was substituted for a ratio that correlated deaths with mine productivity,
giving government officials a baseline to determine the number of deaths acceptable for
the tons produced. In the process, miners became collateral in the drive to fuel the Gilded
Age.
Mine inspectors, then, also played a role in the devaluation of miners. Missouri
mine engineer William Porter argued that at least two mine inspectors were needed to
visit “the most important mining operations scattered over so large a territory as in this
State.” Even in his plan, smaller mines, such as the hundreds of Missouri mines that
employed less than ten workers, would not be inspected at all. 71 In some cases, inspectors
used this to their advantage, accepting bribes from mines to not inspect their facilities
carefully or avoid them entirely. Indiana miner George Johnson claimed that the
conditions in his mine were so poor that miners in the best spots worked in water a foot
deep. 72 “I heard a miner that was emptying the water out of his big gum boots ask the
boss if the inspector ever came around. The boss said yes. Well, how does he get around?
we asked. Says the boss: ‘We haul him around.’” 73 The statement implied that the
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inspector followed the will of the company, and cared less for the well-being of the
miners. A miner in Weir City, Kansas, confirmed this when he reported that the mine
inspector never inspected the inside of the mine. Instead, he “only inspected the mine
from the tipple of the shaft.” 74 Throughout the nation, miners made similar complaints
that state mine inspectors failed to do inspections, were too unfamiliar with the mining
process to do inspections adequately, or gave their mines safety approvals despite
eminent and visible dangers. 75 “I am under the impression that the mine inspector laws
are lived up to on one side, but not the other,” Illinois miner William Gardner claimed.
“The salary side is lived up to, but the duty side is deficient.” His words came in
response to the latest death in a local mine. “He was a Polander that was killed, but a
Polander is not supposed to be human, so I did not hear of any investigation [into] how
the accident occurred.” Gardner’s bitter words, which indicated the inequalities that ran
through the mines and government, also revealed the inspectors’ power of discretion.
Some accidents were more worthy of investigation than others. Some deaths were not
worth reporting at all. As such, even the callous ratios of deaths to coal produced may be
substantially higher than what the officials claimed. 76
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The hardship that miners suffered, from the indifference to their labor to the
disregard for their deaths all indicated to the miners that their employers and those
appointed by the government to look after them, viewed the mine workers as less than
human. Indiana miner “Cambrian” claimed miners were defenseless “prey to every
vicious human being.” 77 Miner “Justice” agreed, writing that miners struggled between
being “men or mice.” 78 The phrase, which referenced the century old poem “To a
Mouse,” was familiar to thousands of Scottish miners throughout the southern Midwest.
Written by Robert Burns, it told the story of a farmer’s drive to clear his field that
ultimately destroyed the home of a timid field mouse. Dozens of miners referenced the
poem, identifying with the mouse whose possessions were overturned by a more
powerful being with the ability to quash its life. 79 Such a fragile existence was
particularly clear to mine workers. Mice often ran rampant in the mines, but seldom
served a purpose except to monitor the amount of breathable air. 80A mouse’s only value
was that it was worthless, its very breath was an expendable tool for the mines. 81 To the
miners, this was a poem about their own poverty and powerlessness. They became timid
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“mice” who labored hard in harsh conditions, entering the mine each day wondering if
they would emerge unharmed.

Unpaid
Company and governmental effort to protect earnings at employee expense
extended beyond the mine and into nearly every aspect of miners’ and their families’
lives. Although some historians have claimed that miners had the power to move to the
best paying mine thus avoiding exploitation, the complexity of the payment system made
this exceedingly difficult. 82 A simple “cent per ton” wage could not be compared
between mines without accounting for the amount of dead work, supply costs, and
weighing method.83 While miners settled on a payment rate for winter and summer
mining each year, the cent per ton agreement was subject to the deductions as well as
dead work that chipped away at a miner’s earnings. In addition to these factors, the
companies frequently switched between a variety of weighing techniques, further eroding
miners’ paychecks while maintaining that they paid a high cent per ton wage.
Because there was no uniform weighing method, it was simple for companies to
lower wages even if the cents paid per ton remained the same. When the coal was
extracted, the “slack” or clay, stone, and silt mixed in with the coal needed to be filtered
out before the coal was sold. To do this, the coal was placed over large “screens” with
“bars” spaced apart to allow the slack to fall through. Coal chunks remained above,
82
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eventually tumbling into a new car separate from the slack. “Run of the mine” coal,
which was weighed before it was filtered, was heavier due to the slack, making it worth
less than “screened coal,” which was filtered before it was weighed. In some cases, mine
run coal earned fewer cents per ton than the screened wage, in other instances, operators
paid screen wages for run of the mine coal, but deducted a percentage of the overall
weight to account for the slack, and at times deducting as much as fifty percent of the
weight. 84
Screened coal was more common in late nineteenth century mines, but even the
screening process was uneven. Mines often changed the “bars” on the screen to increase
the amount of slack that fell through the gaps. In changing the bars’ shape or spacing or
using corroded bars and broken screens, companies could increase the amount of slack.
“I have been told that on one certain occasion,” Illinois organizer William Scaife
quipped, that the spaces between bars in one Illinois mine were so large, “the operator’s
pug dog went down the screen and fell through into the nut car.”85
In doing this, the company not only increased the amount of slack or, in Scaife’s
case, small dogs, filtered away but also caused smaller pieces of coal called “nut coal” to
fall through the screen and into a separate car designated for nut coal. This coal was not
credited to the miner’s coal weight, meaning he dug it for free even though the company
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sold this coal. 86 Kentucky miner “Snake Eye Saul” claimed that at his mine, the
company charged the miners fifty cents a load to burn nut coal in their homes. “We
consider this very unjust as we get [paid] nothing for mining and sending out nut coal,”
he complained, asserting the action was nothing better than theft. 87
But company theft from miners was not limited to large screens and nut cars.
Companies frequently “lost” cars of coal prior to weighing. When this happened, the
miner’s tag was separated from his coal car so that he received no pay for the load when
it was filtered and sold. Illinois miner “K. of L.” reported that at his mine often lost up to
five tons of coal, “and [the pay discrepancy] don’t get rectified for weeks and months
after, and some never get it.” 88 Such operators who dared to “steal” weight from the
miners were especially deplorable, Indiana miner and organizer Aaron Litten wrote. “I
believe there should be a special place prepared in hell for such men as this operator.”89
As deplorable as the acts were, however, the behavior K of L and Litten described
was commonplace in the southern Midwest coalfields. In most instances, it was not only
part of a larger system of withholding payment in part to offset expenses, but also a
means of keeping workers dependent upon their employers that many rural industries
practiced. The heavy investing and high debt inherent in railroad speculation and other
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forms of big business meant that these corporations rarely had money on hand to pay all
of their employees. Some mines, such as the C. C. Company Mine No. 4 in Danville,
Illinois, solved this problem by dividing its workforce into quarters and paying each
group on a different day of the week. According to miner “Joe,” this achieved “entire
satisfaction with the miners,” but few mines implemented the tactic. In fact, when No. 4
received new managers, the payment system quickly ended. The inexperienced new
manager ordered the miners to widen the entry by two feet, which “became a drag” on
coal production and upset the mine’s small but carefully balanced budget. Short on cash,
No. 4 changed its pay schedule so that it could use the miners’ pay to cover expenses for
an extra week. Within weeks, the company was so far behind it stopped paying the
miners regularly altogether. When the miners demanded their pay, the manager offered
them the choice between weekly pay at 43 ½ cents per ton or monthly at 48 cents. 90
For companies with small budgets or large railroad mines like the ATSF that
often flirted with bankruptcy, avoiding laborers’ payroll was crucial to keeping the
company afloat. Even when miners were paid, companies seldom paid miners their full
amount due. An 1891 Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics study, for example, reported
that even the largest coal corporations withheld five to twenty days’ worth of wages in
each pay. 91 Many companies paid their employees as little cash as possible in part to
maintain their limited cash supply, but also to keep the workers tied to the company. In
addition to mines, railroads, sawmills and even larger plantation or bonanza-style farms
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not only paid irregularly, but often avoided paying their workers in cash. Many
employers paid in “checks” that could not be cashed immediately. In an extensive study
on rural wage payment, Missouri Labor Commissioner Lee Meriwether found that the
checks frequently required workers to wait anywhere from one to ten years before
redeeming the check for its full cash amount.92
According to Meriwether, the check system frequently worked in conjunction
with commissary stores that the company owned. Known by the miners as the “truck” or
“pluck-me” store because they “plucked” wages from the miners, these stores frequently
charged high prices for goods that could be purchased without cash. For thousands of
miners facing unreliable and irregular payment periods, these stores were often the only
place that extended credit. Similarly, although the checks were seldom good anywhere
else, workers waiting for their checks to mature could spend the full amount in the pluckme before the cash-in date. Any amount not spent when the check had matured could be
redeemed for cash, but the checks often could only be cashed at a bank, which was often
several miles from the coal camp. In other cases, company issued vouchers known as
“coupons” or “scrip” used in place of legal tender. 93
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Whether the company used checks or scrip, the outcome was the same. If the
worker wished to cash a check prematurely or if he wished to exchange his scrip for cash,
he typically received only seventy-five to eighty cents for each dollar earned. 94
Meriwether argued the companies implemented this delayed payment system to force
miners to remain in debt so that they had to shop at the company store. The tactic
worked. Less than two years after Meriwether’s initial report, the Missouri BLS reported
that the majority of miners in the state received all of their wages in food and
merchandise purchased on credit prior to pay day. 95 One Louisiana sugar plantation
laborer claimed that such a system was designed to “make you a slave” over twenty years
after the Civil War. 96
The incentives for shopping in the company store often compelled mining
families to accept the system rather than challenge its procedures. “J. D.” claimed that
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one miner reported to Meriwether. “It has more sulphur in it or more slack, or I get a
room where it is harder to mine coal. My wages invariably decrease, and I have found the
only way to get a better room and fairer wages is to deal at the company store.”97
Combined with low wages, irregular pay periods, and withheld wages, the
presence of a pluck-me meant that many miners were tethered to the company until their
debt was paid. 98 Although not all miners were compelled to shop at the store, those that
were had no control over the store’s selection of brands that they could purchase. They
also had no means to fight how much they cost. One Missouri wife claimed that she had
no wash tub and that her husband was shoeless because the commissary had neither items
in stock. Because no other stores accepted the company’s tender, she “was compelled to
wait two months until the Holladay store had obtained its new supply.” 99 These
conditions enraged miners who claimed the pluck-me stores were unconstitutional. “It is
a system that plucks me of my civil rights,” Missouri miner S. C. Pierce complained to
Meriwether. It took “one of the dearest privileges of my life, that of having the dollar that
I have earned by the sweat of my brow, to go with it to the place I like, to trade it for food
to put on the table and for clothes to put on my children’s backs.” 100
It was not fair, Iowa miner J. D. railed. “They rob us while producing their
wealth. They rob our wives while they are compelled to trade in their store. Is this all?
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No. They rob our children of the intellect that God has given them.” 101 Even in his
frustration, J. D. knew that legislation overlooked this kind of “robbery.” Since most
“anti-truck” laws focused on either abolishing scrip or compulsion to shop at the
commissary, the miners had no way to fight the stores. 102 Worse, as Meriwether
discovered, operators regularly defied standing laws with impunity. “The law requires
corporations to redeem all checks or tokens of indebtedness issued to their employees
within thirty days after the date of delivery,” Meriwether explained. “This law is laid
down so plainly and explicitly that I hesitated to believe any company in Missouri made a
practice to issue checks to their employees and refuse to redeem such checks in cash until
the expiration of ten years.” 103 Yet not one, but several companies in Missouri and
elsewhere violated this law and others regarding pay, weighing techniques, and mine
safety. 104 “We seemingly have no means of protection,” J.D. concluded. 105 Miners and
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farmers desperate for work had no choice but to accept the terms offered or try to find
work elsewhere.
These experiences of powerlessness, surrender, dependence, and submission,
from the mine to kitchen table, stood in contrast to producers’ understanding of what it
meant to be men and free citizens. Elongated periods between pay and increasing debt
made it difficult for mining families to move away. Consequently, what began as wage
decline spread to nearly every aspect of life, eroding producers’ abilities to make their
own decisions. Miner “Veritas,” claimed that tolerating wage deductions or agreeing to
shop at the company store “only drives away those of sterling moral worth, and invites a
population low in morals, low in self-respect, and depraved in every God-given
attribute.” Such an undercutting of virtue, he argued, was inevitable “when manhood is
surrendered” to the will of the company. 106 Similarly, knowing that the latest failed
agreement between miners and operators in 1889 would trigger another reduction, Illinois
miner “Pro Bono Publico” warned National Labor Tribune readers that the situation
would only worsen. “If we are to do the behests of the operators and submit to their will
without question,” he cautioned, “then we lose our manhood and our freedom.” 107
From the workplace into the home, it seemed that those who looked for work in
the mines sacrificed their manhood and freedom. In these regions, “free labor” had turned
in the eyes of many into “wage slavery,” with no hope of improvement. 108 “Men who

106

“Veritas” to the editor, “Company Stores,” NLT, June 2, 1888.
“Gomer,” letter to the editor, “Our Illinois Letter,” NLT, August 4, 1877;“Pro Bono Publico,” letter to
the editor, “Illinois Organization,” NLT, March 2, 1889; Phil Penna, letter to the editor, “President Penna’s
Pertinent Comments,” NLT, June 9, 1889; KBLI, First Annual Report, 78; W. H. Blake to Lee Meriwether,
Eleventh Annual Report, 24; Cooper, Once a Cigar Maker, 124-5, 322.
108
Patrick McAdams, letter to the editor, “From Indiana,” NLT, October 3, 1885; T. J. Roberts, letter to the
editor, “That Grape Creek Visit,” NLT, February 19, 1887; T. T. O’Malley, letter to the editor, “Answers
Questions of his Own Asking,” NLT, February 26, 1887; “Braceville Miner,” letter to the editor, “Against
the Contract,” NLT, March 16, 1889.
107

72

want to be men cannot get along here,” miner “G. F.” complained, noting that low wages
and pluck-me made conditions in his current mine worse than what he had left behind in
England. The irony was not lost on him. “This is called the land of the free, but if this is
freedom, where does slavery exist?” 109 His castigation was both moral and political. A
nation that prided itself in offering freedom and opportunity allowed the market system to
cripple producer life and liberty, turning a blind eye to suffering and starvation for want
of cheaper coal and grain prices. There was simply no hope to get out of debt, Illinois
miner “D. B. T.” explained after his mine underwent a twenty-five percent wage
reduction. But the reduction was not the only problem. After employer fees and wage
garnishments, D. B. T. and his fellow miners were paid only twenty-five cents for each
dollar they earned. “I think this will show slavery and serfdom, and that we are all, black
and white, in bondage under the present system.” 110

Hypocrites
For thousands of rural workers, the system that allowed businessmen to grow
wealthy while treating others as less than human seemed blatantly immoral. Observing
the greed within the coal industry, “A Well Wisher,” called attention to the irony of
businessmen “claiming to be civilized, and some of them Christianized” while treating
their laborers harshly. They forced their employees “to work down in the dark and
dangerous mines more than eight hours per day, while they themselves are enjoying all
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the sunlight and the pure fresh air and riding about to all the places of amusement… and
then claim to be human.” 111
A Well Wisher’s claim reflected how thousands of rural producers regarded the
business practices inherent in the new nationally and globally competitive market system.
The businessmen who engaged in it and the government officials who condoned it, both
behaved in ways contrary to the values they professed. In treating their employees as less
than human, employers acted as soulless heathens, even as they professed Christian
values. Likewise, the government officials and ministers charged to look after all people
but cared little for workers were equally as hypocritical. Yet workers, like miner “Fair
Play,” condemned this treatment, asserting,“[w]e are not slaves but human beings and
demand to be treated as such.” 112 Often, they used their own Christian convictions,
understandings of citizenship, and moral right not only to show themselves as moral
citizens, but to shame those who treated the poor unjustly.
Most late nineteenth century workers seldom attended church or affiliated with a
specific denomination, but still upheld general Christian beliefs. 113This religious thought
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was more than rhetoric. It offered a way for rural producers to present their hardships as
clear moral, economic, and political wrongs against them and their families. Although
reformers played into such religious sentiments, these understandings transcended union
rhetoric and came out of genuine spiritual conviction often independent of the religious
values middle class society professed. 114 Rural producers asserted their own Christian
values not only to push for reforms, but to challenge their place in society, asserting that
they were humans with Christian souls that deserved respect.
The hypocrisy they witnessed within society was the precise reason many rural
producers did not affiliate with traditional churches despite their religious convictions. “I
used to be a very good church member, and I admire the teachings of Christ very much
yet,” Illinois organizer William Scaife wrote, but he would not attend or give it money
any longer. During strikes, ministers favored operators who gave more money to the
church than workers. “[The ministers] profess to be followers of ‘the meek and lowly’
Jesus, but it is only a profession with them,” he insisted. In Scaife’s mind, this made
ministers part of the “moneyocracy” that hurt the poor. “Better to be without a church
than hire a man or men to stab you in the back when you are engaged in a conflict with
the oppressors of this earth.” 115 This was not Christianity, the Des Moines, Iowa,
Farmers’ Tribune argued. Rather it was “churchianity” where the “greed for power and
popularity welcomes to its folds the very men whom Christ drove from the temple.” 116To
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Scaife, the “so-called Christian ministers who in time of conflict go out of the way to
abuse the weaker party in the fight,” were worse than strikebreakers. “Doubly so,” he
argued, “because they are all educated men, and ought not to allow their sense of right to
be overcome by their desire for gold, and that is what most of them do.” Scaife believed
these actions made them “the worst characters in the sight of God,” and as worthy of
damnation as the operators who sat in their congregations. 117
Indiana miner wife Laurene Gardner agreed. Although she and her husband were
faithful church members, her ailing husband’s request for spiritual guidance shortly
before his death was met with indifference from their minister. “One poor perfunctory
visit was all the minister could find time to give.” Instead, her husband’s coworkers came
to his aid. They performed his last rites, arranged the funeral, and held the ceremony over
his grave. This was why workers did not attend church, Gardner explained. “When the
church does the work then the common people will again hear them gladly. If they leave
the work among the working classes to the trade unions then the church people should
not wonder that workingmen prefer their trade unions to the church.” 118
Unions, not churches, were the organizations that truly followed the “principles”
all should follow, “A Laborer” wrote. “Honest labor,” as thousands of workers called it,
involved working hard, helping those in need, not stealing, and not showing
favoritism. 119 “[T]here is Christianity in these principles,” he argued, yet the wealthy did
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not follow this. “The rich are crushing the poor; many of them make a profession of
Christianity one day out of seven; while man and his wife and family living near the
place of worship are debarred from attending for the want of wearing apparel and that
they may not be made light of by others who are rich in the world’s goods.”120
Yet workers’ agreement that their treatment was immoral was not enough to bind
them to unions. Both the Knights and the National Federation of Miners and Mine
Laborers (NFM) attempted to tap into these understandings in an effort to win the
allegiance of the nation’s mine workers. Despite their efforts, neither organization
swayed a majority of the nation’s coal miners into their ranks. Even those who joined one
or both organizations did not always follow their leaders’ orders. Just as Christian
convictions did not correlate with worker church attendance, so their desire to reform the
system that injured them did not always lead to union faithfulness.
Part of the lack of faith in labor organizing came from the enormity of the system
that hurt rural producers. Worker mistreatment stretched across the nation and connected
disparate industries together in complex ways. For the coal industry, resolving miners’
grievances required a powerful national union capable of addressing questions of crop
prices and farm debts so that the farmers and their farm hands could return to the fields. It
meant engaging the steel and railroad industries that not only demanded cheaper coal, but
were also crucial to coal mining and transport. It required government support to pass
new safety laws and enforce those already in place. Most importantly, it meant finding a
way to fight the entire coal market that forced companies to constantly undercut prices by
cutting costs in their mines.
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Although workers understood the enormity of this undertaking, both the Knights
and the NFM confronted these issues differently. The Knights’ cooperation and education
plans were long-term endeavors that many producers believed were essential to restoring
economic independence. 121 More importantly, its structure of “mixed locals” allowed
farmers, miners, and other trades to all attend the same union meetings, fortifying
connections across trade lines. The NFM, which was founded in 1885, was more adept at
looking after specific trade concerns. Its dedication to the mining industry allowed it to
focus on regulating companies’ cutthroat competition by negotiating a nationwide pay
scale with coal operators each year from 1886 forward. Often, leadership in the two
orders stood at odds with each other. Many of the founding members of the NFM began
as Knights and, like hundreds of workers in other industries, left the order to organize
along trade lines. 122
Thousands of miners, however, believed the two organizations complementary.
Many held membership in both unions. G. W. Dinsmoor noted that his Missouri mine
maintained memberships in both orders without conflict, declaring “[t]his method is far
the best I have ever seen tried yet.”123 Thomas Faulds of Indiana similarly asserted, “I
think if the different labor organizations would work in meeting directions each in their
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own sphere, perhaps what could not be achieved in one might in the other.” 124 In his
mind, cross-union cooperation was not only possible, but ideal.
By 1886, neither group was strong enough to secure the changes they promised.
The Federation established a national pay scale but could not enforce it in all states.
Companies in weakly unionized areas took advantage of the agreement and undersold
mines that honored the scale, intensifying competition rather than diminishing it. 125
Similarly, the Knights’ rapid growth in the mid-1880s did not translate into successful
mining reform. The mixed occupational leadership within assemblies made it difficult for
the union to address problems specific to the mining industry. In many cases, Knight
decisions regarding the coal industry were not made by miners, but by workers in other
industries whose unfamiliarity with the coal industry was a liability. 126 Because of this,
the Knights formed National Trades Assembly 135 (NTA 135) in 1886. Like the
Federation, NTA 135 was specifically for miners, essentially a trade union under the
Knights’ umbrella. This structure allowed miners to remain as Knights while providing
leaders over the miners who were well acquainted with the mining trade. 127
In many ways, NTA 135’s formation upset an already shaky balance between the
two orders. Federation leaders viewed it as an open attack on their trade union structure
and saw it as the Knights working to undermine Federation authority in mining reform.
NTA 135 officers were outraged at the Federation leadership’s unwillingness to
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cooperate, particularly at its resolution that forbid any NFM officer from holding an
office in any other labor organization. 128
The following two years were plagued with bitter disputes between organization
leaderships. Although the Knights of Labor declined in the urban centers that once
formed the union’s stronghold, rural workers often remained in the order. 129 NTA 135
fell into the internal disputes within the Knights, which hampered its effectiveness, but
even in late 1888 the order remained as strong as its rival organization. 130 Unable to win
all miners’ support, the NFM could not enforce pay scales or safety laws. The two orders’
leadership therefore remained locked in a battle to destroy their rival in the name of
protecting miners.
The miners disagreed. They saw little benefit in the ongoing division between
Federation and NTA 135 leadership. Many questioned whether the leaders’ actions, like
those of ministers, government officials, and employers, were guided more by personal
ambition than by care for the rank and file. Illinois NFM organizer P. H. Donnelly
claimed that in founding NTA 135, the Knights strayed from their original goals of
eradicating the wage labor system and building up the workers. “The heart of the great
body of the K. of L. is right,” Donnelly asserted. Yet, to many miners, the organization’s
latest efforts seemed focused more on quashing its competition than aiding miners. “We
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feel that there can be no peace or comfort until that rule or ruin policy is abandoned and
the order of the K. of L. brought back to first principles again,” he continued. If the
organization truly cared about the miners, he insisted, it would “do away with the socalled National District Trades assemblies of different callings.” T. J. Roberts argued
that NTA 135’s formation brought unnecessary strife to the miners who were already
struggling in their workplaces. “I myself respect the K. of L. as much as any man living,
having been connected with it for a number of years, but I don’t like to hear men trying to
break down the best trades union my craft has ever had, simply to further the ends of a
few men who really have not the interest of my craft at heart.” Roberts did not love the
Knights of Labor any less, he insisted, rather, “I love the Federation more.” 131
Despite the dual loyalty, there was no denying that the union divide came at the
miners’ expense. “[W]e are the ones who have to suffer,” miner and organizer John
Duddey explained. Because of the division, the miners were “taxed and levied on by both
organizations.” Indiana organizer Samuel Anderson described similar conditions, noting
that miners in his district paid dues to both organizations but could barely earn a living. If
the miners of both organizations could cooperate with each other, surely their
organizations could as well. 132 In December 1888, union leaders heeded the miners’
demands. Meeting in Columbus, Ohio, leaders in both organizations agreed to sever ties
131
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to their old orders, killing both NTA 135 and the NFM while dissolving the autonomous
state unions within the NFM. In its place, they established the National Progressive
Union of Miners and Mine Laborers (NPU). 133
This was what the miners had demanded for years, but rather than join the unified
order, hundreds of NTA 135 members refused to abandon the Knights. The NPU was
little more than a renaming of the Federation, they complained. There was no structure
that resembled what the Knights offered. Miners who had enjoyed the benefits of both
orders saw no reason to desert NTA 135, even if its leadership did. Kansas organizer
Robert Linn wrote he was not pleased with NTA 135’s structure and function, but he
could not justify leaving the order. “I am, and have been for the past ten years, a Knight
of Labor,” he declared. “I never have had a thought or expressed a wish to abandon N. T.
A. 135 or the Order of the Knights of Labor.” His words reflected thousands of southern
Midwest miners’ sentiments regarding the amalgamation debate. As a result, many opted
to retain their dual memberships in both orders while some refused to join the NPU
altogether.134
Instead of unity, the NPU’s formation drew an even larger divide between
organizations and therefore increased frustration from the rank and file. 135 Indiana miner

133

“The Miners’ Convention, Pittsburgh [Pennsylvania] Post, December 8, 1888.
Union miners in Spring Valley, Illinois, for example, kept their minutes for their Knights of Labor local
assembly and their NPU lodge in the same bound volumes. Spring Valley, Illinois, Lodge 26 “Miners and
Mine Laborers Protective Association” of the NPU, in Knights of Labor LA 8617 Minutes Book 1, IRAD,
Normal, Illinois; “Coal Miners Matters,” NLT, January 5, 1889; Robert Linn, letter to the editor, “A Letter
from Brother Robert Linn” JUL, January 24, 1889; IMPA Official Report, “Illinois Miners,” NLT, July 27,
1889; Ware, The Labor Movement, 215-221; Andrew Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United
States, from the Development of the Mines to the Close of the Anthracite Strike of 1902, Including a Brief
Sketch of Early British Miners (Columbus, Ohio: Press of J. L. Trauger Print Company, 1906), 250; Aaron
Littin, letter to the editor, “Indiana Mine Reports,” NLT, March 16, 1889.
135
Within weeks, the NPU convinced thousands of western Pennsylvania miners to abandon NTA 135 for
the new union by launching an attack against W. L. Scott, forcing him to improve conditions in his mines.
The event marked the beginning of a slow increase in NPU support. By February 1889, the Miners and
Mine Laborers Amalgamated Association, a union mostly comprised of Ohio miners also joined the new
134

82

“Coffee,” one of the thousands who refused to abandon NTA 135 and instead retained a
membership in both orders, claimed that the division between the organizations created a
cloud “as dark as a coal operator’s conscience” that hovered over the miners. Coffee’s
description equated the union fighting with operators’ callous actions in the mines that
endangered miners’ lives. “Now I would like for some one of either side to show me
where there is anything gained by being continually at ‘outs,’” he demanded. 136 Dual
member Aaron Littin agreed, charging “This [fighting] originated and is advocated
principally by disappointed office seekers.” Such men, like employers, government
officials, and ministers only looked to the miners as a means for personal gain. “A man
that will join an organization to get an office is not worthy of recognition by any honest
laboring man,” he insisted, “and when [honest men] find one of that caliber [they should]
at once brand him as an imposter, and when they succeed in getting the heads of all such
demagogues chopped off then they will find peace and success will crown their every
effort.”137
Coffee and Littin’s descriptions of organization leadership as selfish impostors
tapped into the already present suspicions rural producers had against national leaders
who claimed to help rank and file, but did not act so. They were worthy of as much
mistrust as employers who did not treat their employees fairly, government officials who
did not uphold the law, and ministers who did not behave as Christians. In short, the
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unions became another foe to many miners. “A man can be a hypocrite in a labor
movement just as easily as in church,” Indiana miner “X” wrote. 138 His statement made
the parallels between faith and union abundantly clear. Neither the church nor the union
was wrong, but dishonest leaders in both could injure miners more than they helped. Just
as miners’ belief in Christian values prevented them from attending church, so their belief
in honest labor principles prevented them from fully supporting union leaders’ decisions.

The NPU’s inability to unite the miners or earn their trust was part of a larger
culture of suspicion and fraud in the Gilded Age. Corporations’ reach into multiple
industries, government ties, and backroom deals that pulled up profits while driving down
prices contributed to a sense that corruption lurked everywhere from business, to
churches, to their own trade organizations.
Although union leadership also claimed that producers were exploited, rhetoric
alone did not sway miners to the union cause. When unions focused more on defeating
each other than promoting safety and fair treatment, miners believed their claims were
less than genuine. In these cases, even the thousands that joined the labor movement
stopped short of supporting leadership objectives. Consequently, although thousands of
organized miners called for a peaceful merger between the unions, they refused to obey a
new organization that demanded they abandon their labor union ties. The officers who
orchestrated the failed merger, they believed, acted out of their own self-preserving
interests and seemed equally as fraudulent as their employers, government officials, or
the ministers who often claimed to have the miners’ best interests at heart.
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Still, miners and farmers found it difficult to hold fast to their sense of moral right
in a competitive market. A network larger than local community bonds had changed the
rural producers’ world. As earnings continued to decline, the competition between mines
and farms, union and non-union seeped into the ground itself. Producers’ need to provide
for their families facilitated a new kind of competition on the local level, turning
neighbor against neighbor and complicating the divisions between miner, farmer, and
businessman more than ever before.
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Chapter Three
Undermined: Winter Diggers, Union Strikebreakers

One hundred feet below the frozen Illinois topsoil, a handful of farmers turned up
the earth not by the plow, but by the pick. Rather than work their fields, they spent
February 1888 in the Enterprise Mine, digging coal destined for the Chicago market.
Their mine was located in the southernmost region of the state, commonly known as
“Egypt,” whose coal industry was among the fastest growing in the southern Midwest.
Nearly four thousand Egypt miners turned out over 2,600,000 tons of coal in 1888 alone,
almost one-quarter of the state’s total output.1 Miners came from all over the nation and
world to dig Egypt coal, but in February 1888, only farmers went down to work in the
Enterprise Mine.
No one but farmers dared descend the Enterprise shaft because it was one of
several Egypt mines on strike. The miners were already working below scale rates when
Egypt coal operators ordered another wage reduction that would bring their wages nearly
twenty-five percent lower than competing mines. “[T]he men thought it unjust,” miner
Robert Smith explained, because it not only cut wages deeper than market competition
required but it also would trigger wage reductions in mines throughout Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania as they lowered costs to compete with Egypt for the Chicago
market. “We therefore resolved to resist the cut, and not give the operators surrounding
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us the excuse to cut their miners, as it seems southern Illinois is always below our fellow
craftsmen.” 2
But not all Egypt residents shared this conviction. Smith’s emphasis on the
miners’ desire to not go further “below” their craftsmen stood at odds with the local
farmers who broke the strike. Run as a joint stock company, anyone who wished to
purchase stock in the Enterprise Mine could do so at twenty cents a share. Several local
farmers had seized the investment opportunity and purchased as many shares as they
could afford in hopes of generating extra income for minimal effort. 3 The February strike
jeopardized their investment. Unwilling to let the mine shut down and risk losing their
money, the farmers entered the mines to dig the coal themselves. As the miners remained
above ground fighting a reduction that would lower wages throughout the region, the
farmers protected their financial assets by literally going under the miners to mine the
coal. The farmers’ ideological actions mirrored their physical labor. By going into the
mines, the farmers went “below” their neighbors, undercutting the wage scale, taking
their jobs, and challenging the cooperation that bound community members together.
The Egypt farmers who became miners because they owned a stake in the mines
reflected how the competitive market fundamentally altered daily life in the Gilded Age.
As farm profits decreased, farmers and farmhands alike looked to mines and other rural
industries to cover expenses. Some, like the Egypt farmers, approached these industries
as small scale investors. Others entered the mines as hired hands employed by the miners
themselves. Such occupational confusion allowed workers to be owner, employer, and
employee simultaneously and stretched into multiple industries, allowing rural laborers
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like farmers, miners, and railroad workers to work in a host of industries from farms to
mines to lumber camps. By cobbling together various incomes, rural men and women
etched out a living. Rural folk had used these connections between industries for decades,
but as the agricultural crisis intensified, coal profits declined, and the number of
industrial laborers looking for work swelled, the overlap between industries became more
hazard than help. As budgets tightened, rural workers like the Egypt farmers and
countless others moved to protect their own interests. They “cheated” their coworkers by
accepting favoritism in the mines, discarded mine rules to earn extra pay, and broke
strikes to preserve investments or simply to earn a wage. Laborers who once worked
together now competed, turning communities against each other as they turned out more
coal.
In many ways, historians have noted this change, demonstrating how the
economic forces that pushed thousands of producers into poverty also pressed them
against each other, even as they held fast to the community bonds and cooperation that
undergirded rural society. Throughout the nation, ordinary farmers and laborers worked
to reconcile ideas of republican equality and reciprocity with their need to earn a profit or
a living wage. 4 But these shifts did more than drive wedges in local communities. They
reconfigured relationships between owner, laborer, and neighbor tangling them in new
4
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ways within the national market system. The term “neighbor” took on new meaning as
states grew connected through trade, competing against each other for the first time.
Consequently, the “honest principles” that miners prized such as honoring contractual
agreements, not undercutting wages, rejecting favoritism in the mines, and not “stealing”
another worker’s livelihood grew harder to maintain as coal and crop prices fell. Local
and individual need tugged against the grain of national competition and growing
national unions, blurring rural producers’ understandings of how to live a moral life.
Time and again, self-preservation proved more important than “honest work,” compelling
them to compromise their moral principles and undermine their community networks to
survive. 5
In such cases, union miners did not always act according to the values they
professed. Thousands of union miners broke each others’ strikes and filled each other’s
coal contracts. They insisted their actions were justifiable due to their economic need, but
condemned miners in other regions performing these same acts, calling them dishonest
and immoral “blacklegs.” 6 In the process, honest labor in the mines and community was
often determined more by occupational background and geographic lines than by any
clear definition of moral behavior. In 1889, this led hundreds of Illinois union coal miners
to not strike for higher wages and better conditions as labor organizations typically did.
Instead, they followed their union leaders’ orders and broke a strike waged by their nonunion coworkers. The circumstances that prompted farmers not to farm and union miners
not to strike indicated the complicated ways the market system turned rural workers
against each other and prompted them to put personal need before public good. Their
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justification of their decisions to abandon their neighbors and principles, however,
signaled to many miners not only the futility of local strikes in a national market, but also
the moral bankruptcy that seemed to run through in the miners’ unions and Gilded Age
business alike.

Assorted Incomes
Peter Shirkey was already an experienced coal miner when he arrived in the US
from the British Isles at age fifteen in 1850 and on his arrival, he quickly set out for the
coalfields traveling from mine to mine for higher wages. In 1870, he worked in a mine
outside Wadsworth, Ohio, boarding with miner Henry Mendinhall’s family and several
other miners before heading west. He later settled in southern Indiana where he married
Lydia Minnis in 1891. 7 By then, however, Shirkey was more than a migrant coal miner.
Even though he still identified himself as a miner on the 1900 Census schedule, Shirkey
also owned his own farm, mortgage free. He and his wife shared their home with
seventeen year-old Isum Stout who worked with Shirkey in the field and the mines. 8
Shirkey’s life demonstrated how multiple incomes and cooperation jointly shaped
rural life in the Gilded Age. As Rob Weise has shown, average farmers and laborers
regularly made small-scale investments to earn extra cash. They borrowed money to
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purchase more land in efforts to increase crop yields, bought and sold items on credit, and
sold their lumber for cash. 9 Johnathan Levy found this same trend among farmers who
participated in futures market speculation and pursued western farm mortgages, believing
such investments would generate larger income or at least protect their economic
stability. It kept Shirkey traveling from mine to mine in search of better pay, ultimately
enabling him to purchase a farm. Census schedules from 1880 and 1900 show that
Shirkey was not alone in this endeavor. Hundreds of southern Midwest miners owned or
rented houses surrounded by farms, rented a parcel of farmland, or, like Shirkey, owned
their own farm while listing their occupation as a coal miner on the Census. 10
But not all workers experienced Shirkey’s success and instead used multiple
incomes simply to make ends meet. Peter Shirkey’s neighbors, Daniel and Martha
Hornback understood this point well. Although they were the same age as the Shirkeys
and farmed in the same community, the Hornbacks did not own their land. Instead, they
shared their rented farm with their disabled son and sixteen-year-old grandson, Shirley,
who worked in a local coal mine. 11 Unlike Shirkey, who saved funds and used his dual
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occupation to maintain a steady income, the Hornbacks faced a steady decline in farm
profits combined with the added expense of caring for a disabled relative. For the
Hornbacks, mining was a way to make ends meet. By 1910, the Shirkeys and Stout still
lived on their farm while the Hornbacks had relocated. Shirley Hornback continued to
work as a coal miner, but lived in a rented home with his wife Lillie and a widowed
Daniel. In the following years, the Hornbacks regularly uprooted and roamed throughout
the southern Midwest coalfields looking for work.12
Cobbling together multiple occupations, then, was away for the Hornbacks to
balance their budget and for Shirkey to get ahead. Their efforts were part of larger
cooperative networks engrained in rural society that allowed multiple hands and multiple
revenues to contribute to a single family’s income. 13 For decades, farmers like the
Hornbacks took advantage of the seasonal rhythms inherent in both farming and mining
industries. During the winter months, when farms lay dormant, more mines were open. In
Illinois alone, the number of miners working in the mines increased from 16,771 in the
1887 summer to over 23,648 the following winter. 14 Farmers often took advantage of this
seasonal work, laboring in the mines before returning to the farm in the spring. “We farm
in summer and dig coal in winter,” one Kansas farmer and small mine operator explained
to the Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics. In the summer months, his mine
12
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that he shared with other local farmers closed and only resumed after harvest when coal
demand increased. 15 Likewise, miners often found work as farmhands in the summer
months when mines shut down or worked only part time. 16 Large and small mines
throughout the southern Midwest followed this pattern. Those that did not shut down
used smaller workforces in the summer and dramatically increased their number of
employees in the winter months.
These trends rippled through families, connecting sons to the same rhythms their
fathers followed. Like farmers who used their sons in the fields, miners used their sons to
help load coal in the mines, in some cases sending them to school at night so that they
could work in the mines year-round. 17 Companies granted father-son mining teams extra
cars to transport coal, increasing the overall amount credited to the miner while allowing
the son to learn the mining trade. Men without sons, like Shirkey, hired “contract miners”
to help. Such hired loaders were often young men like Isum Stout or farmers like Shirley
Hornback who needed the additional income while tending the farm. As with sons,
companies granted miners with loaders extra cars but because they were the miners’
employees, loaders did not receive their pay from the company. When a loader placed
coal on a coal car, the company counted it as coal belonging to the miner. On payday, the
miner then paid his loader a flat daily wage out of his own earnings. 18
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In many cases, this shared labor made the difference between rural workers
earning a living wage and going into debt. For farmers, it provided an income that
supplemented crop profits. It dramatically increased a miner’s coal output, well-worth the
money spent to hire a hand. In an 1893 study of coal mining families, the Missouri BLS
found that miners’ yearly wages ranged from $200 to $560. Those who worked alone
typically earned a little over $200 each year and never earned more than $300. Miners
with a loader reported earning $400 to $560 each year. 19
But family income streams depended on more than fathers and sons. Tight
budgets demanded that even women contribute to this work. “I never will marry a
farmer,” Gussie Reuter declared to her cousin. Growing up on an Illinois farm, she knew
that farm labor, even when shared, was grueling. “I will marry but not a farmer, don’t
care who he is.” 20 Reuter’s disdain for farm life came from knowing that farmers’ wives
worked hard at long hours. Like other rural wives, they cooked and cleaned, raised
gardens and livestock, made and sold whiskey, and took in sewing and laundry for extra
money. 21 Their actions granted many rural women a degree of authority over household
finances. In her diary, Nannie Stillwell Jackson differentiated the livestock she raised and
the money she earned from her husband’s income and grew frustrated when he spent her
money unwisely. 22 Historian Sally Zanjani found that wives of Western prospectors were
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far from passive helpmeets. Instead, women like Ellie Nay labored passionately in the
prospecting field. They “saw themselves as full partners” in their husband’s, father’s,
and brother’s prospecting enterprises and “demanded the financial rewards due them as
such.” 23 In the process, wives included themselves as crucial components in balancing
family budgets, not only helping to decide how money would be spent, but also in
discerning the proper time to strike.
Southern Midwest wives also fit this description. Although Henry Mendinhall
owned the house that boarded young bachelor Peter Shirkey in 1870, Barbra Mendinhall
cared for him. In paying board, Shirkey and the other miners hired her to cook their meals
and wash their clothes. Other wives used these same roles differently. Unlike
Mendinhall’s housemates who were boarders, the Shirkeys declared that their housemate
was an employee. The room and meals Isum Stout received were a portion of his
payment, making Lydia and Peter Shirkey joint employers. 24 In other cases, wives were
even more enterprising. Missouri Labor Commissioner Lee Meriwether noted that farmer
wives with cash purchased mine scrip and company checks from local miners’ wives for
roughly eighty percent of their value. These arrangements enabled mining families to
have cash without forfeiting wages to the company, freeing them to shop for cheaper
goods elsewhere or even move away if desired. Meanwhile, farm wives saved the scrip
and checks for purchases when company store goods were cheap, maximizing the return
on their investment. 25 Such actions as employees, employers, and investors made
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southern Midwest wives crucial not only in sustaining family finances, but also placed
them in the center of rural market networks.
These trends coincided with larger community bonds that allowed neighbors to
aid each other in times of need. David and Lizzie McMaster of Carbondale, Kansas,
described to the Holt family how their community combined their resources to survive
after a particularly bad year when crops and cattle failed. In addition to aid from the
Grange, residents purchased groceries and provided housing for neighbors who fared
especially poorly. 26 In other instances, such as an 1893 strike in Kansas, rural farmers
gave striking miners wheat when local stores refused to sell to them. 27 “Tommy the
Tramp” and union organizer Tim O’Malley, two wanderers famous in the Midwest
mining industry, frequently described miner and farmer wives who opened their homes
and cupboards to road-weary workers or fellow miners who shared their dinner pails with
those who had none. 28
The multiple incomes and occupations provided by rural men and women in
industrializing rural society, then, were built upon longstanding cooperative networks that
relied upon friends and family aiding each other. A miner hiring a neighboring farmer to
load coal in the winter helped both men increase their incomes just as a farm wife
purchasing mine scrip from a neighboring miner wife granted both women better options
26
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for purchasing their families’ necessities. Such traditions opened the door for neighbors
to join each other in forming cooperatives with the expectation and understanding that all
would benefit from jointly owning and investing in a store or mine. 29 Industrialization did
not separate farmers from laborers at all, but instead drew them together as they cobbled
their incomes side by side.

Turns
If common experiences and community ties could pull workers in various
occupations together, it could also push them apart. For many, the wedge between miners
and farmers who worked in the mines began with “the turn.” In the mines, the turn
referred to the length of the miners’ wait for a car to transport their coal to be weighed. In
most mines, the number of available cars was limited or the weighing process was
backlogged so that miners might only receive four cars a day, which limited the amount
of coal he produced. When mines became overcrowded, such as when companies
recruited miners from elsewhere or when farmers entered the mines, the number of
miners “claiming a turn” increased. This elongated each miner’s wait, making the turn
“slow,” and decreased each miner’s total output.30 Because a miner’s wage depended on
the amount of coal he produced, even miners working at high paying mines found it
difficult to make ends meet. Iowa miner “Rambler” complained that miners came from
all over the country to take advantage of the high wages paid at his mine, but in the
process overcrowded the mine and slowed the turn. “[T]he shafts here would need to run
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night and day to hoist all the coal the men here could send out, and still they come,” he
continued bitterly. Despite the company’s high wages per ton of coal, the slow turn meant
that the average miner in Rambler’s mine still only received a $1.50 for a day’s labor. 31
But crowded mines did not solely come from traveling workers. Mines also
became overcrowded as farm profits decreased and farmers grew more dependent on the
mines to sustain their families. Farmers like Shirley Hornback who began working in the
mines as miners’ employees working for a flat daily wage soon learned they could earn
more by mining and loading their own coal during the winter months or abandoning their
farms entirely. 32 Their decisions to work as miners further glutted the labor market,
slowing the turn so that all miners earned less. “The farmers have crowded us out,”
Indiana miner John Neal complained. The “coal butchers from the farm,” needed only a
supplemental income rather than a living wage. They accepted increased dead work and
lower wages to gain a spot in the mine, forcing “practical miners,” or those who mined as
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their primary occupation, to accept the same terms. 33 Miner “Bald Head” replied to
Neal’s grievance, claiming that the practical miners had no one but themselves to blame.
In their quest to increase their pay, the “practical miners that are so selfish” had trained
the farmers how to mine. “They go to work and give the Hay John [farmer] fifty or
seventy-five cents per day, and about three or four weeks afterward they get to ask the
boss for a room to themselves, and the boss gives them one,” he explained bitterly.
“That’s the way winter diggers have got such a foothold,” he continued. “You don’t
count the risk you are taking when you hire such men as they.” 34 But little could be
done. The need that drove farmers to the mine was the same that prompted miners to hire
farmers to help load coal.
As the turn slowed, mining and farming families turned their own value systems
to accommodate their need, twisting and molding them into new notions of honor and
respectability previously deemed undignified. In the coal mines, labor deemed
“dishonest” came in several forms. Some miners took advantage of the mines’ constant
accessibility, which allowed them to loosen or load coal on Sundays or late nights when
the mines were closed. Because the cars used to load the coal were almost always in short
supply, loading cars when the mine was closed enabled a worker to load his coal without
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waiting for a car. In the process, it took cars away from “honest” miners working during
operating hours. Miner “Working Slack” noted that fathers claimed turns for their sons,
but the sons did not fill them. Instead, fathers loaded extra coal on their sons’ cars while
the son earned daily wages as mule drivers. 35 Other miners complained of coworkers
accepting wage reductions, extra dead work, or large spaces between screen bars in order
to gain a better spot in the mine or secure steady work. In doing so, miners allowed
employers to charge less for their coal, sell more coal, and keep the mines open longer.
Such an arrangement was so effective that an Indiana state investigator found that miners
working at 75 cents per ton earned more in wages than those who earned one dollar per
ton due to the amount of coal the company sold. 36 Still, the dead work and large screens
combined with miners accepting wage reductions ultimately forced other miners and
mine operators to accept the same terms or else face shutdowns in their own mines. 37
Illinois miner, “K. R.” insisted no honest man of union principle would engage in such
“cut-throat” actions, yet desperation drove many to accept the terms. “[T]he result,” he
claimed, “is that good men are made the target of by the operators,” forced to accept
lower wages that would only increase the wage decline or lose their jobs entirely. 38
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Few components of the mining industry revealed this moral compromise more
than the “free click.” Much like the pluck-me, the free click or “free turn” was a system
companies enforced in mines throughout the nation. Most mines required “entries,” or
long corridors that extended from the shaft to the “face” of the mine. The majority of
miners worked in “rooms” situated along these corridors, but a handful of miners were
needed to “drive entry,” or dig the coal from the face to extend the corridor for more
rooms. 39 The faster the “entry men” cleared, the faster production increased. Companies
therefore lost money when entry men waited for cars to transport their coal. To solve this,
many operators implemented the “free click” which permitted entry men to skip the line
and take an empty car whenever they needed it instead of having to wait with the room
men.
The practice was needed to keep the mine functioning, but it had the added
benefit of dramatically increasing the entry men’s pay at the expense of the room men
who continued to wait for access to coal cars. In most instances, companies used entry
driving positions to reward miners for good behavior, such as taking on extra dead work,
shopping at the company store, or accepting a wage reduction without complaint. Such
favoritism used the miners’ economic need to keep the workforce divided. 40 Although
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some miners and companies managed to create a system that allowed all miners a turn at
the entry to keep wages even, this grew more difficult to uphold as wages declined. “We
had a mass meeting and a resolution was passed for the entry men to get six cars ahead
and then to stop until the room men can catch up to them,” Kentucky miner “Penrod”
reported. “This worked all right until they had to stop [after their six cars] and then they
kicked against it and now it is the same old tune—free click.” 41 Mine workers may have
remained opposed the idea of favoritism in the mines, but such an opportunity to earn
more proved too valuable for workers who benefited from the system.

Enterprise
The moral turns that working families faced demonstrated how economic
circumstances transformed social and cultural norms, undermining resident’s values even
as they tried to hold onto them. But not all dishonest labor came by force. Hoping to
grow wealthy, some producers invested in businesses like cooperative stores or coal
mines while others took advantage of workplace favoritism and strikes to gain higher
wages. Hundreds of producers, like the employers and merchants with whom they dealt,
adopted cut-throat practices not to scrape by, but to improve their economic position.
Hundreds of farmers operated what many knew as a “one-horse rig,” or a small
mine on their land that used a single horse to hoist the coal out of their pit. Their wives,
children, and hired hands often aided in the labor, allowing them to produce a meager
amount of coal cheaply. Because these mines were informal arrangements rather than an
1980 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 39; Philip S. Foner, Organized Labor and the
Black Worker, 1619-1981 (New York: International Publishers, 1981), 83; Sterling D. Spero and Abram L.
Harris, The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor Movement, (New York: Atheneum, 1969, 1931
original)232-3. See also Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle; David Brody, Steelworkers in
America: The Nonunion Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
41
“Penrod,” letter to the editor, “The New Kentucky Mines,” NLT, February 5, 1887; “D.N. P.” to the
editor, “The Free Turn Curse,” NLT, January 22, 1887.

102

actual mining company, one-horse rigs did not always pay their miners a per-ton wage,
but instead gave their miners a percentage of the profit earned on the coal, further
reducing production costs compared to miners paid by the ton. One-horse rigs often
operated only in winter months and seldom produced enough to compete for coal
contracts. Still, their production supplied local markets so that, collectively, these lowcost enterprises cut into demand enough to force larger companies to lower their own
production costs. More importantly to miners, when miners struck against coal
companies one-horse rigs often remained in operation, benefiting from the high coal
demand.

42

Landowners with private mines were not the only small-scale operations to turn
their back to honest principles and break strikes. Small mine owners, like the farmers
who owned stock in Egypt’s Enterprise Mine also discarded their neighbors’ and
employees’ interests when their investments were at risk. Scholars, however, seldom
consider these connections between cooperative investment and strikebreaking and
instead highlight differences between the two. Early examinations of worker cooperatives
and strikebreaking often depicted such participants as ill-equipped to participate in the
modern market. Cooperative participants were bent on reviving bygone market systems
while strikebreakers were little more than tools to serve company agendas. 43 Even the
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most sympathetic depictions of cooperatives have maintained this clear division between
producer and capital. Lawrence Goodwyn agreed with previous assertions that farmer
cooperatives grew out of traditional community values, but asserted that these groups
“challenged the existing structures of … the nation’s financial system,” envisioning a
system wholly different from the culture big businesses offered. 44
Recent examinations of cooperatives and strikebreaking have done more to
emphasize producers’ business-minded pragmatism, but in many ways distinctions
between union and non-union remain. Historian Charles Postel saw cooperative efforts as
evidence of business-minded farmers and farm laborers capable and willing to participate
in the modern market, yet cast their efforts as an alternative vision to mainstream market
ventures. 45 Scholars of strikebreaking have maintained a similar dichotomy. They have
highlighted social, economic, and cultural reasons for strikebreaking, but in most
instances, these examinations cast strikebreakers as the antithesis of union workers. 46
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Although Jarod Roll has recently noted the difference between non-union and anti-union
strikebreaking, the distinction between union and non-union, striker and strikebreaker,
remains. 47 In fact, cooperatives and strikebreaking are seldom examined in tandem, so
that those who established cooperatives appear to have little in common with those who
broke strikes.
In practice, however, union-associated entities like cooperatives and actions like
strikebreaking overlapped. For thousands of workers in the southern Midwest and
elsewhere, the nation’s leading capitalists were not the only investors privy to risk
management tactics like joint-stock ownership or cooperative investment. Instead, they
involved average workers looking to earn extra income for their families. Such
opportunities had more in common with strikebreaking than historians have typically
understood. Cooperative mines could seldom price their coal competitively without
cutting into shareholder profits. When prices fell, they were frequently the first mines to
sit idle and the last to resume work. For the duration of its closure, investors gained
nothing. Larger businesses absorbed the loss, but small investors, like farmers and
miners, lost their wages in addition to their investment. As was the case with the
Enterprise mine in Egypt, the prospect of losing such an investment was enough for
stockholding farmers to become strikebreakers. 48
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The farmers’ willingness to strikebreak demonstrated the surest way for an
individual or cooperative to survive in the competitive market. The comparatively few
cooperative mines that succeeded often did so by implementing the same cut-throat
tactics as other firms. A Knights of Labor cooperative in Avery, Iowa, not only cut coal
prices but offered a free car of nut coal for each ten cars of coal purchased. The tactic
stole contracts from their biggest competitor, the Avery Coal Company, allowing the
cooperative to dominate the local coal market.49 Regardless of the Knights’ ideals of fair
labor, the cooperative’s survival depended on its ability to competitively market its
product. 50
Consequently, although they were founded on the premise of allowing average
workers ownership, cooperatives and joint-stock initiatives often helped the owners at
their employees’ expense. The Knights of Labor executive board, for example, owned the
Mutual Mine near Cannelburg, Indiana. It had operated as a cooperative since 1884, but
only a few of its owners worked in the mine. Instead, most were Knights from Ohio,
including the mine superintendent and NTA 135 Master Workman, William T. Lewis.
But by 1892, the Knights could not afford to run the mine and leased it to the Watkins,
Lunch and Company, a coal company based in Peoria, Illinois. Technically, the mine
remained a cooperative. Its owners continued to receive a twelve cent per ton royalty on
all coal mined, but like hundreds of other mine owners, the Knights were absentee
proprietors who left most decisions to local managers. In these instances, already low
profits fell further for cooperative owners who split their dividends with third party
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companies while those working in the mines received little or no benefit from the
cooperative at all. 51
Similarly, joint-stock companies like the Enterprise mine in Egypt were forced to
comply with the wage reductions or shut down entirely. 52 Indiana miner and union
organizer J. C. Heenan’s joint-stock mine in southern Illinois faced a similar problem.
Unable to compete while paying the union-sanctioned scale, Heenan and his business
partners cut their miners’ wages to price their coal under the largest Egypt mines. While
mining coal and organizing local unions in the Indiana coalfields, Heenan simultaneously
drove down wages under union scale rates as a mine owner in a neighboring state. 53
Such instances blurred divisions between owner and employee as well as union
and non-union. Heenan was all four at once. While he pushed for higher wages, market
competition made it impossible for him to pay what he and other miners deemed fair. The
need to recuperate his investment led Heenan to undermine the very policies he
advocated.54 In Petersburg, Illinois, mine stockholders gave themselves first access to
mine cars so that their employees “only get what cars they can’t fill and that is few.”
Stockholders ran a company store and forced their miners to shop there. When the miners
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complained, the stockholding miners fired their employees and continued mining coal on
their own. 55
Companies with more capital frequently used similar incentives to their
advantage, offering miners mine stock to soothe wage grievances. In doing so, companies
decreased the likelihood of miners striking for higher wages because it sliced into their
gains as shareholders. In at least one case, these tactics were so injurious to miners that
one committee of Illinois miners wrote to the National Labor Tribune to end the practice.
“[W]e earnestly implore of you fellow men not to increase the force of the shyster
stockholders whose acts always tend to keep the iron heel of oppression down heavily on
us.” Claiming their actions were “a dodge from men’s duty,” the committee wanted these
stockholding miners to “be branded as traitors to their fellow men and the people’s
cause.” 56
The committee’s distinction between duty to the community’s well-being and
personal investment opportunities tied into a larger moral conflict that ran throughout
nineteenth century society. According to historian Ann Fabian, as the market economy
shifted to one fueled by immediate profits and enormous gains, it changed the entire
nation’s attitude toward investment, risk, and gambling, not just those of big investors. 57
Farmers may have decried the speculators that seemed to manipulate crop prices in New
York and Chicago, but by the late 1880s futures trading was as accessible to ordinary
people hoping to turn a dime into a dollar as it was big investors. Unofficial trading
venues commonly known as “bucket shops” brought the exciting new world of futures
55
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speculation and stock trading into rural communities throughout the nation. 58 Because
they were unincorporated venues, they were classified as illegal gambling dens in most
states by the mid-1890s. 59 Regardless of their legality, however, bucket shops functioned
on the same principles as future traders in urban market exchanges. They “gambled” on
future prices by selling “fictitious” or “fiat” products without actually owning or
exchanging any merchandise. 60 Such cases blurred the lines between reputable business
owner, successful businessman, and gambler. The hope for easy profit drove big
businessmen and ordinary people alike into the world of shareholding and futures
investing.
Few aspects captured this conflation of business, gambling, and dishonesty better
than the term “blackleg.” Labor historians often dismiss it as a taunt during strikes and
seldom consider its meaning. As such, they often imply that “blackleg” and
“strikebreaker” were interchangeable terms. 61 But in the late nineteenth century,
“blackleg” had multiple meanings that most miners and farmers understood well. To
farmers and ranchers, it was a name for the gangrene that killed crops and cattle, literally
eating away the investments they worked so hard to raise. Throughout the nineteenth
century the same term described gamblers and degenerates, not unlike bucket shop
patrons, who gambled illegally with the futures market. By the end of the century, it
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applied to any dishonest “cheat” or “swindler” who unfairly took another person’s
rightful gain. 62
All of these meanings likely ran through rural workers’ minds when they heard
and used the word “blackleg.” Those who used it meant it as an insult that not only
described a dishonorable action, but dishonorable intent. Far from simply describing a
person who broke a strike, a blackleg took what did not belong to him or her without
caring who they injured. Blacklegs were malicious beings whose behaviors seemed to
spread like disease, ravaging the earnings of honest laborers, creating a moral, mental,
and physical threat. In the mining industry, “blackleg labor” implied any kind of
dishonest mining practice that injured one’s coworkers for the sake of personal profit.
While this often applied to strikebreaking, it also included men who labored below scale
rates, accepted free clicks, stole another man’s coal, loosened coal on a Sunday, and
engaged in any practice that miners deemed dishonest.63
To many miners, blacklegging of any sort was a cardinal sin. Indiana miner Lige
Jones claimed that miners who accepted free clicks were “brutal and savage and
heathenish and hell-like…. monsters who were too greedy to give their fellow-man a
62
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chance to live.” 64 Miner “D. N. P.” likewise asserted that free clickers had lost their souls
“– soulless communists I call them,” he declared. “I happened to be in church and heard
them giving their experience at a love-feast, and rise on their feet and thank God that they
could ‘read their title clear to mansions in the skies.’” To D. N. P. and hundreds of
others, such miners were hypocrites. Their good fortune did not come from God’s
blessing, but from accepting what was not theirs. D. N. P. insisted, “I would ask your
readers how these men can sit on their seats, in the sight of Almighty God and the men
they are sitting and working beside, whom they know that they have taken, as it were, the
bread out of their wives and children’s mouths to satisfy self.” 65
But the distinction between dishonest and upright was not always as clear as D. N.
P. envisioned. 66 Thousands of miners acknowledged that they labored unscrupulously,
but insisted that they were not blacklegs. Rather, they claimed they were forced to accept
dishonest labor in order to protect their own interests. Consequently, although the
National Labor Tribune charged such miners were “a little too enterprising,” and looked
after themselves while betraying other workers, the promise of living comfortably
tempted union miners just as it did non-union. 67 Although both Knights and miners’
unions condemned the free click, union miners continued to participate in the system.
The reward it offered was too great for them to reject the system on principle alone. “I am
sorry to say the majority of the entry men are Knights of Labor,” western Kentucky miner
“Penrod” claimed of his local mine. Such men, he insisted, were Knights “in name only,
64
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not principle, if I am not mistaken, or they would not accept of a free click if they want to
act right towards their fellow man, as they get all [the work] they can do and the
roommen in some parts of the mine not making a livelihood.” But Penrod’s coworkers
were not the only organized men who disregarded honest principles. Indiana miner
“T.B.T.” noted that his local’s president “and most of the committee” regularly took free
clicks, causing him to conclude that “we ought not ask others to join [the Miners’
Federation] if we violate the rules ourselves.” 68
William Houston of Indiana noted that the Knights at one local mine accepted a
10 cent per ton reduction that would force all mines in the region to “go down” in wages.
“There is only one name for this and that is blacklegging,” he argued. But the effects of
blacklegging did more than allow blacklegs an advantage to earn more at their neighbors’
expense. Like a contagion, it spread as miners injured by those they condemned as
blacklegs had no choice but to labor dishonestly themselves. Illinois miners faced a
similar situation when operators initiated an immediate 10 cent per ton reduction in
wages that would increase to 20 cents if the miners resisted, National Progressive Union
organizer Patrick H. Donnelly advised the miners to “keep cool” and accept the terms.
“All who can get work at something else should do it,” he asserted, continuing that “those
who can’t get work should adapt themselves to the conditions and make themselves as
useful to the cause as possible.” 69 Such orders were a far cry from the rallies that
typically associated unionism with solidarity and strength. Rather, Donnelly’s words
68
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reflected a language of compromise that came from the realization that market prices for
coal had dropped too low for unions to enforce the agreements made with employers.
Yet, in the process, miners continued to undermine their neighbors, allowing wages to
fall ever lower 70 “We are getting more demoralized every week in Clay City,” Houston
concluded in his letter, acknowledging the guilt many union miners felt when they
accepted their wage reduction. The mining Knights were over 1200 strong, he observed,
but they could not honor their own principles. 71

Concessions
Miners’ belief in honest principles, then, did not forestall their hardships. When
Iowa miners in NTA 135 fell on hard times, they had little choice but to undercut their
neighbors. Rather than face scorn in their own communities, several miners traveled to
Grape Creek, Illinois, a Miners’ Federation (NFM) stronghold in the midst of an ongoing
strike. Carrying union cards, the Iowa Knights insisted they were honorable men forced
to break the strike and meant no harm. “My God, what way would they help us?” Illinois
Federation officers asked “My neighbor to starve my family and then ask that I consider
him a good and true neighbor!” 72
The officers’ description of the strikebreaking union miners as “neighbors”
reflected the difficult position southern Midwest miners occupied in the Gilded Age.
Although the Iowa mines were over one hundred miles removed from Grape Creek, rail
lines placed miners, and their coal, side by side. Regardless of distance, they were
neighbors. At the same time, the word pulled on miners’ sense of working-class
70
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community. More than ever before, miners across the nation were connected and their
actions had an impact on each other. Such an image called for miners to “love thy
neighbour as thyself,” and look after each other’s needs rather than tear them down. 73
Still, a miner’s duties to his neighbors remained secondary to his personal duties.
Miners may have been connected through national markets and even common labor
principles, but responsibilities to hearth and one’s union brothers remained paramount.
Regional boundaries and union divides therefore became means for otherwise “honest”
men to justify non-unionlike behavior. Notions of honor that caused a miner to think
twice before blacklegging at home held less sway when he did not personally know the
miners he injured. Thus the Iowa Knights were not alone in their behavior. Missouri
miners broke Kansas strikes, Indiana miners broke strikes in southern Illinois, and
western Kentucky miners broke strikes in southern Indiana. 74
But in the growing competitive market, miners no longer needed to travel to a
nearby mine to break the strike. Because the goal of the strike was to dry up the coal
supply, miners who accepted the low-paying coal contracts belonging to striking mines
technically blacklegged by ensuring the supply of cheap coal remained unchanged. 75
Business boomed in Danville, Illinois, when nearby Springfield miners went on strike.
But, as one Danville miner noted, it would not be long before Springfield’s strike would
end with a defeat that forced Danville to take a reduction. Danville would go on strike,
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the miner continued, and while it was out, Springfield would fill its contracts until the
Danville strike failed. Both towns technically broke each other’s strikes and claimed its
competition was blacklegging, but neither viewed its own strikebreaking actions as
blacklegging. Rather, it justified its willingness to fill strikers’ contracts by claiming that
it was only taking back what the “blacklegs” had taken from it in its last strike. “That is
the way Springfield and Danville men have been fighting for twenty years,” he
concluded. 76
This dynamic grew more complicated as the national market web expanded,
pulling more mines into the same competitive network. Springfield and Danville not only
competed against each other, but the entire field reaching from Pennsylvania to southern
Illinois. By 1889, miners in Ohio could fill Illinois contracts or Pennsylvania miners
could compete against Indiana without leaving their home state. 77 Although the National
Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers (NPU) had formed less than five months
earlier, the organization failed to unite the miners and could not stop the steady fall of
wages across the coalfields. Pennsylvania and Ohio mines reduced their wages by five
cents per ton, forcing Indiana and Illinois mines to lower their wages to compete for the
Chicago market. In Indiana, bituminous wages fell from 75 to 55 cents per ton and block
coal from 90 to 70.78 Even more harsh, mine owner William L. Scott, “coal king of
Pennsylvania,” instructed his mine manager Charles J. Devlin to reduce the Spring
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Valley, Illinois, miners’ wages from 90 cents per ton to 72 ½ cents per ton, double the
dead work, and crowd the mines by adding a third miner to each two-man room. 79
In the course of negotiating, most Indiana miners managed to settle for a five cent
per ton reduction comparable to a reduction Pennsylvania and Ohio miners accepted. 80
Some Illinois operators offered similar terms as long as the miners agreed to sign an ironclad agreement rejecting the union. 81 Progressive Union leader Dan McLaughlin advised
the miners to accept all terms except the iron-clad agreement. The operators had
stockpiled coal and would not need to reopen their mines for at least six months, “so that
when the markets require our labor we would, through hunger and other causes, be ready
to accept their terms.” Accepting the reduction immediately, he and other union leaders
insisted, “is the very best we can and should do.” 82
The miners disagreed. Calling a mass meeting in English, Polish, and German,
miners discussed the terms, deciding that they were dishonest and unjust. Although the
majority was not affiliated with NTA 135 or the Progressive Union, they voted to go on
strike. 83 Furious at McLaughlin and the other leaders’ willingness to abandon the
principles they professed, the non-union strikers of northern Illinois and the Indiana block
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field insisted that they would fight for honest principles and fair pay even when the
unions would not. 84
As the miners walked out, however, their actions were met with disdain from
union leaders. If the miners wished for higher wages, McLaughlin contended, they
needed to be thoroughly organized across state lines. Southern and central Illinois needed
to honor the pay scale or their cheap coal would flood the Chicago market. The only way
a strike could be successful was if all underpaid miners in all states struck
simultaneously. In light of this, McLaughlin condemned the northern Illinois strike,
calling the striking miners “knaves” for believing that a regional strike would solve a
national problem. They were willing to ruin the progress the national organization had
made for the sake of a local pay increase, “though some of them [claim] to be followers
of the meek and lowly Savior,” he continued. Such a claim indicated that the non-union
strike for higher wages was not only ill-conceived, but morally wrong and dishonorable.
“They will have plenty of time to do penance in sackcloth and ashes for the ruin they
have brought on our people.” The strikers meant well, McLaughlin insisted, “but they
have listened to the wily tongue of the deceiver and not to their friends….” With that,
McLaughlin and other NPU and NTA 135 leaders ordered all organized men to sign the
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contract and return to the mines. 85 In the following days, several union miners
complied. 86
The balance of the strikers grew more outraged. They believed that McLaughlin’s
orders, which encouraged union men to blackleg and break an overwhelmingly non-union
strike, were “a cowardly stab at manhood’s rights.” 87 Such a phrase implied that
McLaughlin’s actions to preserve the union over miners’ wages made him no better than
employers who treated their workers poorly. “Old Dan [McLaughlin]” had no right to
order the miners living “under enforced slavery” to further “sign away their manhood,”
miner and local organizer T. J. Lewellyn observed. 88 Such an accusation indicated that
organizers like McLaughlin were as guilty of making miners less than human as the
employers who refused to treat them fairly. “As to Dan meeting tyranny and oppression,”
Pro Bono Publico asserted, “it is an easy matter to meet in the way he has advised for
eight years. We have been advised to accept reduction after reduction until the thing has
grown monotonous and irksome.” 89 Unlike McLaughlin, the miners could no longer
afford to wait for the day when all miners could strike together. Union officers like
McLaughlin, it seemed, were so far removed from the miners’ daily struggle that they
had lost sight of honest principles. Instead, they grew complicit to the cut throat practices
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that drove wages down. “Keep quiet, ‘Dan,’” Pro Bono Publico ordered. “Don’t censure
any man or men for doing something you never dared do.”90
To them, McLaughlin and those who followed his orders and accepted the
depreciated terms were bowing to company demands. Missouri miner George
Palfreyman, like many northern Illinois miners at the time, insisted that such miners were
not humans but “things in the shape of men.” 91 Illinois organizer William Scaife agreed,
writing that the “hordes” of union men who broke the strike were worse than mice who
timidly accepted company terms. Rather, they were “rats” that “did not possess a spark of
manhood.”92 Accepting the terms did more than make it impossible for northern Illinois
miners to live, northern Illinois striking miner John Rowe argued indignantly. In addition,
it “would cut the throats of our fellow miners in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, who
have got settled on reasonable terms, and we propose to hunger awhile rather than do
this, even though Dan McL. calls us knaves.” 93At a special convention governed by
Illinois NPU officers, the miners agreed. They not only decided to continue the strike, but
officially censured McLaughlin “for branding us as knaves and deceivers of the men of
this district, who are actuated by motives as pure and honest as those of any man….” 94
But honesty meant little when coal flooded the market. As miners and officers
fought over who had the purest motives, the families of strikers suffered. Neither the
NPU nor NTA 135 could support the hundreds of striking families. By August, the
Bloomington [Illinois] Daily Pantagraph reported that at least two infants had already
90
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died from starvation, with more expected if the strike continued without relief. 95
Consequently, as union miners broke the strike in the northern Illinois mines, hundreds of
desperate strikers traveled to the non-union mines in Egypt to find work. Both groups
mined coal below the scale and both sent their coal to the Chicago market. Although both
claimed to be “brave fellows” fighting for what was right for them and their families,
both were also deemed “blacklegs” by other miners who claimed their willingness to
mine coal rendered the strike ineffective. 96
By December, most northern Illinois mines had resumed work. The Illinois strike
officially ended when Spring Valley miners signed a new contract accepting a 7 ½ cent
per ton reduction and increased dead work, but allowing two men to a room. Dead work
taken into consideration, the entire reduction averaged 10 cents per ton rather than the
original 20-25 cents. Within days, the last Indiana mines on strike conceded as well. 97
Although the miners secured better terms, northern Illinois and Indiana miners
condemned the unions for betraying their cause. 98 Dishonesty and selfishness, they
recognized, existed on both sides of the union line. Acknowledging the dissatisfaction,
William Scaife attempted to mollify the embittered workers. The terms were unfair, he
conceded, but the miners’ struggle was no longer a fight between right and wrong.
Instead, it was an ongoing choice between “the least of two evils.” 99
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The national market twisted and stretched understandings of honor and morality,
complicating workplace conflicts in ways that turned workers and unions against each
other. Efforts to generate larger personal profit were never limited to the big businessmen
and bankers that rural producers so readily condemned. Though on a smaller scale,
producers engaged in similar acts not only upsetting local relationships as small mine
owners extracted their profits by decreasing their neighbors’ incomes, but making it
impossible to overcome local interests to create an effective national union.
Consequently, as wages declined, union affiliation did not denote honest behavior any
more than miners’ and farmers’ rejection of union organizations indicated a lack of
“honest” labor principles.
For farmers, miners, and owners, from cooperatives and joint stock ventures to
blacklegging, the concessions that national market competition demanded remained the
same. To fight debt and exploitation producers had to compromise their sense of what
was moral and fair. Miners and farmers gambled, cheated and stole. They cried
“blackleg” when dishonest labor threatened their own livelihoods, but accepted terms
that they knew would “cut the throats” of their fellow miners, breaking their strikes,
filling their contracts, taking their coal cars, and ignoring their scales. It was the lesser
evil than subjecting their families to hardship when increased income was within
reach. 100
But it was still an evil. Miners throughout the southern Midwest looked in disgust
at the 1889 strike failure, observing the markets, declining wages, union officers,
Minutes, December 21 and November 12, 1889, in Knights of Labor LA 8617 Minutes Book 1, page 48-50
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blacklegs, and the families who survived the summer on little more than bread and water.
To them, it was a fresh reminder of the immorality inherent not only in their employers’
business practices, but the practices of their own neighbors. “In the past we have sown to
the lust of flesh and we are reaping a harvest of evils,” miner “Pumpkin Smasher,” said of
the 1880s conflicts. In training the farmers that overcrowded the mines, in flooding the
market with coal, and in accepting more reductions, he observed, the miners contributed
to the dire circumstances they faced. “[O]ur craftsmen have become so greedy of pelf that
they sell their souls to get a dime more,” he continued. Such a phrase was a reminder of
the cost dishonest labor demanded. If operators were “soulless” for demanding higher
profits at workers’ expense, workers forfeited their own souls when they injured their
own neighbors.101
Few miners, least of all those defeated in 1889, believed the Progressive Union or
NTA 135 could end this moral erosion. But the experiences in the late 1880s convinced
the miners that they needed a way to live according to the honest principles they claimed,
to love their neighbors without starving their families. To many, national unity between
the vying unions seemed the only viable option. Union officers “have shown their
inability to look after the interests of their craftsmen,” Indiana organizer William
Houston acknowledged; yet he remained convinced that unionization was “the only rock
and foundation to build upon for the salvation of all.” 102 As the strikers returned to work
in December 1889, miners throughout the nation expressed this same hope, willing the
national miners’ union to be born again just one month later. But even as they formed the
new order, the problems of the 1880s remained. Competition and wage decline
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intensified, more farmers entered the mines, and miners remained skeptical of union
leadership. Cutthroat competition was steadfast, informing the actions of operator and
miner alike and undermining the trust miners had for each other and their organization.
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Chapter Four
Backsliders: Union Betrayal and the Aborted 1891 Strike

“I dislike to speak against those who claim to be engaged in the service of labor reform,
but he who wears your colors and professes to fight on your side, and then turns his
sword against you in the thickest of the fight, is the most cowardly and miserable of all
traitors….” 1
—Thomas Faulds

“Everyone was struck dumb when they heard the telegram read,” nineteen yearold block coal miner John Mooney reported to the United Mine Workers’ Journal. The
stillness lingered in the crowded meeting hall as Indiana block coal miners considered
United Mine Workers of America (UMW) National Secretary Patrick McBryde’s refusal
to support their proposed November 1891 strike. According to McBryde, the miners were
selfish fools for considering the endeavor. Even though the operators refused to pay the
agreed winter wage, the UMW would offer no assistance in enforcing the scale, nor
would the miners have the union’s support if they struck.2
The silence quickly turned to rage. “Do our national officers know what they are
doing? Are they aware of what they are doing? If not they will have to define their
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position and explain their reason for such conduct,” Mooney demanded. His anger came
not only from the telegram’s harsh words, but from what Mooney and thousands of other
miners saw as the officers’ continued retreat from the principles they were supposed to
defend. Six months earlier, national officers canceled the UMW’s first nationwide strike
days before it was to begin. Although officers had once promised certain victory, they
ordered the miners to accept the best terms employers offered. 3
Mooney’s anger toward the national office, then, was part of a broader pattern of
what many miners saw as the officers’ indifference and betrayal of the very principles
that they were elected to uphold. Like their accusations of government officials who
failed to live up to their political beliefs, many rank and filers asserted that union officers
had turned away from union principles and pulled the UMW astray with them.
But frustrations with leadership did more than demonstrate rank and file mistrust
of union leaders. It also reflected the formidable difficulties that grew from forging a
national organization that could regulate a national but decentralized industry. Interstate
competition between coal mines demanded a strong and centralized national union to
negotiate and regulate the wage scale, but doing so often came at the expense of local
concerns. More than ever before, the new union structure forced UMW leaders to look
after national interests and larger mining regions like the western Pennsylvania field over
the issues of smaller mining regions and areas like Mooney’s block field. Consequently,
what appeared to Mooney to be an abandonment of union principle was really evidence
of an overtaxed union spread too thinly to look after all regions simultaneously.
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Still, in 1891, Mooney and thousands of other miners wondered why they should
wait for officers’ blessings to earn a living wage. “We have blacklegged long enough,”
Mooney grumbled. By following union orders, they had worked below the pay scale,
which drove down wages in neighboring mines and made union miners indistinguishable
from the “blacklegs” who broke strikes, the most hated workers in the industry. The
national officers had endorsed the “blacklegging” Mooney described, content with letting
Indiana workers fall in to deeper poverty. But neither Mooney nor the rest of the Indiana
miners and even the district officers agreed with this approach. Recognizing this, IndianaKentucky District Secretary John H. Kennedy ordered the entire state to strike, despite
the national leaders’ orders. Mooney and thousands of Indiana miners cheered. True
union miners fought for fair treatment in the mines, Mooney argued, “and if the national
officers do not help us let them keep hands off and we will fight our own battles.” 4
The Indiana rejection of the UMW national officers in November 1891 was not an
isolated event. By the early 1890s, laborers across the nation were dissatisfied with union
leadership, causing membership to wane. 5 Although historians have cast this decline as a
kind of disillusion that eroded union “solidarity” when the successes that once appeared
guaranteed no longer seemed attainable, Mooney’s assertions show that workers did not
always join or abandon unions based solely on union potential for success. 6 Instead,
many like Mooney, remained in the union long after major organizing failures even
though they disagreed with union leaders and their actions.
4
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In many respects, the UMW’s experiences in the early 1890s are crucial because
of what did not occur rather than what did. The UMW’s 1891 national strike that did not
happen demonstrated that membership numbers did not indicate union strength. Although
the union claimed to be 70,000 members strong the February before the cancelled strike,
only a fraction were willing to strike just a few months later.7 Second, the UMW’s
decision to cancel the strike did not come from antagonistic employers, but from the tens
of thousands of miners who would not honor the strike, indicating that the young union’s
biggest threat came from within the order. Yet, even when leaders canceled the strike and
confessed the UMW’s frailty, miners did not immediately abandon the union as studies of
organizing suggested they should have. Moreover, when miners decided to leave the
union, many still believed in unionism even if they did not have its membership. They
did not abandon the UMW because of any disillusion with organized labor but because
they believed the UMW leaders had turned away from the organization’s original goals.
In the months following the May 1891 strike cancellation, miners and officers
struggled to save the union, wrestling with dissatisfied miners and defiant local unions. In
officers’ eyes, miners who “kicked” or fought against the union by not paying dues,
rebuking leaders, and disregarding union orders were “Judases” who “backslid” away
from the honest principles they had once held. Conversely, miners like John Mooney who
had insisted that the miners could “fight our own battles,” believed that the true
backsliders were the officers who forced miners to blackleg, leading the union away from
its founding principles. Miners “kicked” to regain control of the union supposed to look
after their interests. When their efforts to reclaim the UMW seemed fruitless, miners
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throughout the nation questioned whether the UMW’s centralized structure and national
scope ever would be able to look after all miners’ interests. Thousands formed their own
local unions that rivaled the UMW. The Indiana miners’ actions in the months after the
1891 strike cancellation, then, were part of an ongoing struggle between national officers
and coal miners both inside and outside the UMW.
Close examination of the Indiana miners’ grievances with national and state
UMW officers provides a useful means to understand when and why droves of rank and
file miners abandoned the UMW in nearly every mining region of the nation. These early
UMW failures and mining families’ responses to them indicate that union decline in the
late nineteenth century was not necessarily due to company hostility or worker disillusion
with unions’ ability to improve workplace conditions. It did not denote a waning faith in
unionism at all, but was a conscious effort to recommit the union to its own principles
and create a union that fit with their needs and visions for their futures.

Misled
Over seventy thousand coal miners were supposed to strike on May 1, 1891.
Instead, less than ten thousand struck, and most of that number went out by accident.
Planned by the UMW national officers to initiate the eight-hour workday throughout the
coal industry, the strike would be the first time all miners walked out in unison. For over
a year, officers and organizers trumpeted the strike, promising that it would begin an
aggressive campaign for fair treatment in the mines, increasing wages and improving
work conditions. Despite months of campaigning and assurances of certain victory,
however, UMW leaders called off the strike less than three days before it was to begin.
As the officers explained in a circular sent to all locals, union membership was too low
128

and too many miners had declared they would not honor the strike. Considering these
factors, it was “impossible to unite the country in one solid phalanx for any given object
of reform.” 8
Although it was abandoned, the UMW’s effort to initiate a nationwide reform no
isolated event in late nineteenth century labor organizing. It was part of a great push for
political and economic reform. Throughout the nation, groups pushed for moral, civic,
and economic reforms ranging from temperance to tax reform. Farmers in the South and
Midwest, long frustrated with the economic conditions that slighted “producers,”
gradually built a movement that, by 1890, became a powerful force in several states.
Legislation such as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and countless state and federal laws
regulating workplace conditions and railroad practices, and stronger laws against “pluckme” stores seemed to indicate that the government was on the producers’ side. As
Southern farmers worked to fight jute prices, the Farmers’ Mutual Benefit Association
(FMBA) along with Midwestern Granges mobilized wheat farmers to stand against the
“twine trust” that charged exorbitant prices for the string used to bind wheat. 9 After years
of organizing, groups like the Knights of Labor and Farmers’ Alliances forged farmerlaborer alliances to challenge railroads and monopolies. 10 By early 1891, farmers and
laborers planned to meet in Cincinnati that May to form a third political party that would
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reform the nation. 11 Meanwhile, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) made headway
securing the eight-hour workday, helping the carpenters gain it in 1890 and planned to
extend the push into other industries. 12
The UMW added to this excitement when it formed in January 1890. After years
of fighting, the miners’ unions finally united, creating one of the largest unions in the
nation. Learning from failures, the new union’s structure dissolved neither the
Progressive Union nor Knights Trade Assembly 135. The UMW promised to smooth past
differences between the two orders by creating a flexible framework that allowed Knights
to remain over their local assemblies while the former Progressive Union miners
followed the AFL. Both groups answered to the UMW’s national executive board
members who were required to hold membership in both orders. This board made all
decisions for the UMW, including which strikes the union would support and how much
aid the strikers would receive. The officers and many of the rank and file believed the
centralized power of the union would give it the strength to confront the competitive coal
market, adding mine reform to the growing list of producer-led transformations at the end
of the century. The UMW’s decision to join the AFL’s fight for the eight-hour workday
only seemed to further confirm this promise that change would come soon.
“I never so much regretted that the best half of my life is past as I do now, when I
see what grand possibilities lie in the years to come,” Laurene Gardner wrote excitedly. 13
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The forty-two-year-old miner wife expressed the sentiments thousands of producers in
the southern Midwest held. Although she had never been a union member herself, she
followed both labor and political issues closely. Her interest began at age thirteen with
the American Miners’ Association in the 1860s and continued when she married a coal
miner and settled in southern Indiana. As she raised her three sons and two daughters, she
watched miners’ unions come and go, reading union proceedings “while rocking the
cradle” of her children. 14 She raised them “to take no mean place in the grand march of
liberty to the worker.” 15This was her duty, and Gardner did it well. Her sons, she
bragged, “have never been called blacklegs yet.”16
For Gardner, a white woman who was both a part of and apart from political and
labor movements all her life, the mobilization of the UMW and the Populists gave her
hope for the future. But the enthusiasm Gardner expressed and successes she witnessed
were short-lived. As promising as 1890 appeared, the years that followed demonstrated
that the excitement was premature. State after state became enmeshed in battles over the
constitutionality and enforcement of their new workplace and pluck-me laws. Meanwhile,
Populists failed to establish their third party at a convention in Cincinnati. Despite the
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silver purchase act, economic conditions continued to worsen for producers across the
nation. 17
In the midst of this, the UMW called off its nationwide strike. The cancellation
and its aftermath, known by the miners as “the first of May,” stood in sharp contrast to
what organizers had proclaimed only one week earlier. The miners, then, saw the aborted
strike as more than evidence of the UMW’s inability to look after miners’ concerns. To
them, it was proof that the officers had misled the rank and file by pushing a movement
that failed while lying about union strength. In joining the union, miners had risked their
jobs and sacrificed their pay for what the New York Times dubbed a “May Day fizzle,” a
movement that failed before it began. 18
Those who were ready to strike expressed more outrage at the officers’
misleading actions than the union’s abandonment of the eight-hour movement. Miners in
Flagler, Iowa, expressed “great dissatisfaction” at the strike’s cancellation. “[W]e are
open to confess the calling it off is something we don’t really understand,” they wrote,
noting that the miners had voted in favor of the strike at the last convention. In the minds
of the Flagler miners, only a mass vote of delegates could countermand the strike call.
“Thus the Executive Board would have no right to declare the demand off without very
grave reasons,” the miners reasoned. 19
The problem was that UMW officers had explicitly announced that a May 1
victory was certain. The miners had not been alerted to any “grave” situations that caused
the cancellation. Consequently, the abrupt change indicated that either the leaders were
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too cowardly to fight or were lying about their strength. “I believe there has been too
darned much blowing and bluff indulged by the delegates to conventions which have
been held during the past eighteen months,” Indiana miner “M. F.” complained. 20 The
optimism from successfully forming the UMW gave delegates an inflated hope in the
new union’s abilities. Officers, M.F. and other miners reasoned, should have been more
straightforward on the limits of the union’s success prior to their eleventh hour strike
cancellation, but instead the United Mine Workers’ Journal had proclaimed certain
victory until the strike was canceled. “Are they all imbeciles, or are they all traitors?”
M.F. asked of the UMW’s national officers. 21 For many miners, the answer to this
question did not matter. The Flagler, Iowa, miners reasoned that the “Executive Board
certainly should have known, if they did not know, the strength of this order previous to
the last moment.” 22 That the officers refused to acknowledge the true state of affairs, or at
least hid them from the rank and file, seemed disingenuous and preyed on the hopes of
miners who paid into a cause that never came to fruition.
Miners throughout the nation demanded to know why the Journal’s early issues
trumpeted the eight-hour rallying cry if their defeat was so imminent. For many, the
answer was that UMW officers used the official organ as a propaganda tool to boost
worker faith in the movement without building strength. Indiana miner F. J. Llewellyn
called such efforts “thunder” that, sounded threatening but never generated a true storm.
Instead, it produced “a Don Quixotic effort” that only hurt the miners. “Truly a glory
shared in by none except the authors and creators of the great U Mean Wind paper
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organization. What magnificent victories we have won—on paper! What grand things we
shall do—in the future! But in the living present, what?” 23
Leader William Scaife acknowledged similar feelings among union miners
throughout his home state of Illinois, especially the northern field. Even after their 1889
strike defeat, they believed the UMW would redeem the miners from the years of wage
decline. Yet, instead of going forward with the national strike, the leaders pulled back,
leaving the northern Illinois miners in what Scaife called “hopeless confusion,” and
causing them to wonder if anything the union leaders said was true. The result, Scaife
claimed, was enough to “disgust the members and make them swear they will never
belong to a national union.” 24 UMW Vice President Phil Penna’s tours of the northern
Illinois coalfields in July 1891 confirmed Scaife’s assessment. By then, the thirty-four
year old was no novice to organizing. Born in England, Penna arrived in the United
States in the early 1880s and settled in Linton, Indiana, where he began mining coal. 25
His fiery speeches and short temper for non-union miners soon made “Little Phil” famous
in the Indiana miners’ unions and propelled him to national leadership when the UMW
formed in 1890. 26 Penna had given thousands of speeches and organized hundreds of
locals by the time he combed through the Illinois coalfields in the 1891 summer. Yet as
he traveled from town to town Little Phil discovered that even he could not fully
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persuade the miners to return to their union. Rather, he found that “miners have
disbanded their locals in some instances, while nowhere could I find a place thoroughly
organized.” Instead of pride in unionism, he found “deep seated discontent,” with the
UMW’s actions. 27

Backsliding
Leaders like Penna regarded the angry miners with contempt. If it were not for
such “ilk[,] there would be no need of an organization at all,” the organizer wrote,
indicating that the miners’ worst enemies were not their employers, but their coworkers
who claimed to support the union and then turned away. 28 According to IndianaKentucky District President Michael Commesky, these “chronic kickers” no longer
believed in the principles the UMW advocated. Instead, they opted to “sit like a gnat on a
log” in union meetings and “preach[ed] their scabism to whoever will listen to them”
when union victory came slowly. Their hostility toward the order, he argued, had
hardened their hearts to organized labor’s call. “[W]hen men make up their minds not to
be converted they will always be sinners,” he wrote, reminding readers that even the
strongest union men could fall away. 29
The comments touched a common theme among UMW loyalists. Miner wife
Girsy McNab claimed that such actions were both the source and the effect of the May
first cancellation. Although she insisted it was not her habit “tae tell a fa’ing man o’ his
backslidings,” she noted that many of the union miners in her region abandoned the union
27
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after the failure. “And noo when the’re in trouble they are wishing they hadna discarded
their union.” 30 Sinthy Snodgrass agreed. Like McNab, Snodgrass was frustrated by union
miner complaints about the UMW rather than building it up. “Har is de pint dat gages me
all de time,” she wrote, “why dese bery men dat cus de organazation if dey get in trouble
wid de bos dey run to de union and get dem ter strike to gane der pint an sum ob dem on
metin nite wont go to de metin, but gow rund to de pluck-me an talk to de stoer clerks
and try to git a sof snap jus because dey get der poak and beans fer de skinup stoer.” This
was no way to build a union, Snodgrass argued, instead, “we nede more good strong
onions dat will bring the tears ob repentence to de eys ob some ob de rank and file.” 31 To
McNab and Snodgrass, this was an ongoing trend. Miners constantly joined and left the
union only to join again when the miners grew desperate.
Such descriptions, which echoed complaints many churchgoers made of
“backsliders” who fell away from Christian teachings, tapped into a larger discussion of
honest and moral living in the nineteenth century. Although most often understood within
religious faith, the term “backslider” was frequently applied to people aside from those
who stopped attending church. Local newspapers used the term to describe presumably
upstanding citizens who had acted in ways deemed unethical. 32
A political backslider was someone who turned away from his political
convictions. Methodist Reverend James Miller stressed to his Decatur, Illinois,
congregation those practicing politics should uphold honesty above all. “If you have the
honest spirit you will have the right spirit, and you will go through the campaign with
30
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clean hands and come out with a record of which no man need be ashamed.” But if one
did not, he claimed “you will be certain to backslide and will have to be converted again
next winter.”33 The Ottawa [Kansas] Daily Republican rejoiced in 1893 when a group of
local residents “returned to their first love,” by rejoining the Republican Party, declaring
“that Cleveland and Hoke Smith are frauds” and that “the populists are blind.” 34 Daily
Inter Ocean correspondent “A. R. H.” made a similar claim of Illinois Ex-Governor John
Palmer in 1888. Citing the Republican-turned-Democrat’s long career, the writer
compared Palmer’s speeches from 1868 to his stance in the 1880s. While Palmer had
once referred to Southern rebels as untrustworthy “sinners,” twenty years later, A. R. H.
asserted the governor was a “backslider” himself as he moved to reconcile political
differences and looked at Democrats with sympathy. 35
Whether they were churchgoers, union members, citizens, or politicians, the
“backslider” simply was not committed to the values he or she once professed. Using the
term was a way for ministers, politicians, and union leaders to vividly describe their
efforts as well as those they wished to convert. It reaffirmed that their cause was a
morally right but challenging endeavor and not only called attention to difficult tasks of
persuasion where leaders tried to overcome evil, but also implied that their struggles
continued even when their conversion efforts succeeded.
More importantly, the term shamed the people it described. Backsliders had once
believed in the leaders’ message, but had fallen away. In this sense, the term “backslider”
became a double insult. It acknowledged that those carrying the term did not behave in
33
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moral and respectable ways. This fact was made worse because the backsliders knew
better. They sinned not out of ignorance, but simply because they did not care to act
morally. In short, while those who had never been converted were simply immoral, a
backslider was an immoral traitor. 36
Officers were not the only union affiliates that cried traitor in the months
following the May cancellation. Thousands of miners, who joined the UMW to create a
nationwide front against falling wages and poor work conditions, grew frustrated when
the new union fell short in reaching its goals as well as generating national unity.
Officers, they believed, had not only become less committed to regulating the national
market, but even their limited efforts favored some groups of miners over others.
Miners throughout the southern Midwest saw the first of May as proof of more
than officer dishonesty, but outright favoritism of some regions and miners over others.
In looking over the union’s history in his mining region, Indiana miner William Blakley
claimed that officers habitually neglected Indiana miners’ interests. When the UMW
neglected to set a price for mine-run coal in Indiana that was comparable to the eastern
coalfields, he was furious. “Why were the same provisions in regard to the mine run
price, not made for Indiana as was made for Pennsylvania and Ohio?” The officers
“ignored” the Indiana miners’ concerns “when every other distrist’s [sic] wishes and
well-being were looked after.” 37 Miner “A Beginner” from southern Illinois asserted that
no UMW officer bothered to visit his mining region since they organized, causing the
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miners to wonder if they even had officers any longer.38 It was a valid question for the
southern Illinois miners to ask. Although they were technically members of the Miners’
Federation when it merged into the Progressive Union in 1888, no organizer notified
them of the merger by telegram, letter, or visit until nearly five months later. 39 According
to William Scaife, such tendencies caused thousands of southern Midwest miners to
believe “that our organization is an eastern one.” 40
The miners found proof for their suspicions in the Executive Board’s own circular
that detailed the May 1 decision. 41 Although the UMW had over twenty districts, only
five district presidents attended the first day’s meeting to discuss the strike cancellation,
and four of those were from the Pennsylvania districts. Indiana and Illinois district
presidents were summoned for the second day’s meeting, but only the Illinois president
arrived in time. After two days’ debate, the six district presidents and the Executive
Board decided to cancel the strike and send the UMW’s May 1 strike fund to aid an
ongoing strike in the Pennsylvania coke mines. 42 The balance of the nation’s miners
would have to wait until the UMW was strong enough to fight on a larger scale.

Indiana
Southern Midwest miners were no strangers to weak unions, but by 1891 they
were tired of their unions backing away from the fight, especially when the union
38
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supported strikes in the east. This sentiment was particularly strong in the Indiana field.
The block coal miners, who suffered through the 1889 strike with little support from the
Progressive Union or NTA 135, expressed no interest in joining the UMW when it
formed one month after their 1889 strike failed. Even the bituminous miners who joined
when the new union formed were less than satisfied long before the 1891 summer. Their
anger with the national officers began a year earlier when the officers failed to secure
their desired wage scale with operators in May 1890. Although the Indiana bituminous
miners were among the most thoroughly organized in the nation and were ready to strike,
the national officers ordered them to accept the terms, which required miners throughout
the state to take a reduction. 43
The miners’ frustration was offset with the promise of the May 1891 strike.
National officers assured the miners in Indiana and elsewhere that the strike would not
only initiate the eight-hour workday, but also fair wages. Consequently, when they
learned the strike was canceled, Indiana miners were furious. But the reason for their
anger was not only due to the UMW national leaders’ reluctance to fight. The short notice
of the May 1 strike cancellation prevented Indiana UMW officers from receiving the
news in time. Unaware of the telegram, thousands of Indiana union and non-union miners
walked out of the mines believing that their neighboring states had done the same. UMW
Indiana-Kentucky District Secretary John H. Kennedy was as shocked as the miners
when he heard news of the cancellation “and I may say right here that the officers, as well
as the organized miners of this state, were in favor of the move for eight hours and I fear
the change of policy will be a great drawback in perfecting the organization of District
43
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11.” 44 Kennedy’s assessment proved true. A week later, most mines remained at a
standstill not because miners were striking for the eight-hour day, but because operators
wished to impose another wage reduction upon the miners’ return. 45
“The miners of this portion of Indiana were prepared for an honorable defeat, but
not a dishonorable retreat, and we have been both and not a blow struck!” F. J. Llewellyn
exclaimed. 46 The miners, he insisted, were accustomed to fighting losing battles for a just
cause, but to be abandoned by the union hours before their strike was nothing short of
betrayal. The UMW had left the Indiana miners at the operators’ mercy as other states’
coal filled their contracts.47
Despite the miners’ defeat and anger at what they saw as the UMW officers’
abandonment of the cause, a close examination of the dues union miners’ paid indicates
that few Indiana union miners abandoned the UMW in the months after the strike failure.
Although officers often claimed that dues payments were members’ responsibility for a
wider cause, miners did not always agree. Rather, they often looked at their dues
payments as a way to show support or disdain for union decisions. In some cases, failure
to pay dues indicated that a local union or assembly had dissolved and that miners no
longer wished to be members. More often, miners remained in the union, but refused to
give money to an organization that did not act in their interest. Organizer Tim O’Malley
observed that two Knights of Labor miners’ assemblies refused to pay dues to NTA 135
44
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in 1887 but continued to support the Knights’ General Assembly.

48

In instances such as

this, decisions to not support specific union levels or branches spoke volumes to
organizations that continually operated on small budgets, making dissatisfaction
abundantly clear to union officials. 49
Officers experienced this sentiment in the weeks following the first of May as
they traveled the coalfields to assuage miners’ frustration with the cancellation. “The
month just gone has been one of disappointment and trouble,” Ohio organizer W. C.
Pearce reported in June 1891. “In almost every mining locality in Ohio there has been
more or less kicking and fault-finding regarding the settlement of the 1st of May…. Every
day letters are received stating men will not pay their dues until some of the [national]
officers come and explain the present conditions.” 50 Ohio organizer and national
executive board member Richard L. Davis confessed that only two-thirds of his district’s
union men paid their dues. “The others refuse and some of them say that no matter [what]
they will not pay another cent to anything. They say they have paid and paid and have
never reaped any benefit and it is impossible for any one to try to show them any good
that has been done.…” 51 UMW Vice President Phil Penna found similar conditions
when he toured the southern Midwest that summer. After a trip through the northern
Illinois coalfields, local unions and assemblies unabashedly told the national officer that
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they “will oppose sending another cent to the national while the present executive board
have control” 52
Penna’s statement, combined with other national organizers’ comments pertaining
to national dues payments, indicates an important trend in union dues payments. Because
unions sent their dues to the various organization levels separately, miners and locals
were able to discern when each level received its payment and what amount each level
would receive, regardless of organizational bylaws. No detailed national dues receipts
exist from the southern Midwest during the UMW’s early years. However, IndianaKentucky District Secretary Kennedy’s meticulous weekly reports, which included the
amounts the state received from each local, offer a window into miner dedication to the
UMW. As officers and organizers reported locals collapsing and union miners
withholding their national dues, a close examination shows that the state-level finances
fared somewhat differently than the national. 53
Prior to the strike, Kennedy’s dues totals often ranged from $20 to $90 each week,
with the highest amounts collected between March 28 and April 30, corresponding with
anticipation for the May strike (Appendix Chart 1). This pattern changed in the weeks
following May 1. The first three weeks following the strike cancellation state dues
declined slightly compared to weeks prior, hovering at roughly $40 each week, within the
range typical for his reports prior to the strike. But by June 4, Kennedy reported only
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$8.20 for the previous week. In fact, the secretary’s receipts for the entire month of June
only totaled $70.50, a far cry from the dues received just weeks earlier. 54
Although the decline in the Indiana-Kentucky district’s dues corresponded with
officer reports throughout the nation that miners had lost faith in the union, the decrease
was more likely due to the ongoing strike. Miners seldom paid dues while on strike, but
resumed when the strike ended. Kennedy’s reports confirm this trend: miners resumed
paying union dues after their summer strikes ended in failure. In fact, Kennedy’s receipts
for July 1891 actually showed an increase in union dues that surpassed those collected
even in the weeks leading up to May 1. If union decline was primarily due to any sort of
disillusion with union strength or ability, Kennedy’s dues should have plummeted and
not recovered after most Indiana miners’ strikes had failed. Miners who believed in the
union continued to pay their state dues even as they cursed their national officers. Their
belief in unionism was not rattled; their faith in the officers was. 55
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Misplaced Faith
Few miners captured this sentiment more than those in the Indiana block mines.
They had no interest in joining the UMW when it formed and were not members during
the May 1 strike cancellation. But lack of membership did not mean the miners rejected
union sentiment. Instead, the non-union block men joined the thousands of Indiana
bituminous miners in what they thought was a nationwide strike. Moreover, when the
strike failed, the miners did not abandon the UMW. Even though, as block district
organizer Samuel Anderson explained, they had “not much faith” in the new union, over
one hundred and fifty miners in Knightsville alone decided to “give it a fair trial” and
become UMW members for the first time. 56
The Clay County miners’ willingness to join the UMW after a substantial defeat
demonstrated that union strength or the miners’ lack of faith in it was not enough to
dissuade workers from joining a union. But this did not mean that the new members
trusted the union or its officers. Their skepticism came from their longstanding
frustrations with larger unions overlooking block district concerns. “Nearly half the
miners of this state are in this county,” Anderson complained, but their coal was of a
different quality, mined, and, was priced differently from the coal in the national
bituminous market. As a result, block miners paid the same dues as bituminous miners
but often found that block coal concerns were rarely addressed in the state or national
union agendas. 57
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Block miners grew particularly frustrated with the national defense fund. All
union miners were expected to contribute to the fund to be used as aid for striking or
locked out miners. Unlike past funds, which were controlled by local and state unions,
the National Executive Board held sole discretion over how the defense fund was spent.
The centralization of the funds, much like the centralization of union authority, was
supposed to increase union efficiency. Yet in 1891, it seemed that the UMW gave little
aid to the southern Midwest. “[O]ur most intelligent members began to ask, ‘What are
[the national officers] doing with the defense fund?’” When Anderson and the other
leaders replied that they did not know, “[a] quiet smile could be seen on some faces and
that was the last of them.” The miners understood that they would never see the money
again. 58
Despite Anderson’s effort to revive faith in the union, the miners wanted nothing
of it. “[W]e called two delegate meetings and one mass meeting to discuss the propriety
of thorough organization,” he recalled. “These were failures.” Consequently, as Phil
Penna and the other national officers decried the union miners’ who “kicked” against the
UMW and “backslid” away from it, Anderson, like other local organizers, insisted that it
was not the miners who backslid. Instead, Anderson wanted the nation’s miners to
understand that the Clay County men were neither “dupes” fooled by their employers nor
“sinners” who had backslid from the union. “There are as intelligent and good union men
here as there are anywhere,” he insisted. The union, not the miners had turned away from
honest principles. “I believe that when we started to organize we made a grand mistake,
for if, instead of sending away our money for taxes without receiving one particle of
benefit in return, we had put every cent of money we subscribed into a [home] fund to
58
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thoroughly organize Clay county, we then ourselves could have removed the many local
hardships we have to labor under and could have joined issues with [the bituminous
miners] on a sound basis.” 59
Anderson’s anger was echoed throughout the state when the UMW issued its fall
1891 orders for the Indiana miners to reduce wages. Rather than earning 75 cents per ton
as expected during winter months, block miner John Mooney and his coworkers—at
UMW orders—now earned only 45 ½ cents. The officers’ decision, Mooney asserted, “is
as dishonest and false as the system that it is based on. It is impossible to establish a
common measure of prices that will do justice to the coal miner.” But there was nothing
the miners could do. “We cannot fight the men, the operators and the organization.” 60
Frustration turned to hostility when roughly ten thousand miners in western
Pennsylvania went on strike for higher wages that fall. The UMW did not order this
strike, but because the national officers wished to maintain a unified front, they ordered
all miners to lend their support to the Pennsylvania miners. 61 The Indiana miners were
outraged, Mooney explained, because the same officers “gave their aid and sanction to
the Pittsburg [Pennsylvania] miners to demand 13 cents per ton above scale rates, and
they condemn the miners of Indiana when we are justified in forcing the operators of this
state to pay scale rates.” 62 In short, the national officers had ordered Indiana miners not
only to work at a reduction, but to send financial aid to miners striking for wages nearly
twenty-five cents higher than what Indiana miners earned. 63 Within days, Indiana miners
59
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and officers planned a strike of their own. Their appeal reached the Executive Board just
as the Pennsylvania strike ended in defeat. Facing an exhausted national treasury,
National Secretary Patrick McBryde sent the infamous telegram that stunned the Indiana
miners. His orders for them to accept the reduced wage were countermanded by IndianaKentucky District Secretary John Kennedy, who commanded all Indiana miners to
strike. 64
It was not in Kennedy’s character to disregard orders. Born around 1847 in
Scotland, Kennedy moved with his parents to Indiana and began mining at age nine. 65
When he turned seventeen, he enlisted in the US Army, serving the final months of the
Civil War. After briefly returning to the mines at war’s end, he reenlisted and served for
another twelve years, learning how to read and write during his term. After working for
several years in the Texas coal mines, he returned to Indiana, settling in Terre Haute.
Upon his return, Kennedy began organizing under the Knights of Labor in the 1880s,
becoming Secretary-Treasurer of the Indiana District of NTA 135. When the Progressive
Union formed in 1888, Kennedy was among the handful of officers that left the Knights
to join the new order, where he later assumed the Secretary-Treasurer position for the
Indiana NPU.
Kennedy did not gain these positions through his personality. Unlike most
organizers known for their gregarious behavior and charisma, Kennedy was painfully
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shy, detested public speaking, and often avoided large union meetings. Described as
“taciturn” and “morose,” the slight man rarely socialized, even during union conventions
where he knew the other more boisterous organizers well. Still, none could deny that
Kennedy was “amongst the most persistent [UMW] organizers that we have ever had.”
Rather than relying on oratory or grace, Kennedy organized locals by writing letters to
anyone interested in unionizing, opting to meet with interested parties only when
absolutely essential. Even then, Indiana organizer John Kane later wrote, “When a visit is
deemed necessary by him, he makes it, and many a time he has [arrived] and gone before
anybody knows it.”66
Despite this, both miners and union officials respected Kennedy. Forceful with a
tireless work ethic and meticulous attention to detail, he applied his military discipline to
unionizing. Kennedy faithfully reported district news and receipts of dues to the labor
papers each week, far more frequently than any other UMW officer in the nation. His
efforts and dedication earned him the admiration of union miners throughout the state.
During a period when miners were constantly dissatisfied with union leaders, Kennedy
held the Indiana District Secretary-Treasurer position for over ten years.
No miner or UMW officer doubted Kennedy’s loyalty to the union. Yet, in
November 1891, Kennedy condemned the organization and its national officers and
ordered the Indiana miners to strike. “We are sorry we have to act in opposition to the
wishes of our national officers,” he wrote in his weekly report announcing the strike, “but
we have been sidetracked so often that patience ceased to be a virtue.” Kennedy’s
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carefully selected words resonated throughout the state, where miners committed to the
UMW’s principles believed that the officers no longer did the same. 67
Often, the UMW’s ability to distribute strike aid confirmed these suspicions.
Although locals had limited aid during the Indiana strike, several mines earned the pay
increase. As directed by state officers, they forwarded their pay increases to the state
treasury to be sent to aid the remaining striking miners. However, because the remote
Indiana mines were so spread out, the miners’ aid took days to reach the state officers and
days longer to distribute the funds. In the meantime, striking miners wrote letters to the
United Mine Workers’ Journal complaining that they received no aid. Seven weeks into
the Indiana strike, for example, “Summit Miner” asked the Journal, “What has become of
those men that received the advance six weeks ago and were going to donate us 5 cents
per ton for all coal mined and day men in proportion. If we are defeated and have to
blackleg are we worse than they?” 68
For the miners who had dutifully sent their pay advance forward to the officers,
letters like Summit Miner’s came as a shock. By the time they read the letters, which took
roughly a week to appear in the Journal columns and equally as long for print versions to
reach the rural mines, their aid had long been sent. Consequently, although Kennedy
accounted for the donations, it appeared the funds were entirely mismanaged. 69 To the
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strikers, it seemed that the miners who won the pay advance had abandoned them. To the
donating miners, it appeared as though the officers misplaced or stole the money. 70 “If
this aid did not reach the men needing aid, what became of it?” miner wife Laurene
Gardner asked in response to a claim by UMW Vice President Phil Penna that her mining
town did not pay the aid they were required to send. “[W]e disclaim owing the striking
miners or anybody else anything more than the assistance due one brother from another.
In all my knowledge of Ayrshire we have never asked or received either assistance or
encouragement from anyone,” she argued. “Yet if our striking brothers need more help
we stand ready to give it.” 71 Union miners, in her mind, were bound by the principles
they shared, not by officer commands.
Gardner’s statement indicated disconnect that ran through much of the labor
movement and nineteenth century society. On one hand, people like Gardner understood
and appreciated the need for centralized governing authorities over both union and
governmental affairs. Their national structure was essential in an age where businesses
and people continually crossed state and national borders. For those affiliated with the
People’s Party, government regulation of railroads and coal mines was essential to
establishing regulated rates that, they believed, would benefit both worker and consumer.
At the same time, this uniformity also cost residents and local unions the autonomy they
enjoyed. It placed their money and futures in the hands of individuals that often lived
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hundreds of miles removed from the mines and fields. Centralized boards’ actions
seemed especially distant for rural residents who often remained outside the reach of
timely and reliable communication. In instances like the missing telegram in May 1891 or
the delayed reports of aid the following fall, the communication gap had a detrimental
impact on workers’ lives and their faith in governing structures. Even those who climbed
through union ranks such as Kennedy earned their livings through clerical work and
politics rather than sweat and muscle like those they represented. 72 In many cases, they
were likened to dishonest businessmen and corrupt politicians, consequently placing
these leaders in a centralized structure that gave them increased control over union
finances and affairs prompted miners to mistrust their leadership even more. In the heat
of Indiana’s missing aid ordeal, Kennedy reported that he encountered miners who
praised the UMW yet “in the same breath” claimed “that dishonesty has been practiced
by the state officers in distributing the funds.” 73
Surveying the damage of the 1891 strike cancellation and subsequent failed local
strikes, Indiana-Kentucky District President Michael Commesky noted that miners
throughout his district, as well as neighboring districts all viewed the UMW officers with
contempt. “At this date I cannot say what effect the strike will have on the organization,
but we hope for the best.” Despite his attempt at optimism, however, Commesky had his
doubts. Instead of closing his letter with his characteristic call for organization or the
frequently used “yours for the cause,” the union leader ended with “yours for the
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present,” hinting that the future of the organization or at least his future in it was
uncertain. 74
Kennedy’s dues receipts indicate that Commesky had cause for concern. The
union miners faithfully paid dues through the 1891 fall (Appendix Chart 2). In fact, by
November 1891, the same month the miners struck against UMW orders, Kennedy’s
receipts totaled $283.00, a larger amount than had ever been collected prior to the May
cancellation. The UMW’s condemnation of the Indiana strike, insulting the miners, and
the Indiana miners’ subsequent failure, however, proved detrimental to the Indiana
UMW. The number of locals paying dues fell drastically so that most of the $85 in dues
Kennedy reported in early 1892 came from five locals. 75
The decline, however, was not limited to Indiana. Hostilities and misgivings the
Indiana miners expressed toward the UMW structure in the labor newspaper pages met
miners’ unease throughout the country. 76 Throughout the nation, miners and organizers
claimed their experiences with UMW leadership decisions were similar to those of the
Indiana miners. 77 The Bloomington, Illinois, Daily Pantagraph reported that faith in the
UMW was so low that only fifteen members attended the Illinois District’s 1892
convention, and that most of the northern Illinois mines had “withdrawn from the
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union.” 78 “Napoleon” of Iowa observed that if Ohio and Indiana, the “great union states”
of the nation, could not function, there was little hope for other regions to avoid such
“tomfoolery.” 79 The Indiana miners’ winter strike became symptomatic of larger
problems and misgivings already spreading throughout the UMW rank and file regardless
of region.
The officers’ perceived inability to look after the miners’ interest informed many
mining families’ decisions to reject the UMW or refuse to pay their dues. Even the most
dedicated unionists charged that the officers failed in this respect. Although Laurene
Gardner professed she was a faithful UMW supporter, she was among the first to take up
her pen and question the officers’ decisions. She had “faith in at least their good
intentions,” she wrote, “but we know how disastrously they turn out sometimes.” 80 For
her hometown of Ayrshire, the turnout was especially disastrous. In the wake of the fall
1891 defeat, mines like Ayrshire that won the pay advance were forced to either resume
work at the reduced wages or risk the mine shutting down entirely. Ayrshire shut down. 81
Partially locked out and partially on strike against a reduction even lower than what they
had originally fought, the Ayrshire miners who had donated all of their pay to the striking
miners just weeks earlier looked to the UMW for aid. Their strike, however, was not
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sanctioned by the National Executive Board and therefore was not entitled to a share of
the UMW strike fund. 82
Furious with the UMW officers for demanding Ayrshire pay to the union in return
for nothing, Laurene Gardner chastised the UMW’s leadership and practices. “I offer no
apology for any suggestions or remarks I may make in these lines,” the miner’s wife
began. With that, she demanded an account of the National Executive Board and Indiana
state board’s spending. “Commencing with Ayrshire, how much money has been paid
into the treasury and what has become of it? I mean since the United Mine Workers was
organized here,” she demanded. To Gardner and many others, it seemed “that part of the
business is but poorly managed.” The UMW’s rejection of the miners’ need and the
inability of miners elsewhere to send adequate aid made this abundantly clear. National
officers simply were not capable of handling the miners’ funds responsibly. As a result,
Gardner joined the chorus of miners throughout the southern Midwest who adamantly
opposed the “national defense fund.” UMW locals should control their own funds, she
argued, “instead of sending it out like bread upon the water without even the assurance
that it will return again after many days.” 83
Gardner’s assertions were repeated in mining regions throughout the state in the
weeks following the strike. Indiana miner John A. Templeton reported that the once solid
82
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unions in his region had fractured over the officers’ actions in the late 1891 strike. Like
Gardner, however, they were reluctant to turn their backs on unionism. The winter strike
failure had “given the organization a blow from which it will not get over for some time,”
Templeton acknowledged, but miners were more ambivalent about union structures than
opposed to them. According to Templeton, “the men are badly split up at Dugger
[Indiana], some of them wanting to hold on to the U. M. W. of A. and another lot wanting
a local organization and some want no organization at all.” 84
Within weeks, Dugger miners’ membership in the “home organization” known by
locals as the “Nickel Knights” grew. According to miner “Dogtown,” the Nickel Knights
originally formed as the Independent Order of Home Mine Laborers in Washington,
Indiana, where miners were upset with the high dues paid to state and national officers
without receiving any benefit. 85 Their nickname, he claimed, came from the five cents the
members paid in dues each meeting night, which were kept at home for expenses and
local cases of sickness or strike. 86 The miners in the home organization did not seek to
organize other locals under their name, but mines like Dugger applied the structure to
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their own mines so that “any organization outside the United Mine Workers has been
termed nickel knights.” 87
Dugger UMW leader John E. Griffiths claimed he knew nothing of the order, but
admitted that many local miners were dissatisfied with the UMW ever since the strike. 88
Ironically, the locals had sided with the national officers in opposing the strike, arguing
that the state officers’ strike order “was premature and ignore[ed] the fundamental
principles of our organization.” With their argument dismissed at the state convention,
Dugger miners honored the state officers’ strike call. Within weeks, however, “a number
of men got dissatisfied with the amount of aid received from defense fund and openly
declared they would pay nothing into the organization… and that feeling grew during the
strike until it looked as if organization was a thing of the past.” Dugger miners “got luke
warm” and pulled away from the UMW, unwilling to be part of a body whose parts did
not cooperate. 89
UMW miners viewed the Nickel Knights with contempt. Phil Penna described
them as “Nauseating Knaves.” They were not men, he insisted, but “specimens of which
we have everywhere,” who had no sense to stay in the union and or uphold its
principles. 90 The Nickel Knights were “Judases who have sold their manhood” to the
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company, T. J. Llewelyn argued. 91 According to miner wife Sinthy Snodgrass and many
others, most were “pumpkin rollers,” or farmers who mined for supplemental incomes
and cared little about the trouble they caused. 92 John Kennedy agreed, stressing that he
hoped the Nickel Knights would “abandon their evil ways and return to their proper place
in the United Mine Worker’s [sic] of America.” 93 Nickel Knights, they believed, were the
backsliders at the heart of the UMW’s impotency.
But not all held the UMW in such high regard. Laurene Gardner first encountered
the Nickel Knights when her family was forced to abandon their home in Ayrshire and
search for work in the mines surrounding Dugger and Linton. Her experiences during the
Ayrshire strike, like those who joined the Nickel Knights, caused her to question the
UMW leaders’ abilities. Although Gardner remained committed to the UMW and
vehemently criticized the Nickel Knights, she did not defend the UMW’s actions of the
past year. She did not claim those who joined the local organization were backsliders
who abandoned their beliefs or dismiss the Nickel Knights’ grievances against the UMW
as unjust. Instead, she criticized their methods. “It is a poor way to correct any evil in the
organization to pull out,” she wrote. In condemning the Nickel Knights this way, Gardner
indicated that the true evil was not the rebellious miners, but the organization itself. The
Nickel Knights’ fault, in Gardner’s eyes, then, rested not with any kind of abandonment
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of principles, but with their unwillingness to run the perceived evil out of the miners’
national organization. 94
Such assertions that evil lurked within the UMW resonated throughout the
southern Midwest. Indiana block miner and mine operator “Old Timer,” claimed that the
block miners backslid from their principles not when they decided to leave the UMW, but
when they first decided to join it. Their decision to reject the UMW and form their own
local, then, was a return to the principles they once abandoned. “[W]e wandered off to
follow strange gods; were led into the wilderness and there left to perish; but thank God,
we are coming to our senses again and I expect soon to see our craft in this district
organized into a solid block coal union,” he declared. 95
Miners like Old Timer defended their rights and principles by leaving the UMW
rather than joining it. Thousands of miners like Old Timer and the Nickel Knights
believed that local unions had a better chance of favorable work terms than the union that
struggled to control the national market. “Home organizations” like the Nickel Knights
settled all disputes with the companies directly rather than waiting for UMW officials to
mitigate differences. This proved beneficial for several reasons. First, it allowed workers
to settle disputes and return to work quickly. In addition, operators, seeking to keep a
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national union out of their mines, often granted local organization miners’ requests more
than those of the UMW miners. 96
These factors, combined with the miners’ growing frustration and mistrust of
UMW leaders, caused state and local organizations that rivaled the UMW to spring up
across the nation. Northern Illinois organizer Will Hall described a mass meeting in
Streator where miners resolved that a national union was not reliable. With that, they
decided “to form a local union, attached to nothing or nobody….” 97 Pennsylvania miner
M. J. O’Neil claimed that miners in his district also no longer trusted the UMW. “I am
not in any organization at present, neither are the miners of this run,” he confessed,
adding that the miners, “one and all have become disgusted even at the word
organization.” 98 Within months, miners in O’Neil’s district planned to establish a new
regional union comprised of the mines along the Monongahela, Ohio, and Kanawha
rivers. 99 UMW miners in Ohio debated seceding from the UMW, leading the movement
to return to state-based organizations. 100 These sentiments reached to the southern
Midwest where Iowa miners did form a new state organization that fall. 101 Within
months, Missouri and Kansas union miners considered organizing two “national” unions,
one representing the mines east of the Mississippi River and the other with jurisdiction
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over the west.102 Although they had pushed for a unified national order for years, by
1893, its structure and scope no longer seemed ideal.
Far from being committed to the national and centralized structure, miners looked
at the UMW’s shortcomings and suspected that, somehow, miners’ organization had gone
astray. “[I]t is the most trying time I have seen in my life,” western Kentucky miner
“Blackbird” confessed. Most of the miners in his district had abandoned the UMW while
those that remained had no money in the union’s treasury and made little effort to
connect to the national officers. Operators took advantage of the union’s weakness and
abolished all mine rules that kept miners safe. 103 Blackbird, who had always tried to labor
honestly, was exasperated. “I have done and am doing my best to lead a christian life and
to stand by our organization and lead others to it, but they will not.” The miners
recognized they needed to restore their union, but refused to revive their UMW locals,
much to Blackbird’s dismay. Instead, they organized on their own. “It troubles me to see
men go astray like this,” Blackbird continued. In his mind, neither UMW miners nor their
officers had remained faithful to the UMW. “I sometimes feel like exclaiming my God!
where are we drifting to?” 104
Blackbird’s question was an old one that touched the heart of many Americans’
deepest concerns. From the time the nation began to industrialize, many citizens
expressed anxieties over the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few and
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the greed, corruption, and moral decay that seemed to follow in its wake. 105 “Whither are
we drifting?” became as much a warning as it was a question, in reaction to the rapid
changes in economics, society and culture. In 1882, Freeman Otis Willey took up the
concerns of Midwestern producers, asking “whither are we drifting as a nation,” the
Michigan lecturer offered a close analysis of the currency system. The current system, he
claimed, only intensified the wealth gap. He closed his examination remarking that “if the
present monetary system is allowed to continue, the child is born who will live to see the
masses of the American people bankrupt and the principal wealth of the nation in the
hands of ten per cent of its population.” 106 Ten years later, miner wife Margery Jones
echoed Willey’s claims. Pointing out workers’ patriotism in a country that favored
wealthy classes over poor, she urged readers to “inquire a little more into the question,
‘Whither are we drifting, as a nation,’ and not only as a nation, but as a world….” How
could other nations emulate the United States “if in a land like this, blessed as it is with a
keen, discreet and enterprising population, the perversity, avarice greed and selfishness of
man is to succeed in subverting liberty and independence except to those who by the
most diabolical schemes have possessed themselves of nations wealth and opportunities,”
she asked. 107
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Such fears of going astray indicated the concerns and discord that ran through
nearly all reform movements of the period. 108 As the UMW attempted to recover from its
1891 failure, NTA 135 delegates to the 1892 General Assembly of the Knights of Labor
were shocked to hear General Master Workman Terence Powderly condemn the mine
workers’ union. The UMW had drifted away from the Knights’ driving principles,
Powderly insisted. According to him, the UMW favored the AFL at the expense of the
Knights, that the miners had stopped paying dues to the Knights, and that their
willingness to set a wage scale rather than abolish the wage system contradicted the
ideals the Knights professed. With that, Powderly ordered an investigation into the UMW
with the added suggestion that NTA 135 withdraw from the UMW and restore the
miners’ union to its original goals. 109
Such expressions of division and corruption indicated that a common vision was
not enough to create a united movement in labor organizing or beyond. Just as union
miners divided over whether local, state, or national unions could best protect their
interests, so Populist proponents split over whether a third party was the best way to
initiate their desired changes. Like thousands of the nation’s miners and the new union,
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they remained outside the organization even as they sympathized with its stance. 110
President and Master Workman John Rae described this in his final convention report.
Noting the numerous local strikes called against national leaders’ orders and the dozens
of anti-UMW locals, he asserted, “it is plain that while our miners cry for national
organization, they continue to practice local methods.” For Rae, who tried to uphold the
union’s national scope while appeasing local interests, this duality cost him supporters on
both sides of the UMW divide.
Just as local miners criticized Rae for not fully supporting them, miners who
supported a strong centralized union condemned Rae for tolerating miners who
disregarded national union orders. The 1892 UMW convention sided with national
leaders’ in their decisions to not support the winter strikes in Pittsburgh and Indiana and
insisted “stricter methods must be adopted” in enforcing national authority over the
mining districts. 111 Rae’s unwillingness to be forceful, Tim O’Malley and others
believed, created “the criminal blunders of last year.” Rae may have tried his best to keep
the peace in the UMW, but “in their hearts [the miners] despise him, and admire the man
who has convictions and the courage to express them, even if it does not suit them at the
time.” 112 Recognizing Rae’s difficult position, Illinois leader William Scaife expressed
sympathy for the leader that, he noted, simply could not act without the full support of a
unified rank and file body. “These have been troublesome times,” he wrote as he
surveyed the events of the past year, “and it has been another case of damn you if you do
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and damn you if you don’t. With Brother Rae, no matter what he done, he was certain to
be damned.” 113

As Rae’s predicament demonstrated, defending rights, even for unions, proved a
difficult task. Establishing a centralized national organization that looked after specific
regional concerns demanded more manpower and better communication than the young
UMW could provide. It involved bringing together disparate groups across a vast region,
and in most cases, it demanded sacrificing the needs of some for the good of the whole.
For miners who looked to the UMW for salvation from workplace ills, Rae’s damnation
did not come from the strike cancellation, but from his overstatement of union strength
and his inability to tend to all miners’ concerns. These actions, combined with those of
the other officers, tainted miners’ trust for the entire order.
Far from a solidified force, union miners’ criticisms against leaders over strike
funds and union dues were part of a rank and file battle with officers and each other over
how the UMW would look after miner interests. For others, this task required forming
new unions while still others believed that the surest way a miner could look after his
interests was to stay out of unions entirely until one was strong enough to uphold its
principles. Although officers dismissed these varying views as an abandonment of union
principles, mining families disagreed. Their dedication to unionism never waned, but they
believed UMW officers’ devotion had.
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Chapter Five
Outsiders: Race and the Exclusive Politics of an Inclusive Union, 1892-1894

Less than fifty miles of rugged countryside separated miner “Willing Hands” and
Laurene Gardner’s Indiana coal towns. In many respects, their backgrounds were very
similar. Both were deeply connected to the coal industry, originally from the Upper South
and moved north for better mining jobs. Gardner and Willing Hands were both ardent
Populists and, although neither quite fit with the UMW, they were two of the union’s
strongest advocates during a period of widespread rank and file discontent with UMW
action and policy.
But in 1892, when both participated in a debate featured in the United Mine
Workers’ Journal, two very important differences drove a wedge between their otherwise
common ground. One was a coal miner by trade, one was not. One claimed to be an
accepted part of the UMW, one did not. The alignment of these sentiments, however, did
not follow the clean division one would expect. Instead, they reflected how lines in late
nineteenth century unionism contorted in ways that simultaneously included and
excluded the same individual in a host of ways. Gardner, a white woman, was neither a
coal miner nor union member, but she and her “fellow craftsmen” considered her a part
of the UMW. Willing Hands, a black union miner, wrote repeatedly that he was not a part
of the UMW’s main body.
Coming of age in the Southern coal mines, Willing Hands believed that race and
class issues were deeply entwined. Fears of corporate and political corruption, increasing
wealth gaps, and poverty were interwoven with lynching, convict labor, and Jim Crow.
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He watched in horror as racial hostilities intensified throughout the nation, including the
coal mines. Like thousands of producers, Willing Hands insisted that slavery still existed,
but the enslavement he witnessed involved more than poor treatment and low wages. It
involved literal chains, forced labor, segregation in mines and coal cars all fortified by the
growing power of “the lynching club of the South.” 1 Consequently, when miners began
discussing the best course for the UMW’s reviving its dwindling membership, Willing
Hands vehemently argued that the UMW had neglected black miners when it needed to
defend them. “You can never get your union strong as long as you ignore the AfroAmerican as a coal producer against you,” he challenged. 2 Arguing that the UMW only
stood to gain by speaking out against convict labor and other Jim Crow-related systems
practiced in and around the mines, Willing Hands expected the UMW to be an
organization that would fight for racial equality in addition to economic. When it fell
short, he and thousands of black miners like him, asserted that the UMW offered them
little more than membership.
But not all agreed with his forceful stance. “I notice our friend ‘Willing Hands’
seems much troubled about the interests of his race,” Gardner noted in her weekly letter
to the Journal. 3 A white miner’s wife born on the Illinois-Kentucky boarder in 1850,
Gardner believed that the economic inequality all miners faced should be the UMW’s
main focus, not questions of racism. Her effort to promote unity over racial equality
echoed white conversations taking place throughout the nation. As citizens voiced
concern over the nation’s fragility and expressed fears of another civil war, miners,
wives, and officers expressed similar alarm with the UMW. In 1892, no national miners’
1

“Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, June 2, 1892.
“Willing Hands,” letter to the editor, “Brazil, Ind.,” UMWJ, March 24, 1892.
3
Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Island City, Ind.,” UMWJ, May 5, 1892.
2

167

union had existed effectively for longer than five years. Each one proved a failure due to
internal divisions that made the union too weak to withstand the pressure brought by a
competitive market and employers hostile to unionism. Gardner, like many white men in
the mines, was determined to make sure that the fragile unity formed by the young UMW
held. “[N]o side issue, race, creed, sectionalism or anything else should divert attention
from the common doom of slavery that is hanging over us all,” she later declared. 4 If the
miners could pull together and secure better conditions, justice and equality for black
miners would follow, she and other whites believed, but the key was to stand united on
their common ground. Consequently, much like the Northern and Southern reconciliation
that came at the expense of African Americans, the UMW, in a similar quest for unity,
eclipsed these questions as well. 5 “We have seen the results of divided action in the last
year’s record of troubles,” she wrote. “Not until the order will move as one harmonious
whole will victory crown our efforts.”6
The discussion involving a black miner and a white miner’s wife in the pages of
the United Mine Workers’ Journal highlighted several crucial aspects of the UMW’s
function in the late nineteenth century. Neither looked like the typical white male coal
miner, yet miners and officers alike encouraged Willing Hands and Gardner to write their
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opinions to the Journal. 7 During a period when black voices were systematically, legally,
and violently silenced and when women had limited voice in the public arena, Willing
Hands and Gardner were welcome to participate in a white male-dominated forum of a
white male-dominated organization.
This kind of partial inclusion is seldom reflected in the scholarship of Gilded Age
organizing or society. Scholars studying the period have carefully observed the politics of
ethnicity inherent within unions, political organizations, and greater society. They have
described how unions and political parties included and excluded groups of workers or
potential constituents based on immediate need. In particular, they have shown that skillbased hierarchies in workplaces often corresponded with ethnic and gender backgrounds
that gave preference to English-speaking white men. In most cases, it resulted in outright
exclusion of black and immigrant workers not only from skilled positions, but also from
unions that, by the 1890s, focused on recruiting skilled laborers into their ranks. 8
But Willing Hands and Gardner do not fit within these patterns of exclusion any
better than they fit within the union they defended. Like thousands of other rural
producers in the Gilded Age, they sat on the fringes of the order and society at large,
neither fully included nor excluded. Social structures functioned differently in rural
regions where working class women and men often worked and socialized together,
creating organizations more receptive to women than those in urban settings. Similarly,
unlike skilled jobs where employers created stratified hierarchies, the drive to lower costs
7
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of coal production made it more advantageous to force all miners regardless of color,
language, or experience to compete against each other for jobs. Any miner, regardless of
ethnicity, who accepted a pay reduction automatically forced all other miners in his mine
to accept the same. Consequently, any union that wished to regulate wage rates needed to
include all miners without regard to ethnicity as well. Whereas other industries and
unions could exclude unwanted minorities based on skill, organized workers in semiskilled industries often sought to include minorities rather than push them away.
Yet, as in the case of Willing Hands and Gardner, inclusion often only reached so
far. When literal skill met the politics of late-nineteenth century society, they became
both a part of and apart from the whole. Laurene Gardner had never mined coal in her life
and therefore was banned from full membership and attending union meetings, which
were limited to members. She lacked experience in mining, but her skill in raising a
family on a miner’s meager wages and raising children to follow the union were
commendable qualities to a union facing a dwindling budget and a wayward rank and
file. 9 Although it did not formally include her, she included herself in the UMW when
she spoke of the miners and the union officers, using phrases such as “we need” and “our
officers.” More importantly, no one challenged Gardner’s claim. While they at times took
issue with her opinions on union policy and politics, they argued with her views rather
than dismissed them even as they forbade her from entering the meeting hall.
While Gardner’s inclusive wording indicated that she was of the UMW even if
she was not in it, the language Willing Hands used demonstrated that although he was in
the order, he was not of it. In 1892, he was a member of the Knights of Labor and UMW
yet in his letters, which were often directed toward white UMW miners, referred to the
9
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UMW as “your union” and used the word “you” to describe the miners. His use of “we”
never referred to a collective body of miners or organized producers as Gardner used the
word. Rather, “we” described black miners whose interests and experiences, Willing
Hands believed, differed from those shared by white miners and their wives. The UMW
may have accepted any creed or color, but Willing Hands remained ostracized from the
miners’ organization. He was a member and heavily involved with the UMW, but, in his
mind, the UMW was a white union.
In many respects, Willing Hands’s assessment was correct. White Englishspeaking union “miners,” including wives like Gardner, included many ethnicities in their
ranks and expected them to be faithful to the order and its principles. But they stopped
short of welcoming these minorities in their workplaces or addressing their grievances,
despite leaders’ efforts to promote racial harmony. Although the UMW put forward
ethnically inclusive platforms, the labor legislation it actively pursued often favored
white English-speaking miners’ interests over others. Their decisions to support or reject
proposed labor legislation such as laws pertaining to convict labor, competency tests for
mining or mine inspecting, or ending the use of screens to filter the coal often placed the
rank and file at odds with union leaders who could not understand why miners would
oppose any legislation that would promote equal and fair treatment in the mines.
Desperate to protect their jobs, lives, and wages from those they perceived as particularly
immoral, careless, and unskilled, experienced white English-speaking miners moved to
regulate who could enter the mines. Despite their claims of wanting to protect the mining
craft and their lives, the UMW’s efforts ran along ethnic lines rather than those of skill,
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tearing through the organization’s already riddled ranks and pushing away its minority
members.

Separated
Women like Gardner had a hard time understanding why miners like Willing
Hands insisted on pushing for racial equality when the union so desperately needed unity
within its ranks. 10 Because it accepted all miners, white English speaking miners
believed the union treated all colors and nationalities equally. To them, black miners like
Willing Hands who complained about race were no better than the miners who grumbled
that the union did nothing for them. “There are some slobs in it who have only sense
enough to be always howling about all cost and no profit, who if the mote could only fall
from their eyes would realize the benefits to be derived from organization,” wife Mary
Jane Beanblossom wrote. During a period when dissatisfied miners abandoned the UMW
in droves, the remaining union miners and wives grew more determined that personal
interests, including those of race, be secondary to the union’s survival, which, they
believed, was crucial to bringing the changes that all miners needed. 11
Black miners and wives, however, disagreed. Although black and non-English
speaking miners shared the same problems as all miners regarding wages and working
conditions, many faced these problems on a level worse than white miners experienced in
addition to other problems that the UMW often failed to acknowledge or address. Phrases
white miners commonly used like “white slavery” or urging the union to defend the rights
10
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that belonged to them “as free white men,” made it clear to African American members
that UMW priorities favored white concerns over black. 12 In other instances, as white
Indiana miner “Freedom” proudly wrote that he was “not ashamed our institutions,” and
applauded a local vigilante association known as the White Caps that “serves to keep the
niggers in of nights….” 13 Such a statement indicated that while white miners joined a
union that was inclusive to black workers, those who populated its local unions and
assemblies seldom practiced this inclusion on a daily basis.
These practices were continued in the workplace. Many operators took advantage
of already present racist and nativist sentiment in the mines and used black or nonEnglish speaking workers as a means to lower wages, often refusing to hire them unless
they worked under scale or as strikebreakers. In addition to the desperation that came
from often being the last hired and first fired, these groups also found it more difficult to
confront their bosses regarding wages and working conditions. They not only faced the
unequal relationship between mine owner and employee that tended to dehumanize all
workers, but also confronted language barriers and social expectations that made
challenging one’s white employer especially difficult and dangerous. French miners at
Frontenac, Kansas, found it difficult to communicate problems with working conditions
to their employer and often resolved to simply continue working in the poor conditions. 14
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Polish miners in northern Illinois worked for such low wages that when the company
store burned down, their wives climbed into the smoldering timbers to salvage the
charred food. 15 A black miner who confronted his white employer over hazardous work
conditions, unfair weights, or lost cars not only upset the workplace hierarchy but also
challenged contemporary racial norms. Kentucky miner W. J. Smith reported that few
men dared dispute their working conditions in their Madisonville mine. “The men lost
cars all the time and one colored man claiming a car talked plain about it and the
weighmaster shot him.” 16
Events such as this made it clear to African American miners throughout the late
nineteenth century that they had no real option other than accepting the terms presented.
Black miners’ decisions to fight wage reductions, push for fair weights, and, as in the
case of Madisonville, object to operators stealing cars, not only made them especially
susceptible to losing their jobs, but also increased the risk of losing their lives. “This is
why they won’t have organization in Hopkins county,” Smith concluded in his report of
the Madisonville shooting. There was no point in joining a union that did not offer
protection to its members. 17
Black mine organizer and union officer Richard L. Davis faced a similar situation
in his Ohio district. There a group of black miners carefully considered accepting an
operator’s offer to put a majority of black miners in the No. 3 mine. “Some claimed that
they thought they ought to have a majority in one mine, at least, that the whites had the
majority in every mine in the valley,” Davis reported. A black majority mine would not
only offer more jobs to black miners, but also allow black miners to be elected to places
15
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of prestige. Checkweighmen, for example, were usually elected by the workers in a mine
to make sure the coal was weighed fairly. Black miners seldom received the position in
mines where whites were in the majority. “I can remember the time when this mine was
altogether colored, all the other mines for the whites,” Davis wrote. “Now then, for No. 3,
the colored man’s mine at that time, all the other mines in the valley had the 1 1/8 inch
screen, the screen at mine No. 3 was 1 ½ inches; at all the other mines the men were paid
for dead work at mine No. 3 they were not paid for this class of work. Thus you can see
the difference between the white man’s mine and the colored man’s mines…. Well then,
as we are now mixed up all through, when one makes a demand we all make it, there is
no color line; is it not better or do you class yourselves inferior beings?” 18
Despite Davis’s efforts to push for integration to further dissolve the color line in
the mines, racial divisions remained steadfast. Miner F. H. Jackson responded to Davis
the following week, explaining the black miners’ frustration. “The white miners of Mine
No. 3 refused to work some three weeks ago because they thought they had to work
under a negro boss, which was very wrong to them. It caused my race in this valley to
feel very angry over this action of my white friends.” Learning of the dissatisfaction, the
mine boss promised he would “fill Mine No. 3 with negroes and give them eight and nine
months work, and it would be best for them.” Although Jackson insisted that the tactic
was a ploy to divide the miners and their union by race, he also acknowledged that the
offer was a tempting one for black miners who seemed to get no protection from the
UMW regarding steady work or promotions in the workplace. 19
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When offered the opportunity of steady work at high wages at what the agent
promised was a new mine, Madisonville, Kentucky, miner Wylie Johnson eagerly
accepted the terms. He was one of thirty western Kentucky black miners, ages fourteen to
forty-three who answered the call. But instead of being taken to a new mine as promised,
the miners were sent just north of the Ohio River, to Evansville, Indiana, where the mines
were on strike. Local residents ambushed the party as they traveled from the train station
to the mine on the city outskirts, injuring several miners before they made it to the safety
of the mine. 20
Terrified, Johnson told his story to the local labor-sympathizing newspaper. “I
had a good job and left it to come here. We did not know there was a strike and were told
we would be well cared for,” he claimed. “We want to go back home,” the twenty-sixyear-old miner pleaded. “Won’t you send us back home?” The UMW denied that its
miners were involved in the ambush, claiming instead that they were men who had
learned the mining trade as “convicts” in the South, but there was no doubt in Johnson’s
mind who gunned him down. “The union men ought not to have attacked us,” he insisted.
But instead of condemning the UMW, Johnson appealed to it, asking for help. “We want
the union to send us back home.” 21
Johnson and the other miners returned to Madisonville the next day. Their
experiences were not unique. Hundreds of black miners, both men and women, were
imported to striking mines each year, both voluntarily and by force. Some knowingly
20
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came to break strikes while others, like Johnson, came unaware of the strike but did not
have the funds to return home. 22
Situations like this became a root of hostility between white and black miners.
Many white English-speaking union miners and organizers condemned minority miners,
charging that these groups were particularly less honest than others in the trade. “The
colored men often kick because white men do not treat them right, and say we don’t give
them a chance,” former Illinois union leader Dan McLaughlin wrote from his new home
in Indian Territory. “Just as long as the colored man allows himself to be shipped around
the country in gangs for the purpose of driving white men away from their homes and
lowering wages, just so long will the prejudice and hard feeling exist. Let him be white or
black, we have no use for the man who insists on going down into the ditch and dragging
us with him.” 23
McLaughlin’s statement revealed a disjunction that ran throughout workers’
ranks. 24 The old union leader spoke of strikebreaking in general, condemning all who
broke strikes and worked below scale rates. In his mind, the problem plaguing black
miners and the UMW was not one of race, but of ethics. White miners’ anger against
black miners, he insisted, was not due to their skin, but to black miners’ willingness to
22
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drive down wages. 25 Yet, McLaughlin’s claim also revealed the racist sentiment rampant
in union ranks. Not all black miners broke strikes, and many of the black union miners
that complained to McLaughlin about fair treatment in the UMW were likely as willing to
break strikes as their white coworkers. Still, McLaughlin’s unapologetic words indicated
that he and other white UMW members would discriminate against all black miners as
long as some black miners broke strikes. Even though white union and non-union miners
frequently broke strikes and compromised their labor principles to provide for their
families, the strikebreaker, in many white miners’ minds, was black. 26
To black miners, such treatment was far from equitable. All miners were accepted
in the union, and, by 1891, the UMW had added a provision to the constitution that “no
person be hindered from securing work on account of race, color or nationality.” 27 Still,
thousands of unionized white English-speaking miners refused to work with black men in
the mines. Progressive Union organizer John Young reported that although black and
Italian miners in Braidwood, Illinois, were interested in the union, they still refused to
join. “They say that they would be in the union if they get the same show as other men,
and there is a great deal of truth in it,” he wrote, acknowledging that black and nonEnglish speaking miners’ interests were frequently neglected even when they joined the
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order. 28 Recognizing a similar situation, Kentucky miner and organizer W. H. Foster
reported that the union was “going down,” in his region because “the white man is doing
all he can to down the Negro and the Negro is doing all he can to down the white
man….” 29 Willing Hands insisted white miners should not be surprised at the black
miners willingness to tear at the miners’ union. His own assembly in Bevier, Kentucky,
dissolved over the very issues Foster described, yet he offered no apology for the black
miners’ unwillingness to work with the white miners. “[W]hen everything is smooth you
object to our color, which is unconstitutional and contrary to the will of our National,
state and general officials.” Given this inconsistency, Willing Hands argued that white
miners should not be surprised that when white miners went on strike “out of revenge we,
the bulk of the Afro-Americans go to work for spite,” he wrote. 30
Perhaps not surprisingly, in the midst of the widespread frustration with UMW
authority when locals throughout the nation broke away from the UMW and formed
“home organizations,” thousands of black union miners did the same. Fed up with UMW
officers who did little to end the racial discrimination in the mines that hired white miners
over black and learning that the region’s five hundred white miners in Leavenworth,
Kansas, were planning to strike, black miners of Leavenworth broke from their white
brethren and formed an “anti-strike organization.” In doing so, the miners curried special
favor with their employers, securing the fair treatment and steady work that the UMW
did not provide. 31
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The African American miners of Leavenworth demonstrated a crucial component
encouraging anti-UMW organizing. To UMW Missouri-Kansas District President F. B.
McGregor, the black miners were “led by the nose,” away from proper organization and
morality. 32 They turned their back on honest labor principles out of selfishness and greed.
But to the miners who joined the anti-strike order, it was a way to secure what the
national union neglected. In organizing, the miners demonstrated their understanding that
collective action brought desired results. Their faith in unionization never wavered, but
their trust in the UMW did. As such, their anti-UMW order became a means to not only
secure higher wages in their workplace, but to also strike at the order that had betrayed
them. 33
Illinois miner Pro Bono Publico recognized this problem in his own district and
bamed the problem on both races. Black union miners were upset with white members
because they were not treated equally in the order. Meanwhile, white miners resisted
opening their locals to black miners based on their presumed dishonesty either through
working for lower wages, breaking strikes, or laboring as convicts. Like many organizers,
he pushed miners to put aside racial differences. Urging his readers to “treat every man
as white,” he ordered them to cooperate with each other regardless of whether a coworker
may have broken a strike or might have once been a convict. “[I]t is a business matter,”
not one of racial sentiment or morality. “Christianity or morality don’t dig coal,” he
argued, reminding miners that “the coal produced by the immoral man is just worth as
much money in the market as that produced by the moral man or church member.” For
32
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that reason, he continued, “it won’t do for us to hold aloof from another man because his
life has not been all that could be desired previously.” Rather, “the only way to make
those men better and at the same time make yourselves better is to get into the union with
them” and urge upon them to do better in the future than they have in the past.” 34
But, as Willing Hands and other black organizers found, even when they were
willing to work in the same local, white miners seldom wished to follow black leaders.
Richard Davis endured countless threats from both white and black miners for his firm
stance for white and black miners to unionize and cooperate across the color line. 35
Miner T. H. Rollins demanded to know why black miners “are never elected to any
position that there is any honor or pay in?” To Rollins, the practice of accepting black
miners but denying them leadership smacked of hypocrisy. “I feel that we have as much
at stake as our white brothers,” he wrote, echoing white union miners’ claims that all
miners had an interest in improving the mining trade. But while white miners used this as
an argument for black miners to cast aside concerns for racial equality within the union,
Rollins used it as a way to push for black rights within the order. “I know that I speak the
sentiments of my colored brothers at large,” he wrote. Black union miners were as willing
and competent as whites to help guide the union, but were seldom given the chance. 36
To black miners, exclusion from the UMW did not come from any concerted
effort to push them out of the organization, but from rank and file resistance to UMW
laws. “Now what is needed most is principle and discipline,” Willing Hands wrote of
white miners ignoring the inclusion laws of the UMW and Knights of Labor, “brothers,
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buy and read a few Afro-American papers, to see just what the negro has to fight….” His
words referenced the trouble “that not only the Afro-American gets in the South, but all
over the land, both North and South.” 37 In the following weeks, he called readers’
attention to a lynching in Ohio, a race riot in Nashville, and reminded them that such
happenings were connected to the events at Coal Creek, Tennessee, a year earlier when
black convict laborers were forced to take the place of striking miners. “I appeal to you to
do something against such outrages,” he wrote, arguing like T. H. Rollins that such
actions affected white miners as well as black. 38 Using “supposed Afro-American
criminals” as laborers, lynching, and other forms of violence, the “lynching club of the
South” kept African Americans pressed down while forcing all miners to “work for a
song.” It was in the white miners’ best interest to join the anti-lynching cause, he argued.
“Laborers you will suffer the same fate that we Afro-Americans are if you don’t become
more solid, for it is you next that the despots will mob.” 39 Like T. H. Rollins and
thousands of other black farmers and laborers throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, Willing Hands firmly believed that their labor organizations were ideal
vehicles to lobby for racial change. 40
But support was not always easy to cultivate. White miners readily supported
laws forbidding convict labor, but seldom for the reasons black miners listed. Rather, it
was because, as miner wife Girsy McNab wrote, it was another means for the mine
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operators and government to work together “that guid American citizens may starve.” 41
Laws that dealt with broader aspects of racism that had indirect implications on mines,
however, received substantially less support. Segregation, black miners’ inability to
safely express workplace grievances, and lynching all affected black miners and
organization, but few could convince white miners or the UMW to push for new laws.
White miner “Mike,” for example, replied to Willing Hands’s plea for UMW action
regarding the Nashville riot with a joke. Known for his sarcasm, Mike quipped that the
black prisoners’ deaths were “too bad.” Instead, “they should have been taken to the
World’s Fair and exhibited to Sunday school scholars as models of innocence.” 42 Mike’s
response, however, appeared in the same Journal issue that contained black mine
organizer Richard Davis’s report of a trip through West Virginia. Traveling with two
white men to organize the region, Davis faced hostility at nearly every coal town they
visited. Denied access to the boarding house, he was expected to sleep in a run-down
cabin far from town. He was forbidden from eating indoors, from eating with his fellow
travelers. In each case, his companions spoke to their hosts and usually secured Davis
better accommodations, or at least access to a bed and dining room table. Still, Davis
could not help but wonder what would have happened if he had made the trip alone. He
presumed he probably would have been arrested, “for I felt like cursing and I would have
used cuss words had I been by myself.” 43
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Outraged at the irony, Willing Hands once again urged readers to pay attention to
the violence blacks faced, “for it will not be long until a Virginia mob will have an AfroAmerican labor organizer hung…” With that, he condemned Mike’s words, asserting that
the violence African Americans endured was no joking matter. “Further,” he continued,
“it is not possible for you to wish the organization success as long as Afro-Americans are
left at the mercy of others, as I fear that you would have done R. L. Davis should you
have been in company with him.” 44 Davis cautioned that this ongoing racism against
black miners would only hurt the UMW. Black miners would continue to reject the order
and worsen white miners’ conditions in the process, he argued, “for take the negro out of
the organization and you have a vast army against you, one that is strong enough to be
felt and feared.” 45 UMW membership was simply not enough to be included in the order.
Even within union ranks, as many black miners understood it, the line between white and
black, “you” and “us” remained.

Unskilled
Distinctions between “them” and “us” extended to miners who did not fully
assimilate into American culture. In most cases, these were newly-arrived immigrants
who spoke very little English. Like miners from the British Isles, these immigrants often
arrived with prior experience in the mines and traveled to mines in regions where they
already had friends or family waiting. While stereotypes of strikebreaking and immorality
applied to these groups, most miners placed more emphasis on non-assimilated
immigrants’ lack of knowledge, both of American customs as well as of the mining
industry. In her account of the economic downturn, for example, Laurene Gardner
44
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described a “flood” of “imported laborers” that were different from the immigrants that
came before. Like black miners and convict laborers “imported” into mining camps to
lower wages and break strikes, new immigrant miners were “imported” into the nation for
the same reason. “Our fast growing millionaires cast about for cheaper labor more
amenable to their wishes and found it in the hordes of vagrants and paupers the old
countries were glad to be rid of.” 46
The desperate population of beggars Gardner described became a menace in many
miners’ minds for several reasons. First, they feared that their communities would
become overrun with men and women who did not adhere to local customs and
disregarded local law. 47 In addition, the new arrivals’ presumed willingness to work for
low wages would only worsen the condition of miners throughout the nation. IndianaKentucky District Secretary John Kennedy described a new group of immigrant miners
arriving at a small Indiana mine whose operator deemed the miners qualified to mine coal
because “they could live and work on a piece of bread half the size of his hand and a
glass of water for twenty-four hours.”48 Though hyperbolic, such a claim was horrific to
miners who understood that such a denial of basic necessities resulted in a wage
reduction that would cascade into their own homes. These notions were made worse by
the belief that the “pauper laborers” arriving were “unintelligent” and “unskilled.” 49 Not
only did these new miners not speak English or understand American customs, but,

46

Laurene Gardner, letter to the editor, “Laurene’s Budget,” UMWJ, August 4, 1892.
“The Miners and their Cause,” NLT, June 29, 1889.
48
J. H. Kennedy, UMW Indiana-Kentucky District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ,
August 6, 1891; Kansas BLS, 1891 Report, p. 124-133.
49
Miners routinely used these phrases when discussing immigration. Sullivan and Clay County [Indiana]
Citizens, Official Preamble and Resolutions, “Indignation,” UMWJ, November 19, 1891; Mary Jane
Beanblossom, letter to the editor, “From Ashboro,” UMWJ, December 3, 1891; “Freedom,” letter to the
editor, “Is Immigration Hurtful to the Country?” UMWJ, December 29, 1892; J. H. Kennedy, UMW
Indiana District Eleven Official Report, “District Eleven,” UMWJ, November 26, 1891.
47

185

according to most assimilated miners, they did not know how to mine coal.
Consequently, many assimilated miners maintained that the new miners would degrade
the mining trade by lowering wages, making a mockery of the skill required to perform
the job safely, and placing all miners in grave danger underground.
For thousands of miners and other citizens, trouble began with the new arrivals’
inability to speak English. “It is quite a common thing to lay the blame on a number of
those who work in the mines who do not understand the English language,” one
Braidwood, Illinois, miner explained of the declining wages and failed unions. Although
many non-English speaking immigrants honored strikes while English-speaking miners
broke them, he acknowledged, the stereotype remained. 50 John Kennedy agreed with the
Braidwood miner’s assertion and conceded that “those non-English-speaking people were
not all to blame” in the recent strikes. Still, “it was through them and on account of them
that the strife and bloodshed was brought about.” Even if they did not break strikes, they
were responsible for lowering wages, he insisted. All the “ignorant Poles,” were good for,
Kennedy asserted, was driving down wages and pushing honest laborers out of work.
Kennedy was not alone in such beliefs. Southern Illinois miner and organizer J. C.
Heenan noted that operators used the non-English speakers’ “ignorance” as a way to keep
the union out of the mines. By shuffling non-English speakers from one local mine to
another, operators kept non-English speakers “constantly among strangers,” never
assimilating, never getting to know English-speaking coworkers. Such a tactic not only
added to the desperation of non-assimilated miners who never knew where they would
50
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work next, but also “destroy[ed] all confidence that might otherwise be established
between them and the English-speaking miners.” 51
These claims, which often associated lack of English skills with ignorance and
indifference to unionism had a bigger impact on miners than lowering wages and
crippling unions. In many cases, English-speaking miners and society at large carried
these assumptions of ignorance into how they understood skill. Charles Fisher, for
example, learned how to mine coal in France but was working in the No. 2 mine in
Frontenac, Kansas, when it exploded in 1888. He was in the mine when he heard the blast
and nearly died trying to navigate the toxic tunnels to fresh air. With over seventeen
years’ experience mining coal, the thirty-three-year-old knew proper mining practices,
how to ventilate a mine, and on the day of the explosion could tell simply by the sound
that a “blown out shot” was the source of the mayhem that followed. 52
But when Fisher was called as an expert witness in a trial to determine who was at
fault for the 1888 explosion, he did not know how to explain this. He sat on the witness
stand confused at the court proceedings—each time the plaintiff asked him a question, the
defense objected before Fisher could answer. By the time the plaintiff asked him to tell
the jury whether or not the company supplied “brattices” to direct the mine’s airflow and
after the defense’s objection was overruled, Fisher neither knew whether he was allowed
51
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to answer the question nor what the plaintiff meant by his question. As the jury awaited
his answer, Fisher voiced his exasperation to the Court. “You must explain this to me,”
the miner demanded. “I can’t understand very well the English language; I want you to
explain so I understand.” 53
The problem was not that Fisher could not speak English. He could. Prior to the
explosion, French miners not fluent in English went to him for assistance when dealing
with mine management. Fisher spoke on their behalf, requesting new rooms for some
men or, on the morning of the 1888 explosion, demanding better ventilation in the rooms.
More likely his fluency in English and knowledge of the common complaints in the mine
explain his inclusion as an expert witness for the plaintiff in the trial.
Fisher’s confusion came from the words the lawyers used to describe the mining
practices that were seldom used in the mines. Most miners familiar with the term
“brattice” knew it as a wooden frame placed in a mine doorway that, by itself, had little
to do with controlling air flow in the mines. The heavy canvas cloth coated with tar
which hung from the brattice controlled the flow. Only miners of British descent called to
testify during the trial voluntarily called the curtain and frame together “bratticing.” The
other miners, including Fisher, simply knew it as a “curtain” or “canvas” and never used
the word “brattice.” This was especially important, since the Cherokee and Pittsburg
Company often provided the wood for the frame, but did not provide sufficient curtains
to hang from them. The plaintiff’s question, as Fisher understood it, made no sense. 54
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The misunderstanding, which came from the attorney’s unfamiliarity with mining
terms and practices, however, reflected poorly on Fisher and drastically altered his
treatment during his testimony. The miner’s outburst where he admitted not
understanding the question caused the plaintiff to rephrase the original question and ask
whether the company provided “curtains,” but it also had a second outcome. Although
defense attorneys had frequently objected to the questions asked of Fisher and the other
witnesses as a tactic to muddle testimonies, the grounds for objections to Fisher changed
after his outburst. In the other testimonies and before Fisher’s outburst, the defense’s
objections were that questions were “too suggestive” to the witness or “irrelevant” to the
case. The objections, like those for other witnesses, were quickly overruled and the trial
continued. But after the outburst, the objections grew more frequent and often charged
that, “the witness has not shown himself competent to express an opinion with reference
there to.” 55 Much to Fisher’s frustration as he tried to recount his experience during the
explosion, the defense argued he was incompetent to do so. “I can tell it if you let me,”
the miner insisted as he grew more restless on the witness stand, but it was no use. 56
Unlike the objections to other witness testimonies, several objections against Fisher
attacking his competency were sustained. 57 Nearly two decades of working in the mines
was not enough to be recognized as a mining expert by the Kansas courts. Credibility
hinged on more than one’s ability to mine coal; it also demanded impeccable proficiency
in the English language.
Despite his actual skill, Fisher’s lack of English fluency placed him on the fringes
of the workplace and society. Throughout the coalfields, immigrants like Fisher were cast
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as “ignorant,” and “unskilled” despite their experience in the coal industry. To be sure,
European mines and mining methods were not drastically different from procedures in
the United States. As in the southern Midwest, European mining techniques often varied
from mine to mine based on coal quality and surrounding rock composition. However,
English-speaking American miners frequently assumed that non-English speakers,
particularly those from eastern European countries were unskilled in the more “modern”
mining techniques, namely blasting the coal with explosives. In reality, mines in Eastern
Europe were as likely to use explosives to blast the coal as mines in Britain, and any
immigrant miners had more experience in mining coal than a local farmer, but the
stereotype of the unskilled “Hun” remained steadfast. 58 Miners who wished to keep the
new immigrants out of the mines therefore not only did so because they believed nonEnglish speakers lowered wages and took jobs, but because they believed that the new
arrivals were unskilled at mining and endangered the lives of all who worked in the mine
with them.
In a report circulated throughout southern Midwest mining districts as well as
labor newspapers, Ohio Chief Mine Inspector Robert Haseltine claimed that “Slavonic
and Latin races,” possessed “intense greed” that “create a constant menace to the lives
and health of themselves and their fellow workmen. These people are entirely ignorant of
the science of mining and as a result are continually working in peril.” Not only did they
not know how to mine, he continued, but they could not be taught. “Their lack of
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knowledge of our language precludes their being warned in time of danger or of being
instructed as to the mode of applying the remedy, until many times it is too late.” 59
English-speaking miners did not have to look far for evidence. Haseltine found
that although the total number of immigrants laboring in Ohio mines was less than 9
percent, 111/3 percent of Ohio mine fatalities for 1891 were “among this class of
people.” 60 The mines that hired the majority of non-English speaking immigrants to drive
down their prices also tended to cut more expenses in keeping mines safe. Mines that
hired an overwhelming number of non-English speaking miners were also the most
unsafe and the most likely to experience an accident. Just seventeen months before the
infamous 1892 Homestead strike, Andrew Carnegie’s business partner and Homestead
manager Henry Clay Frick faced a different kind of labor crisis when one of his coal
mines exploded. The Mammoth mine disaster, which killed nearly one hundred and
twenty men and boys, became one of the largest ever recorded. Miners and wives
throughout the nation expressed alarm at the explosion, offering their sympathy to those
affected in the disaster. Miners knew that the same disregard for safety took place in their
own mines and looked at the disaster as a rallying cry to change procedures in extraction,
not only by making sure that explosives were handled with greater care, but to also make
sure that inexperienced miners did not handle them and that mine inspectors knew
enough about explosives to check the mines properly. In the midst of this debate was a
careful mention of who died. Over one hundred of the dead were immigrants from
eastern Europe, adding to the evidence that new immigrant arrivals had no business
59
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working in the coal mines. Consequently, even as they offered sympathy and even
monetary assistance to the non-English speaking miners’ families injured or killed in the
Mammoth explosion, English-speaking miners also moved to take them from the mines
entirely. 61
Dozens of miners cited the Mammoth mine disaster as evidence for tighter
regulations against unskilled miners and mine inspectors. “[I]t only seems to be a matter
of time when more of our craft will share the same fate,” organizer W. H. Turner of Iowa
asserted, insisting that more precautions against mine gasses needed to be implemented.
“It is not likely to be detected until too late, unless some competent person is keeping a
vigilant watch for its presence,” he insisted. 62 Turner did not speak alone. In the wake of
the disaster, miners clamored for tighter laws such the Gallagher Bill that restricted who
could work in the Pennsylvania anthracite mines. 63 “If other states will follow this
example,” the National Labor Tribune wrote, “the miners will be similarly protected; if
not they will be subjected to the competition of not only the Huns and Italians who have
drifted there under ordinary circumstances, but will have also those that Pennsylvania
will refuse to take.”64 But the bill did not work as planned. Although the legislation was
designed to keep inexperienced miners out of the mine and mine inspector’s office,
anthracite miner “A Delving Serf” insisted that it was ineffective because it “has not
stopped one Polander or Hungarian from filling the place of a miner.” Irate, the miner
continued to say that he witnessed miners receive mining certification “who could not tell
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in English where they were born, what their names were, or how old they were.” Worse,
Delving Serf insisted, one local operator had three of his Polish employees go before the
board in hopes they would be appointed to the mining board, “and lo and behold, Mr.
Polander was appointed, when to my certain knowledge miners of at least twenty-one
years’ experience who were passed by.” 65
Delving Serf’s statement, which contrasted “Mr. Polander” with experienced
“miners” indicated that, in his mind, one could not be Polish and an experienced miner.
Such a belief came out of more than simple expectations of white, English-speaking
entitlement, but a fundamental understanding that those who could not speak English
were incapable of being honest skilled workers. Rather, many saw them as tools that
furthered company’s power over the mines. The Gallagher Bill, Delving Serf argued, not
only failed to keep immigrants out of the mines, but also gave operators a valuable
loophole in the event of a mine disaster. “[I]f any anthracite miner gets killed the
employers can say ‘Well, he had a certificate of competency; surely he knew what he was
doing. What had he a certificate for but as a practical miner? We are not liable.’” 66
Such a fear prompted thousands of English-speaking miners and wives to stop
pushing for legislation to keep new immigrants out of the mines and instead favor laws
that would prohibit immigration entirely. The “intelligent foreign born miner” should not
be offended at UMW efforts to stop immigration, Laurene Gardner observed. If “he is
ready and willing to avail himself” to assimilate, unionize, and mine with care, he was
welcome to stay. But those who did not were “one evil that organization was meant to
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check,” she insisted.
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Citizens in Hymera, Indiana agreed. A mass meeting at the

Hymera Baptist Church demanded on behalf of the miners that all immigration be
immediately prohibited, “except for persons who can read and write the English language
and who bring with them the means to make a home in this country.” 68 Although
thousands of farmers and laborers in the United States were already impoverished to the
point of desperation and had no “means to make a home” without living on a tenant farm
or a company house, non-English speaking immigrants seemed far more dangerous than
any other group. 69
English speakers may have accepted non-English speakers into their ranks, but
such actions left no doubt where their true sentiments lay. For thousands of non-native
English speakers, such hostility gave them little reason to support an organization
devoted primarily to native-born and English-speaking interests. Swedish miners in
Oswalt, Iowa, for example, took pride in the fact that they kept their entirely Swedishspeaking Knights of Labor assembly strong when the English-speaking miners’ assembly
faded. Such enthusiasm was in part due to Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes’s
attention to the local, promising them assistance in whatever way he could. 70 Still, by
summer 1892, miner Oscar Anderson voiced uncertainties about NTA 135 and the UMW
to Hayes. As one of the two organizations that comprised the UMW, NTA 135 was
supposed to have a say in UMW affairs, but it held little influence. “[I]n fact,” he wrote
to Hayes, “135 is dead as far as Iowa is concerned.” To the Swedish miners of Oswalt,
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this was a problem. “[T]he Mine Workers organization is so much mixed up in the
Federation of Labor that our members positively refuse to pay them any Tax.” 71 Like
thousands of English-speaking miners who refused to pay dues to organizations that did
not respect their wishes, Anderson and the Swedish union miners of Oswalt wanted
nothing to do with a labor organization voicing increasing hostility to immigrant labor. 72
The Knights General Assembly, Anderson believed, was far more accommodating to
their interests. With that, he requested that Hayes transfer the Swedish local’s charter
from NTA 135 to the General Assembly, and to send all Knight material to the local in
the Swedish language. Anderson’s request, which would pull the assembly out of the
UMW, revealed that, what many English-speaking organizers would have described as
ignorant and anti-union actions were actually an effort to unionize according to the
organization that best addressed their interests. Irate at being called an “ignoramous” for
opposing officer decisions, French miner Louis Goaziou sarcastically played into this
stereotype. “What little English I can speak and understand I have learned in or around
the mines, and the little I can read and write I have learned at home in the evening, so you
can easily see that having such an ignoramus as myself for teacher it’s no wonder that my
education is very imperfect.” Perhaps he was incapable of understanding how the union
functioned, he continued, but many miners “not as ignorant as myself” nonetheless
agreed with his assessment. Several miners rushed to Goaziou’s defense, but the miner’s
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statement made it plain that his words against the union were dismissed because he was
an immigrant incapable of understanding the union, making his grievances against the
officers less legitimate than those of native-English-speaking whites. 73 In his Ohio mine,
“Union” claimed that immigrant miners like Goaziou who complained against the
officers or refused to pay dues until the union acknowledged their grievances were
behaving unreasonably. Although miners of all backgrounds and ethnicities withheld
dues or abandoned the union when it did not suit their interests, non-native-English
speaking miners who did so were seen as particularly hostile to the union. throughout the
nation. “Some of the foreign-speaking people have told us that they are in the majority
and they do not intend to be ruled by the American of English-speaking people,” Union
explained, implying that such demands were illegitimate. When their requests for equal
treatment in the union were denied, immigrant miners abandoned the union. “I feel sorry
that our foreign-speaking brothers are responsible for such a state of affairs. Let us have
unity and we shall prosper; without this we will get farther apart.” The claim blamed the
union’s failure on non-English speaking miners who were refused a full voice in the
miners’ organization. For Union and thousands of other English speaking miners, “unity”
came only when these miners accepted the leadership of white, English-speaking miners
and dutifully paid their dues to the organization that begrudged them. 74
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“Coal Butchers”
Despite its proclamations of inclusion, the UMW’s actions unapologetically
favored white, English-speaking miners. Even when these groups were officially included
in the order, they were still in many ways ostracized. Yet, as firm as their sentiments
were toward black and immigrant workers in the name of keeping wages fair and mines
safe, white English-speaking miners were far more ambivalent when addressing these
same issues among local farmers who also entered the mines. Like black and non-English
speaking miners, companies used farmers, most of whom were white and English
speaking, as a means to lower wages and decrease production costs. In addition, although
they could join the miners’ unions because they worked in the mines, few farmers did.
Still, unlike black and non-English speaking groups imported into the mines, farmers
were often well-rooted in the local community. As a result, farmer-miners became a kind
of quiet threat compared to the hysteria that followed other minority mining groups.
White English-speaking miners recognized farmer-miner presence in the mines as a
danger, but one secondary to black and non-English speaking miners. Despite constant
complaints from mining regions throughout the nation, miners never implemented any
major initiative or policy to keep the farmers out of the mines.
But the skilled miners did not treat the farmer-miners with the same hostility as
they did black or non-English speakers, even though farmer-miners’ presence in the
mines intensified in mid-1893 when the Panic and depression shattered the already
crippled economy around the southern Midwest mines. As Mary Lease urged Kansas
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farmers to “raise less corn and more hell,” hundreds followed the first part of her advice
and made up for the difference in the mines. They “crowded out” the practical miners
during the winter months when wages were highest. Their presence in the already full
mines slowed the turn and lowered earnings for everyone. It was unfair, the National
Labor Tribune wrote, the farmer-miners “take from the soil during the season of farming,
and when the winter demand set in for fuel they cut a fat streak out of what the regular
miners should have.” 75 Miner John Neal complained that his mine continued to take on
farmer-miners until the mine was so crowded the miners could not earn a living wage
despite the regular winter pay increase. 76 “It will take two of those farmers to put out as
much marketable coal as one practical miner would do, but then it would not do to refuse
those men good places in the mines, because they are useful in time of strikes.” 77 Yet as
pressing as the matter had become, miners were ambivalent about how to address the
problem. Even though white English-speaking miners at times walked out when black
men were hired in their mines and often rallied around anti-immigration legislation, they
staged no demonstrations against farmer-miners and agreed upon no policy to rid them
from the mines. Instead, their presence on the fringes of mines and miners’ organizations
created confusion that, in several different ways, served as formidable stumbling blocks
to organizational unity.
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Indiana miner and operator “Old Timer” considered farmer-miners a liability on
multiple fronts. Noting that Elijah Bridgewater, an inexperienced local farmer-miner,
injured himself in the mine, he reminded his readers not only of the dangers that ran
rampant for any miner, but also that the danger increased when working with less skilled
men. But Bridgewater’s injury, caused by a slate fall, was likely at least partly the
company’s fault. The company seldom supplied enough timbers to prop up the mine and
Bridgewater had good evidence to prove that the company’s neglect caused his injury.
But when the farmer-miner moved to sue the company, his inexperience worked in the
company’s favor. Bridgewater “knew but little about mining, and on the trial the lawyers
could make him say just what they wanted.” As such, the jury sided against Bridgewater
ten to two, ruling that his negligence, not the company’s caused his injury. Not only did
Bridgewater’s presence in the mines place miners in direct danger, but as a witness, he
aided the company in escaping responsibility for the fruits of its neglect, allowing unsafe
workplace practices to continue. 78
In this sense, white assimilated miners’ fears of unskilled miners being used by
the company proved true. But the real danger of the inexperienced miner came not from
the non-English speakers, but from local farmers. Working six months a year in the
mines, farmer-miners simply did not have the skills of “reading” mine faces, cracks, and
other danger signs that might prompt a practical miner to use a different technique to
blast or otherwise loosen his coal. 79 Instead, farmer-miners knew just enough to claim to
know how to mine, but were often far more likely than other minority groups to become
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mine foremen or mine inspectors. With little experience, they often followed company
orders without understanding the consequences in coal mines and as inspectors, seldom
recognized company violations. “A Miner” wrote that his Missouri mine should have
been shut down because there was no escape shaft. But the mine inspector disregarded
the violation. Even though nearly two dozen miners were killed in a mine fire just a few
months earlier, he still failed to note the safety violations in the mines. “He is a farmer
and does not know anything about a coal mine,” Miner wrote. “He should be removed or
thrown in the mine and roasted with the twenty-three men that were burned to death…
either would suit the miners so they get rid of him and get a competent inspector to do his
duty.” 80
Still, as dangerous as it was for the miners, companies saw merit in pushing for
inexperienced miners into authority positions. Not only were they more likely to miss
safety violations simply through inexperience, but in the event of a mine accident, the
company was often absolved of guilt since the mine inspector found no violations. “The
operators have the advantage every time,” Old Timer observed, “and unless we become
awake to the fact we might as well quit suing coal companies first as last.” The surest
way, he believed, was to stop training the farmers. “I have never taught one yet and never
will,” he insisted, reminding his readers that “miners must dig the coal and the hay John
must grow the corn and raise the pork and beef. Then, and not till then, will we better our
condition.” 81
Although hundreds of miners agreed with Old Timer’s sentiment, most
recognized that the farmer-miners would not leave the mines. At the same time, miners
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also understood that few farmer-miners were willing to join a trade union for an
occupation they performed six months each year. Even when forced to join in strongly
unionized areas, they stayed in only for the period that they mined, seldom paid dues, and
rarely honored the principles they were supposed to uphold. But if they could not force
the farmer-miner to labor honestly, many miners believed that they could force them to
pay additional fees. “If we were organized here and charge these winter coal diggers
about $20 for the privilege of taking our living from us, we would not be bothered with
many of them,” John Neal suggested.82 Although few suggested a fee so high, Neal’s
plan was an old one. One of the first resolutions the UMW passed when it formed was an
“anti-‘corn-husker’ resolution” proposed by an Illinois miner which stated that “men who
only work part of the year in the mines must pay all dues and abide by all conditions of
our organization and should they fall in arrears during the time they are out of the mines
they must pay all arrears before they can be allowed to work.”83
But these precautions did not work to the miners’ advantage. “During the strike of
1889 in the block field our chances of success looked favorable up till the time the
farmers had their crops put away, and then they swarmed down on us and we must either
divide our small resources with them or they would go to work in the mines,” John
Kennedy observed noting that the same conditions applied four years later. “And every
week when the amount was a little smaller than usual they would come to the
commissary, draw their rations and the same day or the next morning go to the boss and
tell him they were ready to go to work although they had worked on their farms and had
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[a] year’s provisions stowed away in their homes.” 84As dues paying union members who
worked in the mines, they were entitled to the aid the union provided. Yet, Kennedy and
hundreds of other miners who saw the mines as the farmers’ secondary source of income,
believed that the farmers should allow the aid to be reserved for those truly in need that
had no other income. Not only did the “cornfield-mechanics” take jobs at lower rates,
then T. J. Llewellyn observed, but these “Benedict Arnolds” tore apart the miners’ union,
even if they could be forced to join and pay dues. “[T]hese ‘coal butchers’” would be the
first to sign iron-clad agreements to keep unions out of the mine. “Were it not for the
good men who will suffer through the action of the ‘things’ who are supposed to have
been created upright, but who haven’t backbone enough to make men, I would cheerfully
say that 50c a day is enough for these poor, miserable traitors, who are busily engaged in
tearing down the bulwark between themselves and slavery,” he wrote. 85
Statements like Llewellyn’s left little doubt that farmer-miners who worked
against the union were seen as deplorable co-workers, yet his statement indicated that
they were also viewed very differently from the black and non-English speaking miners
who were accredited with the same behavior. Whereas black and non-English speaking
miners were viewed as naturally inclined to dishonest labor and therefore ostracized from
within their organization and not entitled to fair treatment, farmer-miners, like white,
English-speaking practical miners, were expected to know better. They were “Benedict
Arnolds,” traitors to their own people. In identifying them as such, Llewellyn included
farmer-miners with the interests of the UMW, even as the farmer-miners acted against the
order.
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Such a stance resonated with thousands of white English-speaking miners who,
though seldom understood black or immigrant struggles in the mines, fully understood
farm life. “I have been one of them [a farmer] in times past and was a farm laborer for a
good many years, and I am sure they would be much easier organized than any other
class I know of,” Indiana miner “Salamander” argued. 86 “Tow Row” of Ohio agreed,
claiming that the farmer-miners were not only good men, but that their actions should be
emulated. “I think it would be better still for all of us to own farms, and work on them,
too, when the scale of wages did not suit us.” 87 In her reply to Tow Row, Laurene
Gardner expressed her own sympathy for the farmer-miners. “I wish every coal digger
owned… a little patch [of farmland], for that would give me one, two or three, in fact,”
she began, she merely opposed to their willingness to rob miners’ work. Farmer-miners
were not wholly bad, they were industrious and hard-working, “in fact a little too
enterprising,” as one National Labor Tribune editorial professed. Though their actions
were as damaging as other non-union miners, practical miners still counted them as one
of their own, like miners who became operators or foremen, their faults lay in selfishness,
not a predisposition to dishonesty that many associated with black and non-English
speaking miners. 88
Willingness to exclude some miners based on presumed skill while tolerate other
miners with decidedly less mining skill came to a head in 1893. For decades, miners had
complained about the unfair advantage coal screens gave to the company. Although many
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states had passed laws standardizing the size of the screens that sorted the coal, they were
seldom specific enough to be enforced effectively. The screens not only needed to be
specific on the length and width, but also in the spacing between the bars that allowed the
coal to pass. The shape of the bar, typically either “flat” or “diamond” also affected how
much coal fell between the bars. Finally, these factors meant little if the screen was not
kept in good repair. The thousands of tons of coal that crossed the screens regularly
corroded them, shrinking bars or breaking them entirely. As a result, more coal fell
between the bars before it could be weighed, making it coal the company could sell
without paying miners for mining it.
Miners and labor organizers alike had long favored the idea of instituting a “run
of mine,” “gross weight,” or “anti-screen” law that would force coal companies to pay
miners before the coal was run over the screen. Such a law made it easier to regulate
scale rates and compensate miners for all coal they mined. By 1893, several states,
including Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri, all secured anti-screen legislation in some
capacity and, the UMW expected Ohio to follow that January. 89 Quoting Ohio Chief
Mine Inspector Robert Haseltine’s warning of increased dangers created by
inexperienced immigrant miners and citing the latest mine explosion in Colorado that
killed twenty-five miners, the United Mine Workers’ Journal presented the anti-screen
legislation as a viable means to protect the mines from the “Sicilian or the Bohemian”
who “don’t know of the skill, the care, and the intelligence necessary to be a safe and
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complete coal miner.” 90 If mines weighed the coal before it was screened, the UMW and
many miners reasoned, companies would pay all miners equally for the full weight of the
material they mined, including dirt and slack. Skilled miners who produced large
amounts of coal therefore produced a more valuable gross weight than the inexperienced
miners who produced more slack than coal. As a result, companies would seek out the
best and most experienced miners to extract the coal, giving skilled miners the ability to
set their own wages and work with the most careful miners. 91
As desirable as the anti-screen bills were to many miners and organizers,
however, hundreds of miners demurred. The number of Ohio union and non-union miners
who rejected them caught organizer Richard Davis by surprise. “I can not for the life of
me see how and where they base their argument,” he wrote. “I believe the miners want it
or they would not have mentioned it.” It simply did not make sense why the miners
would oppose a law that would pay them for all the material they mined rather than the
largest chunks of coal. 92
“Willing Hands” readily answered Davis’s question, noting that Indiana had
already passed the law, but could not enforce it unless “it is in the employers [sic] interest
to do so.”93 His words reflected the skepticism that hundreds of miners shared regarding
workplace legislation. “It makes a miner laugh to hear paid lawyers explain what is right
between operators and miners,” miner “Old Timer” wrote of legislation. “Doctors,
lawyers and preachers whenever they make a law to benefit miners always have a
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loophole through which an operator can, by greazing himself good, squeeze out of paying
a poor coal digger one cent damages.” 94 Legislation to aid miners like abolishing
company stores and establishing weekly pay laws, if they were not ruled unconstitutional,
were seldom enforced in any state, many observed. When they were enforced, companies
used the legislation to protect themselves, such as when mine inspectors’ superficial
inspection and approval of mines’ absolved companies of guilt in mining accidents.
These trends extended into the national forum. Union leaders like Phil Penna
encouraged the miners to support “protection” in 1888, yet by 1892, miners dealing with
wage reductions questioned whether they received any benefit from legislation like the
McKinley Tariff. “I don’t know whether to attribute the above results to the operations of
the McKinley tariff law or not, but it is certainly a protection which we miners of Indiana
could have done without,” miner “Uncle Abe” wrote bitterly. “The Democratic
politicians are just laughing in their sleeves… not that they are glad to see us reduced, but
because it proves as they say the sophistry of those coal operators and with this insure the
State of Indiana on their (the Democratic) side in next November.” 95 As the economy
crumbled, hundreds of other miners looked at the McKinley Tariff and the newly
repealed Sherman Silver Purchase Act and agreed, asking how any legislation aided
producers. Demonetizing silver “played sad havoc with the business of India,” miner
Ecce Homo observed after the United Sates repealed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. “I
would like to ask Mr. McKinley what caused the panic of ’73, and all the panics since
then,” he demanded, insisting that legislation was little more than a “tool” for bankers.
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Politicians “claim to be in favor of protecting home industry,” miner “Sorehead” wrote,
“But what are the facts of the case? A few Eastern capitalists seem to get all the
protection.” Meanwhile, silver and coal mines shut down and farmers continued to flood
the mines that remained open, all to the benefit of the “gold gamblers” throughout the
world. 96
If state legislators repealed the laws that aided miners and only enforced the ones
that could benefit companies, and if the national government did the same by repealing
laws like the Sherman Silver Purchase Act that producers wanted while “financial
pirates” exploited the tariff to their advantage, miners saw little reason for the anti-screen
bill to have a different fate.97 “It is a good law for the miners if they only would believe
it,” Willing Hands wrote to Davis, “but, brother R. L. D., you are wrong, there is a large
percent of the men here that don’t want it lived up to….” 98
Many miners opposed it because companies would use it to further injure the
miners. Anti-screen bill supporters were correct that the operators would only want
practical miners, “Union Miner” conceded, but this would not benefit the miners. Even
when wage scales were set according to screen size, mines paying wages for mine run
coal deducted as much as fifty percent of the weight for slack. 99 No doubt this practice
would continue in some form under the anti-screen law, Union Miner asserted, which
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would mean that all miners would be deducted the same flat rate, regardless of their skill.
“[W]hat are you going to do with the ‘pumpkin rollers’ and the ‘woodchoppers’ that are
already in the organization? They cannot be discharged, because we will not allow it,” he
reasoned. Unlike the UMW’s willingness to overlook mistreatment of black or immigrant
miners, they would not tolerate a unionized farmer-miner to be discharged from the mine.
But farmer-miner coal production was substantially lower than that of practical men,
“and while making the yearly [pay] scale, should it be taken on the anti-screen basis the
average would certainly be taken.” 100
In short, the anti-screen bill would pay practical miners as though they were as
unskilled as the farmer-miners. “By that the unskilled miner would be benefitted at the
expense of the skilled miner,” Union Miner concluded. Kansas miner John M’Laughlin
agreed. “I am satisfied that if we insist upon a straight mine run price we will be whipped
into accepting a price far below what the practical miner should have for his labor,” he
wrote. Accepting the bill would not only do little to help miners in securing fair wages,
but it would also make the mines more accessible to less skilled men, degrading the
mining craft.101
The anti-screen bill opponents were not far off in their predictions. While most
states simply did not enforce the law, miners gained little in those that did. Farmers
continued to work in the mines while companies paid depreciated wages for run of mine
coal. “Developments have shown that [the anti-screen law] is inductive to poor mining,”
Missouri Labor Commissioner Oscar Kochtitzky observed in 1888. Far from cultivating
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careful and skillful miners, he found that miners had little incentive to produce quality
coal. Rather, “in order to increase their ‘output,’” miners “resort to the excessive use of
powder and heavy blasting, shooting from the solid, without ‘under,’ or ‘side’ cutting.”
These tactics were the precise actions accredited to immigrant miners and outraged
practical miners when performed by farmers because of the increased likelihood of mine
explosions. But run of mine miners were not paid to be skilled. Whereas experienced
miners once used concentrated blasts to loosen only coal, under gross weight pay, they
overloaded their shots and extended their blasting range to bring down more slack to
increase their weight.102 Rather than protecting the skilled miner, the legislation only
made him less skilled.

Gilded Age efforts to protect the mines and miners manifested in contradictory
ways. Who unions accepted and what legislation they desired did not always align, but
did reflect how late nineteenth century society and skill divisions in a semi-skilled
industry inhibited unity along ethnic and occupational lines. Although the UMW
professed to be an inclusive organization that embraced all miners regardless of ethnicity,
it pushed aside black and non-English speaking miners, dismissing their concerns and
berating their abilities. Instead, groups that did not fit with the white, English speaking,
experienced miner mold were accepted into the union more out of a desire to make them
obey union doctrine rather than genuine interest for their well-being.
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While these various groups could work together for common interests, as when
white and black miners fought against convict labor, minority groups were ostracized
when their interests did not align with the white, English speaking rank and file.
Questions of racial discrimination in the workplace and community, lynching, or unfair
laws were seldom addressed and never given serious consideration by miners’ delegates
at national conventions. Such practices alienated black and immigrant workers who
looked on the UMW with hostility.
Such a stance allowed the organization to be more accepting of those who were
not male or not miners than these minority miners. Whereas skilled black and immigrant
miners were pushed away from the order, women like Laurene Gardner and farmerminers blended in with it. Consequently, official inclusion in union ranks meant little.
While white and English speaking union miners did not want minority groups in the
mines, they expected minorities to join and remain faithful to the union. Even as they
extended this invitation however, white English speakers neglected legislation that would
help black miners and embraced legislation that would keep immigrant miners out of the
mines and nation. These positions stood in contrast to the miners’ stances on farmerminers, who though they were not welcome in the mines, did not suffer from any sort of
hostile action from the practical miners. Instead, miners looked on the farmers with
sympathy, judging that their placement in the mines was due to the same hardships all
white English speakers faced in the midst of an economic depression. The best means to
remove the farmer from the mines, many reasoned, was to improve the economy.
Ultimately, these various groups that did not completely fit with the UMW frayed
the already unraveling union. Unable to unite for common interests, union legislation to
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regulate the mines failed, causing many to put their hopes more in national politics than
the union strength. This is what gave Willing Hands and Laurene Gardner the common
ground they shared. Despite their disagreement on who belonged to the UMW and what
the organization’s priorities should be, both remained confident that it was the best labor
organization to achieve their goals. Yet, as the depression continued, even the most
steadfast believers began to question the union’s strength. As officers abandoned the
organization and the Knights of Labor disintegrated, it seemed that the UMW and what
remained of the miners’ unity was not far behind.
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Chapter Six
Waiting for “Moses”: Renegade Leaders and Absent Victories, 1894-1896

From district to district, miners’ reports of their strike success rolled in. “[W]e are
right in line to call for the general suspension” Missouri miner “Sunshine” wrote just a
few days after the 1894 strike began, “every man stopped at noon.” 1 From Illinois,
“Calamity” boasted “All solid in this county; men all out, will stand by the national
officers win or lose; organized to a man—300 to 500 at every meeting.” 2 Such a solid
standing caught union miners and officials everywhere by surprise. For the first time in
their memory, the miners had a widespread and united national movement. Indiana had
nearly shut down its entire coal production. Non-union Iowa miners who reluctantly
joined the strike were not only still strong six weeks in, but decided to reorganize UMW
Iowa District Thirteen. 3 Miners in Ohio were firm and stronger unionized than ever
before, “waiting patiently for the final suspension to come to a close at 70 cents, and
nothing less,” W. S. Moke reported.4 In nearly every state miners echoed his claim.
“There must be no receding, no backsliding, if it takes all summer and next fall to fight it
out,” declared one Pennsylvania miner. 5 Wages had fallen too low not to fight; on this
point nearly 150,000 bituminous mine workers agreed.
The seven-week bituminous coal strike that began in April 1894 shut down coal
production more successfully than most miners thought possible. Years of strike defeats,
constant wage reductions, and with the only previous nationwide coal strike canceled
1
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before it began, miners had little hope that 1894 would bring any real change. UMW
membership and coal prices steadily declined as the depression worsened and the warm
summer months approached, causing many miners to believe it was unwise to strike. But
these same factors also convinced them that they had nothing left to lose. The desperation
that came from a prolonged economic depression stirred up unrest from producers in
nearly every corner of the country. Coinciding with the growing Populist movement and
railroad worker unrest, the union and non-union miners also made a national push on the
national stage.
There were only 13,000 miners in the UMW when the miners walked out, yet
with the overwhelming support of the non-union miners, the strikers earned a roughly ten
cent per ton wage increase despite the ongoing depression. The gain was enough for
UMW officers to call the 1894 strike a victory, not only because they increased miner
wages, but because they mobilized the miners as a unified national force. But many
miners disagreed. To them, the strike did not mark their first national victory over the
competitive coal market, but a defeat that came from within their own organization. The
officers’ tactical decision to negotiate with operators while the strike force was at its
strongest looked like betrayal to miners who believed that union leaders had “sold out”
their best chance to earn a fair wage. Consequently, this defeat that leaders presented as a
victory became the latest betrayal in a long history of union deceit. As charges of officer
corruption circulated, the effects of such a non-victory cast a shadow over the UMW and
its officers that lasted for years. 6
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Previous scholars have been correct to observe the power of failed strikes and
employer strength as critical factors in workers’ decisions to abandon their unions. 7 In the
case of 1894, the settlement crushed the enthusiasm the strike had inspired. Many of
those who joined union ranks quickly left as mine operators initiated new wage
reductions shortly after the new wage scale was established. Others threw away their
union cards to avoid being blacklisted. As both capital and government became more
hostile to workers, repression snuffed out any remaining hope for raising wages.
But these blows struck a movement that was already weakened and fragmented.
Many rural producers would have agreed with “Old Miner” of Kansas who insisted that a
“wolf in sheep’s clothing” lurked among them. 8 By the time he wrote those words in
1894 no miner was entirely sure who the “wolf” was, but distrusted across the board
government officials, mine operators, and union leaders who claimed to act on behalf of
the miners’ interests. As rural producers across the country moved to clean out
government offices of leaders unsympathetic to the average worker’s plight, so workers
and officials set out to “purify” their own ranks from within. Locals overthrew state
officials and demanded UMW national officials’ resignations. State leaders accused
national UMW leaders for accepting bribes to end the coal and railroad strikes. But such
actions were not restricted to the UMW. In the Knights of Labor General Assembly in
November 1893, Knights overthrew longtime General Master Workman Terence
Powderly. A little over a year later, UMW President John McBride unseated Samuel
Gompers as President of the American Federation of Labor, the UMW miners split from
the Knights of Labor and helped form the Independent Order of the Knights of Labor,
7
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and the following June, the Knights of Labor established a new miners’ union that,
drawing on the residual anger from the 1894 settlement, siphoned the UMW’s already
dwindling ranks. 9
Recrimination among the rival organizations mattered little to the rank and file
and divisions between the Knights and AFL meant more to organizational leadership than
its grassroots. Instead, mine workers asserted that their leaders’ wars came at the
detriment of worker interests, reinforcing miners’ beliefs that officers cared little for their
interests; and they wondered who, in fact, still labored for honest labor principles and
who had “sold out” and used the organization for personal gain.
The 1894 settlement then, proved to be far from the victory UMW leaders
claimed. Workers saw it as part of an extensive web of treachery both within the labor
movement and in Gilded Age society. It tapped into rural producers’ existing suspicion of
leadership and became another symbol for why they doubted anyone who claimed to help
the common man. Such confusion and frustration split an already divided rank and file,
indicating that the battle workers fought was as much against ‘labor’ as it was against the
‘capital’ that oppressed them.

The Suspension
Wages fell drastically between the time of the canceled 1891 strike and the first
nationwide strike in 1894. In 1891, southern Midwest bituminous miners in competitive
regions earned an average 70 cents per ton for screened coal. By 1894, they earned 50
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cents per ton for the same labor.10 Nearly every miner understood that the declining price
came not only from miners’ willingness to work for low wages, but too much coal. For
years, many union leaders and miners called attention to the surplus and insisted that the
only way to raise coal prices was to decrease the supply. Some proposed lessening the
supply through a process known as “restriction” where miners limited coal production
either by producing a predetermined tonnage or shortening work hours. 11 Still, given
miners’ actions like accepting free clicks, and other means of making extra money, it was
unlikely all miners would honor restriction. 12 Worse, the overcrowded mines and slow
turn meant that even if all miners restricted their output or hours, operators could
maintain production rates by adding more men to the mine, further slowing the turn to the
point that it forced miners to work more in order to feed their families.
Others, however, believed that coal exportation was now a viable option. The low
coal prices reached a level for some qualities of US coal to be cheaper than that mined in
the British Isles. To government officials, operators, and miners alike, exporting the US
coal surplus became a viable alternative. 13 Some operators considered expanding US coal
exports to British dominions and other regions with poorer coal qualities. At the time,
the total amount of US bituminous coal exported never exceeded 2,400,000 long tons,
worth roughly $6,000,000 in 1893 and $4,900,000 in 1894, indicating over a thirty cent
10
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decline in coal prices, felt in coal mining regions throughout the world. When English
miners struck to raise their own wages in early 1894, a handful of US operators took
advantage of the scarcity and increased their exports to fill demands formerly supplied by
Britain. The expansion of trade indicated that if US operators could price their coal far
enough below Europe, they could claim their own piece of the global coal market. 14 Still,
as countries negotiated tariffs to protect their own coal industries, the cost to ship and
competition with Britain and Germany largely restricted US exports to the Americas
where industrial development lagged in comparison to the European and Asian countries
where Britain exported its coal surplus. 15
For thousands of miners, then, the only way to decrease the US coal surplus was
to stop mining entirely. 16 This was the course the UMW decided to take in summer1894.
This was not the first time the miners’ union proposed a national strike. Miners vividly
remembered the aborted 1891 strike for the eight-hour day. Delegates at the 1893
convention likewise voted to demand and strike for a five cent per ton wage increase on
14
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both screened and run of mine coal, an amount that UMW President John McBride
claimed was too low. But low union membership, particularly in West Virginia and
Pennsylvania, combined with the onset of the 1893 Panic, ended miners’ demands before
the UMW could initiate an official campaign. “Had the delegates at our last annual
convention been able to read the future, and thus learn what was ahead of us, there would
have been less disappointment over the failure to advance prices,” McBride said as he
advocated the 1894 strike.

17

Yet, conditions in 1894 had not improved much over 1893. A strike at any time
was a gamble, but a coal strike in a vastly non-union trade during the summer months of
a depression was especially risky. Great Britain’s success with its own coal suspension
left little doubt that coal prices would increase in a coal shortage, but there was no
guarantee operators would be willing to pass this increase on to the miners, especially
since the surplus coal meant operators would make high profits on coal long before their
supply ran low. 18 Illinois miner “Irish American” was one of thousands of miners who
acknowledged the ongoing reductions that seemed to happen monthly in the mines. In
some districts it drove weekly wages lower than the cost of a single ton of coal. Still, he
remained opposed to the suspension altogether, noting that the miners were too
unorganized and too desperate to feed their families to honor the strike long enough to
win. “I wish to say to those who favor national suspension that such a move would only
work injuriously toward your organization,” he wrote, “and I think if such a move was
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inaugurated it would only bring on defeat, and defeat means demoralization, as all those
know who have witnessed failures even in sectional strikes.” 19 Thousands of miners
agreed with Irish American’s reservations. “Let me inform you there are miners out in
this Western country not by the hundreds, but by the thousands who have been living on
half rations for months and only half clothed,” one Missouri miner wrote.20 A suspension
at this time, “W. L.” of Foster, Iowa, observed, meant that the miners in his region would
not pay the rent for their company homes. 21 A suspension, then, might make conditions
worse for the miners rather than improve them.
Still, as more mines announced immediate reductions ranging from ten to twentyfive percent, suspending work in all mines throughout the nation seemed the only means
of increasing wages. 22 “Mr. Editor, how much longer is these hard times going to last in
this country?” the Missouri miner asked in his letter. His questioning reflected the
desperation many miners faced in light of the depression and the indecision they had
toward the suspension. The Missouri miner never claimed to be in favor of the strike,
never insisted that it was the best move for the miners to make. He did not write excitedly
about certain victory. Instead, he wrote that he thought there was nothing else left for the
miners to do. “I sincerely hope that this general suspension all over the country will prove
beneficial to us miners,” he wrote, “for if it doesn’t, I don’t know what is to become of
us.” 23
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Such ambivalence stretched throughout the miners’ ranks. In many places, a small
majority favored the decision to join the strike, so that although most miners honored the
strike, not all agreed with it. Delegates to the Iowa state convention voted to join the
strike by a vote of 66 to 58.24 For others, the timing of the strike seemed wrong. Miner
“Blind Robin” suggested that the strike commence a week earlier to prevent operator
stockpiling while others pushed for the miners to quit work on May 1 when their yearly
wage contract expired. Traditionally, striking on May 1 was a way to negotiate a new
wage contract with the company for the upcoming year. If the miners did not agree to the
terms the company offered under the new contract, they would not work until the contract
was resolved. But in 1894, most miners accepted that the low wages came more from the
overstocked coal market than operators’ unwillingness to pay higher wages. The
suspension, therefore, was an effort to deplete the nation’s coal supply and elevate coal
prices high enough to restore miners’ wages to the 1893 scale of 70 cents per ton, not a
negotiating tactic against their employers as a strike was typically used. 25 Consequently,
even if an operator was willing to pay the 1893 scale, the miners were forbidden to accept
the offer. The suspension would only end when the UMW Executive Board declared it
over. No local settlements or loading coal for any reason would be tolerated, regardless of
the wage amount. All miners would work for the same price or not at all. 26
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But not all miners agreed. Indiana delegates to the 1894 UMW Convention
initially voted against the suspension with the intention of finishing out the 1893
contract. 27 For the delegates and many of the miners they represented, striking before
May 1 meant breaking their contract and going back on their word. For others, it meant
they would sacrifice extra weeks of pay when the mines were running full time for the
first time in months. Although they remained overwhelmingly non-union, miners in the
Indiana block district favored the suspension but voted 726 to 1349 in favor of not
joining until May 1. Even local union leadership was divided over when to walk out.
Most in favor of carrying out the contract, Indiana Secretary John Kennedy observed,
“favored restricting themselves to two days per week—that being as much or more than
they have worked for the last four months.” Miners in LaSalle, Illinois, likewise decided
to continue working until the contract expired until nearby Spring Valley miners marched
to the LaSalle mines to convince them to stop.28
To many miners’ surprise, the strike began as a success. Although the UMW only
had roughly 13,000 miners in its ranks, mostly concentrated in Ohio, the non-union
miners’ own frustrations allowed them to join the strike, even if they would not join the
union. 29 By May 1, roughly 125,000 miners were idle and more followed in the following
days. 30 Miners throughout the nation reported marches to neighboring towns to convince
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more miners to join the strike. Missouri and Iowa almost entirely shut down their
industries, Indiana and Illinois shut down by three-fourths, with more expected. Ohio,
Alabama, Indian Territory, and New Mexico slowed their production to a crawl. Such
overwhelming support, “Makeshift” of Bevier, Missouri, noted, was “something unusual
for Bevier to do.” 31 Upon traveling through the partially-unionized Kentucky mines, J.
Carter, like dozens of other union organizers, found the miners’ faith in the UMW
revived as the strike continued. “Even the women here are helping us,” he wrote
excitedly, “they say they will desert their men if they go back to the old wages.” 32 By
May 10, John McBride proudly announced that within five days “there will not be 5,000
bituminous coal miners at work in the whole country.” 33After years of defeat, the
overwhelming success of the national suspension inspired new hope among the miners,
causing thousands to believe for the first time that national solidarity was not only
possible, but within reach.
Yet, not all mines were at a standstill. Mines in Earlington, Kentucky ran full
time, mostly with black miners who had no interest in aiding the UMW-led suspension
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and instead filled southern Indiana contracts.34 “If there is any possible way to have those
miners lay down their tools, I would like for some one to suggest the plan, for we have
done all we can do,” Kentucky miner “Blackbird” wrote of the working mines. 35 In other
regions, farmers abandoned their fields for the mines, unwilling to turn away high-paying
work, even during the normally busy summer farming months. “[The miners] done
everything they could to persuade them to quit work a couple of weeks, and put in their
time cultivating their farms,” John Kennedy wrote, “but as there was nothing human to
them except their shape of course they could not be persuaded to quit work.”36
Such problems were not isolated to Indiana and Kentucky. Virginia, Maryland,
and substantial portions of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Colorado all refused
to join the suspension. 37 Missouri miner Philip Veal claimed that most of Kansas ignored
the suspension because the state’s organizers, like M. L. Walters, ordered them to remain
at work. “The miners in Kansas in most places have seceded from the union under Mr.
Walters, their leader (which Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot must envy),” Veal
wrote. 38 According to him, Walters told the miners that “Kansas was not invited to join
the national movement,” and that the suspension would only benefit the eastern mines. 39
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Even when Missouri miners marched across the state line to encourage the miners to quit,
they were met by a crowd of angry miners, wives, and strikebreaker-sympathizers who
chased the strikers out of the state.40
Though the number of men who refused to work was higher than expected, they
were not enough to shut down national coal production. Pennsylvania and Kansas fields
shipped coal to railroad depots across the country while Kentucky and other nonsuspended mine regions began sending their coal to fill the Chicago market demand.
Dozens of striking miners and wives in coal towns throughout Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana
stopped trains and uncoupled coal cars to sidetrack them, but railroad workers,
unsympathetic to the coal suspension, quickly rehooked the cars and continued their trip
to Chicago. Nothing, it seemed, would prevent coal from going back into the market,
especially as several state governors ordered troops to keep the trains running. 41
Meanwhile, dozens of operators throughout the nation, eager to turn a high profit
while the majority of the mines remained out, appealed to their employees to return to
work, offering the scale price and, at times, even more than the miners asked. By May 5,
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hundreds of miners, having suffered for months, accepted the offer and returned to work
while others remained torn between honoring the strike and accepting the 70 cents per ton
that the miners had already declared as their goal. “I must say that it is useless for Bevier
miners to stay out any longer,” Kentucky miner “Blackbird” wrote, asking the UMW
Executive Board what they should do. “[T]he men are getting restless now seeing all
other mines working and we idle. I do not know what they are going to do, they want to
work and are afraid to work, for they don’t want to do anything wrong if they can help
it.” 42
Concerns like Blackbird’s prompted UMW leaders to reconsider their position.
Between the growing number of miners abandoning the strike and the increasingly
violent hostilities between the miners and strikebreakers, it seemed wise to settle quickly
rather than hold out any longer. 43 UMW leaders called for a special convention, but
warned all miners that the UMW would not be able to reimburse travel expenses. If
miners wished to send a delegate, they had to pay for his travel. The expense garnered
from the May Special Convention and the difficulty of getting all delegates to Columbus
in time made it clear that the miners would not be able to hold another special
convention. Consequently, when the delegates failed to settle on a scale, they passed a
resolution allowing the Executive Board to settle on the delegates’ behalf. Within a
month, McBride and the Board settled with the operators, but not for the 70 cents the
miners and delegates expected. Instead, McBride and the national officers ordered the
miners back to work for 60 cents per ton.44
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UMW officers claimed to share in the disappointment of not securing the 70 cent
scale, but nonetheless insisted on calling the settlement a victory. “Under all the
circumstances I think you have done remarkably well,” Terence Powderly wrote to
UMW National Secretary Patrick McBryde. He, like other officials wanted the miners to
“have the good sense to accept the terms you have won.” 45 But many miners saw little to
celebrate. To those who remained faithful during the suspension, the settlement was no
victory, but, as miner “Incog” wrote, a “great fizzle.” 46 Miners who returned to work
early on the 70 cent scale faced reductions to the new settlement rate whereas those who
stood by the strike and refused to work despite the high wage offers were furious that
they sat idle when they could have been earning much more had they abandoned the
strike. “[W]e are beaten, and that badly, by ourselves, after having been idle only two
months, when the country was about paralyzed for the want of coal, trains laid off,
factories closing, mills shutting down, everybody in this great country brought to realize
that they cannot do without the coal miner,” Alfred Broad of Illinois wrote, “Will we ever
be so near victory again?” 47
The frustration Broad expressed was but one part of the rank and file outcry that
came from the settlement. Thousands of miners believed the national officers overstepped
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their authority in settling the strike on terms not approved by the miners. “To simply say
that we don’t like the settlement signed by our officials would not give the readers to
understand just how bitter the dose is for us to swallow,” Indiana miner W. J.
Winterbottom wrote. Although the miners in his region returned to work as ordered,
many Indiana miners believed that the officers “abused the power delegated to them at
the Cleveland convention.” As it stood, Winterbottom noted that in his region at least,
“Feeling against our officers who signed the compromise runs high, with no sign of
abatement; nothing short of their resignation and its acceptance will satisfy us.” 48 His
assessment reflected the sentiments of thousands of Indiana miners. Within four days of
the settlement announcement, miners in Sullivan County, one of the state’s densest
mining districts, immediately called for a special state convention to discuss the UMW
leaders’ actions. 49 Dunkerly “had no right whatever to sign that scale without first
consulting his constituents,” the miners declared in their resolutions. Moreover, they
insisted, all national officers and district presidents “have violated the trust reposed in
them by the miners of the bituminous districts of America” and “crippled our greatest
chances of success in the greatest and only true fight of our lives….” With that, the

48

W. J. Winterbottom, letter to the editor, “How They Feel,” UMWJ, June 28, 1894.
Due to the spread-out nature of the Indiana mines, many mines were too far removed to hear of the
settlement in time and therefore did not learn of the special convention until it had already happened.
However, the mining region surrounding Terre Haute, Linton, and Dugger, one of the densest mining
districts in the state, had enough locals to demand the convention meet immediately. The views reflected in
the state convention, then, most closely reflect the sentiments of the miners in this region rather than the
entire state. In fact, local union 38 of Ayrshire, Indiana, passed a resolution resolving to return to work and
condemning the Terre Haute Convention as the work of “hotheaded, dissatisfied miners” who committed
“treason and open rebellion to our organization.” Bart Stinson and George Laughlin, official resolutions
passed by L. U. 38 in Ayrshire, Indiana, “Ayrshire, Ind.,” UMWJ, June 21, 1894.
49

227

miners asked for the resignations of Dunkerly and the national officers who signed the
scale and announced that they would “continue this fight until we get last year’s price.” 50
The Indiana miners succeeded in removing Dunkerly from office, even though the
convention was called so quickly that many miners outside of Sullivan County had not
yet even learned of the settlement, let alone the convention called in response to it. 51 Yet,
as they learned of the special convention, more locals endorsed its outcome. “The
removal of President Dunkerly has met with general approval throughout this district,”
W. J. Winterbottom reported, insisting that anyone who condemned the coup was a traitor
to the UMW. 52 Winterbottom’s sentiments were confirmed throughout the state in a
second special convention called to allow miners throughout the state participate in the
decisions. Although the miners accepted the new scale under protest, they refused to
reinstate Dunkerly and continued to request the national officers’ resignations. Their
actions demonstrated that while they would tolerate low pay, an untrustworthy officer
was unacceptable. 53
The only significant exception to the Indiana miners’ favor of overthrowing
Dunkerly was the Indiana block district where miners endorsed the national officers’
settlement decision and condemned Dunkerly’s removal. By then, the block miners had a
tenuous history with state officers, frequently arguing that the state officers looked after
bituminous interests at the expense of the block. Lamenting that “it was an evil day for
50
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the miners of Clay Co. when we allowed our charter to be absorbed by [NTA] 135,” the
block district seceded from Indiana District Eleven. With the national officers’ blessing,
formed its own UMW district, District Eight. “[I]n the name of common sense, why
should we be taxed to pay men that we would not recognize, believing that they [the
Indiana District Eleven officers] not only violated our constitution, but violated every
sense of honor, equity, and justice?” block district President Samuel Adams asked in his
defense of the new district formation. 54
The fracture that caused state and local districts’ rebellions indicated the
hostilities that ran throughout the nation’s coalfields after the suspension. Illinois miners,
like those in other locations, resolved that even though they believed the officers acted
within their authority to make the settlement, they would disregard the officers’
settlement and continue the fight for the 1893 scale. 55 “John McBride is the greatest
scoundrel on earth, and Penna and Fahy have been consigned to hades long ago,” one
southern Illinois miner wrote on behalf of the non-union men who were UMW members
before the strike. 56 They were not alone. Soon after the settlement, miners felt doubly
betrayed by charges that McBride and other officers had “sold out” the miners by
accepting bribes to end the strike. Not only had the officers overstepped their defined
roles, but if the rumors were true, they accepted money from operators while doing so. “If
54
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that be true it is a scathing comment on the miners who put him in office,” miner wife
Laurene Gardner wrote of McBride, noting that this was not the first time he was charged
with dishonesty toward the miners. “As for Phil,” she continued, “I haven’t the slightest
doubt of his sale.” Her claim that Penna did not care for the miners was shared by an
“army of detractors” throughout the coal districts.57 Her assertion was not wrong. A mass
meeting of over 1,000 outraged miners in Ohio resolved to continue the fight for the scale
and requested the resignations of the entire UMW Executive Board that signed the
compromise. 58 In other Ohio regions, miners simply praised their state president, A. A.
Adams for refusing to sign the compromise and continued their fight. 59 Missouri miner
“Justice” voiced the complaint of many Missouri miners when he condemned McBride
for the settlement that benefited no miner, least of all those in Missouri. “East of the
Mississippi river are all that were considered when it came to a settlement,” he wrote.
Delegates to the Missouri-Kansas Special Convention echoed his complaint. During the
strike, the UMW did nothing about the Kansas strikers who proved detrimental to the
Missouri suspension effort. The delegates’ frustration at such disregard was enough for
them to declare that no national officers had authority in Missouri-Kansas District
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Fourteen any longer. Rather, they ordered “that the legislative power be placed in the
hands of the local unions.” 60
The UMW’s 1894 claimed victory over the coal industry, then, did little more
than divide the organization’s ranks not only against the national officers, but also along
state lines as locals rejected national authority. But local rule did not work in a
decentralized national market. With the national officers unable to establish the scale the
miners wanted and the miners unwilling to accept the scale set, the state conventions’
resolutions to fight for a better price seemed logical, but not practical. Those who
resumed work at the 60 cent scale stood at odds against those who remained out for the
70 cent scale. 61 Worse, miners hopeful for a better settlement soon found employers
unwilling to negotiate or hire anyone associated with such an organization. Although the
practice of blacklisting union men had long been implemented in the coalfields, it grew
more widespread as miners looked to return to the mines after the suspension, causing
local unions and assemblies throughout the southern Midwest to shrink as they
surrendered their union cards to return to the shafts. 62 Their strike effort was not
successful at securing the miners’ desires or ensuring their dedication to the UMW,
despite officers’ claims of victory. It did, however, powerfully demonstrate the UMW’s
potential strength, which lay not in its membership, but in the organization’s ability to
60
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mobilize those outside the order.63 Such ability increased operators’ concern for the
UMW even as miners’ faith in it waned.

Unrest
The UMW’s ability to attract non-union miners to the cause tapped into a larger
movement taking place among producers. By 1894 the alliance between farmers and
laborers to challenge the systems that oppressed them had gathered steam throughout the
South and Midwest. 64 The ongoing depression and elected officials’ seeming indifference
to solving the problem added to the unrest in the nation’s coal and grain fields. For some,
the People’s Party seemed the best option to confront questions regarding railroad power,
banking, and finance. Most producers, however, stopped short of fully joining the
People’s Party movement. Like the thousands of miners who joined the UMW strike
without joining the union, producers subscribed to the general frustrations voiced by the
People’s Party without committing to the third party. Indeed, as bituminous miners
prepared for their first nationwide coal strike, Ohio businessman and currency reformer
Jacob Coxey set out for Washington D.C. voicing the frustrations of hundreds of
thousands of farmers and workers who simply could no longer make ends meet. His
demands for government assistance in securing higher farm profits and fair paying jobs
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resonated with both agriculture and industry. 65 Surveying the low number of union
membership in the weeks leading up to the 1894 suspension, one northern Illinois miner
pointed to Coxey as inspiration. “Let us… be like Mr. Coxey,” he wrote, “start out with
the intention to get there, and we will find the people of the whole country will be with
us.” 66
The miner’s claim not only described the UMW’s initial success with the 1894
suspension, but also the broader legacy of resistance during the 1894 summer. Just weeks
after the miners’ suspension began and days after Coxey reached Washington, the
American Railway Union (ARU) launched a strike against the Pullman Car Company.
Led by Eugene V. Debs, an already well-known organizer who hailed from the Indiana
coalfields, the ARU enjoyed the support from coal miners in nearly every district of the
southern Midwest. Coxey and other reformers may have wanted to classify these events
as a collective push from the “Army of the Commonweal,” but as the UMW’s
overwhelming body of non-union strikers demonstrated, such a push was far from united.
Still, even though the efforts did not represent a formal collective push under a common
head, they did reveal a broader sense of unrest that came up from the grass roots during
particularly difficult economic hardship. 67
This trend became more apparent in the 1894 election when neither farmers nor
laborers united behind the People’s Party campaign. In addition to longstanding party
65
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loyalties and beliefs that the ballot box was not the ideal means to change the ongoing
circumstances, even those who supported Populist ideals questioned whether the People’s
Party’s goals were attainable. 68 “We will never again see the day when wheat will be
worth $1 a bushel,” Democrat Hermann Lieb stated to the German residents of Decatur,
Illinois. “The reason is that the Argentine republic is now unloading in Liverpool sixty
millions of bushels of wheat against the five millions they used to send.” Nothing the
Populists could do would change how supply and demand functioned in either the wheat
or coal industries, he insisted. Illinois Germans, then, would do better “to vote straight
democratic this time at least.” 69 Such claims held sway among thousands of producers
throughout the southern Midwest who were uncertain whether the People’s Party, much
like their unions, was strong enough to bring about the changes it desired. 70 Such
divisions among producers remained steadfast in the 1894 election, with Populists
making small gains in pockets throughout the southern Midwest, but falling short of
forging any sort of farmer-labor coalition strong enough to sweep political offices. 71
Farmers and laborers shared common angst and employed common forms of resistance
against the forces that oppressed them, but their efforts in the southern Midwest were too
decentralized to unite effectively. 72
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These divisions, dissatisfaction, and unrest reached into other producer
organizations. Dozens of locals abandoned the Knights of Labor as leadership seemed
unable or unwilling to address rank and file concerns. 73 Although the UMW’s dual
relationship with the AFL and Knights of Labor had always been difficult to balance, the
relationship between the UMW and the Knights’ general leadership continued to decline
in the months after the 1892 General Assembly of the Knights of Labor. 74 An official
Knight investigation uncovered that Knights General Secretary-Treasurer John Hayes had
misrepresented NTA 135 numbers and dues payments in his books in an effort to thwart
the UMW and bring all UMW miners, including those of the National Progressive Union,
under the Knights’ exclusive control. 75
Although McBride and Powderly both vehemently insisted that the UMW was
innocent of the charges presented at the 1892 General Assembly and that UMW officers
were loyal to the Order, doubts remained. 76 Hayes, McBride declared, “is now and
always was an implacable and unscrupulous enemy of the United Mine Workers and their
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interests.” 77 Powderly reinforced this claim at the 1893 Knights of Labor’s General
Assembly, noting that he “felt mortified to learn that while acting under information
which I had every reason to believe to be genuine I had written that part of my address,
and I regret having done so very much.” 78 However, even as he issued his declaration
that there was no doubt of the UMW’s loyalty to the Knights, the Knights made it clear
they were no longer loyal to him. Internal dissention riddled the Knights’ ranks long
before 1893 and when charges of impropriety surfaced indicating that Powderly had used
the Order for personal gain, Powderly’s enemies, including a faction led by Hayes,
unseated Powderly as General Master Workman at the November 1893 General
Assembly, replacing him with James Sovereign of Iowa. 79
Such a coup set the tone for 1894, fitting with the national upheaval that caused
Coxey to march, Populists to form a third party, and the miners and railroad workers to
shut down the nation through strikes. It made claims of union leader corruption even
more credible and provided a pathway for the UMW miners to push for resignations from
their own leadership the following summer. That fall, Powderly and his sympathizers
attempted to launch their own coup within the Knights in the name of “purifying the
Order.” NTA 135 and other Powderly supporters would overthrow the Sovereign-Hayes
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faction at the 1894 Knights of Labor General Assembly. For very different reasons, union
leadership was as frustrated and restless as their rank and file. 80

Cast Out
The tumult that cast out Powderly and caused miners to call for their officers’
resignations in late 1893 and the summer of 1894, was only the beginning of the upheaval
that ran throughout the mid-1890s. As miners demanded the UMW officers’ resignations
and the UMW officers conspired with Powderly to reinstate his faction in the Knights of
Labor, Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes made his own plans in the name of
cleaning house. NTA 135, known to the miners as the “secret branch” of the UMW, was
the Knights of Labor’s arm in the UMW for nearly five years by the time of the Knights
of Labor’s November 1894 General Assembly in New Orleans. By then, however, the
Knights membership, like many other unions, including the UMW’s in the mid-1890s,
was in a steep decline and the UMW’s increasingly close relationship with the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) made many Knights leaders uneasy. In addition, it was no
secret that the miners’ delegates were part of the group planning to reinstate the Powderly
faction at New Orleans. Powderly claimed he would refuse the General Master Workman
position if it was offered, but remained closely apprised of the Knights’ affairs. 81 By
October, the former General Master Workman informed his sympathizers of Hayes’s plan
for the Sovereign-Hayes faction to retain control of the Knights. “Every District and State
Assembly supposed to be friendly to me, or opposed to them, that has elected a
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representative to the New Orleans session is to be disfranchised,” Powderly warned. 82
Still, he wanted as many supporters as possible to attend in order to make a unified stand
against Hayes, even if they no longer represented their home orders. “John McBryde [sic]
should be at New Orleans if he has to walk, even if they [the miners] have thrown him
out,” Powderly stressed to UMW National Secretary Patrick McBryde. 83
No one was surprised, then, when John Hayes renewed his 1892 charges against
NTA 135. In fact, Powderly traveled to New Orleans in anticipation, ready to stop the
proceedings with a court order at the first sign of illegal action. But Hayes denied the
miners’ delegates as well as those in LA 300 a seat, convincing the other delegates, with
the help of Daniel DeLeon and the Knights’ socialist faction, to forbid them from
entering the Assembly with a vote of 25 to 37. The decision to bar the miners divided the
Assembly. Knowing this, the expelled delegates hoped that the 25 who claimed the act
was unwarranted would convince other delegates to turn against Hayes and reinstate the
miners in time to vote for the executive officers. But Hayes had enough support to hold
the officer election before the Assembly could move against him. 84 “Come to think of
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it,” Powderly later reflected on New Orleans and the election, “hayes [sic], was not the
only rascal, he was simply preeminent in the role that was all.” 85
Such a line between honest officials and rascals was not as clearly defined to rank
and file miners. In the weeks following the New Orleans Assembly, local assemblies
received a barrage of circulars from the Knights and UMW. On behalf of the Knights,
Hayes published the charges against the UMW officers and ordered that NTA 135 be
reorganized solely under the Knights. UMW officers refuted the charges and insisted that
reorganizing NTA 135 outside the UMW would dissolve the UMW and return to the days
of the divided and fighting miners’ unions. 86 “Judging from the letters I am receiving
from the local assemblies of the United Mine Workers of this state the men are at a loss
to know what to do,” Indiana District Secretary John Kennedy wrote in his weekly report.
“They claim they are receiving circulars from the general assembly and circulars from the
national office and that they do not understand them,” he continued, noting that he was
equally confused. “I am not furnished with copies of all those circulars, and even if I
were, I do not know that I would be able to advise.” 87
Rank and file confusion came from the ongoing debate over which leaders were
worthy of the miners’ trust. Already uneasy by the 1894 settlement, Hayes’s claims of
impropriety within organized labor beginning with his 1893 overthrow of Powderly and
subsequent attack on UMW officers intensified an already ongoing debate regarding
which of labors’ leaders were honest. As UMW delegates voiced their outrage over the
New Orleans Assembly, the AFL faced its own upset. Nominated by Phil Penna, UMW
President John McBride ran against Samuel Gompers for the AFL presidency, defeating
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him with the help of the AFL’s growing socialist faction. In the AFL, the coup signaled a
push toward political action not possible under Gompers’s direction and was another
indicator of the growing divisions and unrest within organized labor as a whole. To the
miners, however, it furthered the already present claim that McBride’s actions always
benefited his own interests more than those of his rank and file. Hayes’s cries that the
UMW was aligned more closely to the AFL than the Knights found new ground as
McBride handed the UMW Presidency over to Phil Penna in January 1895. 88
These misgivings came to a head as the UMW prepared for its own national
convention. In addition to holding the annual UMW elections, Knights delegates to the
February 1895 convention would also decide whether to side with the UMW or the
Knights of Labor. Residual anger over the 1894 settlement loomed large as miners
prepared for the convention, knowing that the officers who signed the settlement were the
same officers embroiled in the ongoing UMW-Knights conflict and the same officers
seeking reelection at the 1895 convention. The fact that these same men were involved in
so many controversies caused many miners to question if it would not “be best us to have
a new set of officers entirely composed of men that have not held any office in the
national before?” 89 Noting that resentment over the 1894 settlement remained strong in
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his district, Indiana miner Sim Cooper suggested that Phil Penna decline the nomination
for president. “Now, Mr. Editor, Phil is not the only man by a great deal,” Cooper
continued. “Secretary McBryde is in the same box, and all that signed the compromise
last June, and I think that Pat [McBryde] ought to decline, too, and let us see if the order
can run one year with a new set of officers.” 90
Cooper and the other union miners’ demands for new officers did not come from
frustration with the 1894 settlement alone, but officers’ seeming preoccupation with
affairs that had little to do with the average miner. Many miners believed the “trouble
between our delegates to the General Assembly and the general officers of the K. of. L,”
had no bearing on local affairs. In fact, few state officials and local correspondents even
commented on the events in New Orleans or the fight between UMW and Knight
leadership that followed. Instead their debates centered on whether their union dues were
too high, if they should establish a defense fund for strikes, what to do about the constant
reductions, and how to reach the eastern European miners alienated from the union. 91
These were the issues the miners wanted addressed, but found that the officers’
“jealousies,” desires for control, and personal grudges came at the expense of these
concerns, just as they had in years past. “It seems to me that when labor officials devote
their time fighting each other for supremacy, that the interests of their constituents are
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sadly neglected,” miner “T. T.” wrote. Such a revival of the old ‘rule or ruin’ policy, they
believed, would only cause further injury to the already hurting rank and file. 92
“The sooner we are rid of such officers the better it will be for the laboring men of
this and every other country,” T. T. declared speaking for miners throughout the nation. 93
These concerns came not only from the fighting or seeming dishonesty, but from the
neglect that many miners felt while the officials waged their war against each other.
“Think of it!” T. T. exclaimed. “Ten thousand miners in Ohio on the verge of starvation.
Fifteen thousand in Pennsylvania attempting to avert a reduction in the present rate of
mining. And yet we have some labor leaders who appear anxious to precipitate a war of
extermination between the K. of L. and Federation miners. Shame on such men.” 94
T.T.’s claim highlighted how far removed officers were from their rank and file,
but he was not the only miner that noticed. Rather, many miners pointed to the officers’
salaries to demonstrate officers’ disconnect from rank and file concerns, placing the
salary question as another of the items to be discussed at the 1895 UMW convention.
Although wages continually declined and UMW numbers shrank, officers’ salaries,
which came from UMW funds, never decreased. 95 Indeed, even the 1894 settlement
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made by the officers on behalf of the miners did not affect officer salaries, causing one
Illinois miner to quip that union miners were “paying officers a salary to neglect their
duties.” 96 When union leader Tim O’Malley defended the officers, claiming that they did
not accept their pay during the strike and instead donated “several hundred dollars” to the
strike effort, miner Louis Goaziou quickly responded that this was only further damning
evidence that the officers earned too much. “What about the miner who don’t earn $1000
in three years and suffered the pangs of hunger to uphold a principle? I know some who
fed themselves on boiled bark and leaves sooner than to give up the fight,” the miner
continued, adding sarcastically, “But the well fed officer who goes a little into his own
pocket, knowing very well that he will get it back, that’s the real hero, and I suppose the
hungry miner who foots up all the bills, he is a darn fool.” 97 Goaziou was not the only
miner to observe the wealth gap between union officers and their rank and file. By early
1895, one group of Ohio miners found that officers already made five times more than
the average miner in their district and another reduction for the miners was pending. They
believed paying the officers flat salaries would not only bankrupt the miners and their
union, but also make the leaders complacent. “We believe that the nearer the officers can
be kept on an equal footing with those they represent the better it will be for us,” the Ohio
miners declared. 98 To them, union affiliation meant little if the unions could not aid the
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miners, but time and again officers seemed unconcerned with the instability of the union
as though they did not realize how close the UMW was to dissolution.
“This neglect or overconfidence in our solidarity of unionism has led us into a
snare,” Ohio official William H. Crawford cautioned while surveying the UMW’s
precarious condition. The union may have successfully called out all the nation’s miners,
but only to its own detriment, especially as officers continued to engage in petty fights.
“Men have lost confidence in their officials and can not trust one another,” he continued,
“This is the gigantic evil in our midst.”99 If the union’s leadership did not heed the
miners’ concerns, he and others believed, there would be little need for them or their
orders, regardless of whether they won their fights.
This dysfunction coincided with the already growing tension between UMW
national officers and miners west of the Mississippi River after the 1894 suspension. Like
most other regions, western states faced wage reductions upon resuming work, but their
trouble came from two distinct causes. First, the depressed coal prices caused mines to
increase production in hopes of selling greater volumes to make up for profit loss. For the
first time, Iowa mines mined enough coal to compete with Illinois and Missouri mines for
the Chicago and railroad markets at the same time that southern Illinois looked to take a
bigger portion of the Chicago market as well. 100 Western Pennsylvania miners also
moved to capitalize on the Chicago market and the overwhelmingly non-union region
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caused wage reductions to cascade through competing mines in Ohio, Illinois, and
Indiana, regardless of union affiliation. 101
The competition-fueled reductions were compounded with old problems that
intensified with the economic and agricultural crises. Desperate farmers suffering from
lowering grain prices and western silver miners hurt by the silver legislation all sought
relief in the coal mines. While some simply entered the larger shafts as diggers, others
used their land to open their own mines. “Every farmer in Bellville who wishes to, can
have his own coal mine, and it is not uncommon there to see the ‘old man’ and his boys
digging, and the old woman and girls hoisting the coal with an old gin horse, and thus
producing very cheap coal indeed,” Illinois union leader James Flynn observed. Such
enterprises, or cooperatives where miners leased farmland from local farmers to open
their own mines, dug their coal with no overhead and little debt, selling their coal far
below the scale. Although their production was less, there were enough farmers,
cooperatives, and small coal companies to force larger mines to push their wages down to
compete. But by early 1895, the larger corporations operated with higher overhead costs
and larger debts, making it difficult to sustain their corporations on the meager profit
margins that fed cooperative miners’ families. 102 Consequently, operators in Iowa
appealed to the UMW to force the smaller and cooperative mines to adhere to the scale
rate. 103
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But the UMW did little to address the miners’ concerns. Indeed, Missouri mine
worker “Cornfield Sailor” observed that although his state remained loyal to the UMW
throughout the 1894 strike, the organization did little to save them from the constant
injuries sustained from union and non-union miners in neighboring states. Kansas miners
abandoned the UMW and returned to work, injuring the Missouri miners’ strike while the
Oskaloosa settlement that Penna described ultimately caused Missouri miners to accept a
reduction. “The reduction that those places [in Iowa] are getting now is only the
consequence of former reductions at Bevier [Missouri],” Cornfield Sailor explained. In
his mind, the trouble came from the UMW’s inability to regulate the mines west of the
Mississippi. Preoccupied with the larger producers competing in the eastern markets, the
UMW rarely bothered to address the problems in western mines competing for railroad
markets. 104
As the February 1895 UMW national convention neared, however, UMW
President Phil Penna looked to Iowa with newfound interest. With rank and file miners
pushing for a formal investigation into his role in the 1894 settlement and the growing
threat that the Knights miners would vote to break from the UMW, Penna seized the
opportunity to cast the UMW in a positive light. Although he attended the Iowa state
convention where miners discussed the problem at length, Penna sent an open letter to
Master Workman James Sovereign blaming him and the Knights of Labor for the wage
decline. According to Penna, miners in Des Moines, who had recently abandoned the
UMW by transferring their NTA 135 charter to the Knights of Labor’s Iowa State
Assembly, were working below UMW scale rates, forcing all miners to accept the same
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reductions. 105 Noting that this assembly was under Sovereign’s jurisdiction rather than
the UMW, Penna challenged Sovereign to “exemplify the ability of the Knights of Labor
to care for the miners’ interests” by commanding the Des Moines non-UMW Knight
miners to honor the scale “or admit your inability to do so….”106 Such claims, designed
to highlight the Knights’ weakness also made light of the problems miners faced and the
UMW failed to address, particularly in western states. Consequently, by the time Penna
charged Sovereign with being unable and unfit to care for the Iowa miners, the remaining
UMW miners west of the Mississippi considered seceding from the UMW to form a
western miners’ union. 107
Despite Penna and the national officers’ claims that the Knights ultimatum would
split a unified order, many miners understood that what remained of the UMW was
already splintered but those who remained in its ranks desperately willed it to survive.
The 1895 convention at Columbus, Ohio, then, served as a means to patch wounds, even
if it could not heal them entirely. Even miner wife Laurene Gardner, who blatantly
accused Penna of accepting bribes to end the 1894 strike not only encouraged miners to
put aside differences, but endorsed Penna for president. 108 The salary question was
quietly laid to rest by reducing the president’s salary by three hundred dollars. Penna won
the presidency, but his reputation remained injured. Although the miners’ committee
105
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exonerated Penna and the other officers of the “selling out” charges, even the committee
unanimously agreed that the officers had “exceeded their authority” and acknowledged
that McBride did have a suspicious amount of money credited to him at the strike
settlement. 109 At a second meeting, Knight miners voted in favor of seceding from the
Knights to remain loyal to the UMW. Within weeks, the former Knight miners, along
with several other trades assemblies, formed the Independent Order of the Knights of
Labor.110 Led by General Master Workman William Beauchop Wilson, a former UMW
organizer and delegate at the New Orleans General Assembly, the Independent Order
would allow Knight miners to retain their dual membership in NTA 135 and the
UMW. 111
The outcome of the 1895 convention, though a testament to many miners’ loyalty
to the UMW, did little to assuage the fractures already present within the order. Furious
that the officers remained unscathed, Local Union 296 of Ohio submitted resolutions to
local presses declaring that they were leaving the UMW and encouraging others to follow
suit. The plan reverberated throughout the state, enough for Ohio UMW leader R. L.
Davis to express alarm that the UMW was at a breaking point. 112 This sentiment was so
strong in Indiana District Eleven that the delegates at the state convention considered a
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resolution to leave the UMW and use the ten cents paid in national dues to build a local
defense fund. 113
Davis and the other officers had good reason to worry about their ranks breaking
apart. As Wilson and the Independent Order moved to incorporate former Knights into its
ranks, their actions were matched by Knights of Labor Secretary John Hayes, who
“reorganized” the Knights’ own NTA 135 and called for the former Knight miners’
assemblies to return to the order. Eleven delegates representing ten assemblies from Ohio
and Indiana attended founding meeting, held in Evansville, Indiana, in June 1895. 114
Although it was dismissed by UMW officers, the split was not taken as lightly as
they implied. Officers insisted the new NTA 135 of the Knights of Labor would be shortlived, but the frequency of their comments indicates that the number of assemblies
leaving the weakened UMW was cause for concern. The three assemblies that originally
seceded from Indiana to form the NTA 135, Knights of Labor, for example, were nearly
one-quarter of the total locals still paying dues in District Eleven. 115
The Knights’ reach soon stretched into other states, but their decision to leave the
UMW for the Knights did not necessarily reflect a preference for Knights procedure over
the UMW. In fact, the fights between Knight and UMW leadership and even the
organizational splits were met with little comment or fanfare from the miners. By 1895,
neither Knights nor the UMW had proven able to adhere to their principles and in most
113
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regions, the local assemblies, like local unions, were more concerned with reviving their
dying locals and finding trustworthy leadership than they were with the ongoing fight
between organizations. 116 The vast number of non-union miners, constant district
competition, and lack of faith in officers had a greater impact on miners than their union
affiliation. Indeed, one Pennsylvania assembly under the Independent Order declared that
the infighting among the officers in the newspapers was tiresome and declared that
instead of attacking each other, they should organize the miners in whatever organization
they wished. 117
But if the rank and file miners were unconcerned with the Knight-UMW split,
their decisions regarding which organization to remain affiliated with after the split
revealed that hostilities from the 1894 suspension remained strong. NTA 135, Knights of
Labor’s selection for master workman, former Ohio state president A. A. Adams, left
little doubt that those who left the UMW to rejoin the Knights did so out of an
unwillingness to sit under the UMW’s present leadership. By the summer of 1895,
Adams was a symbol for organizational purity. He became a hero in 1894 by refusing to
sign the 1894 settlement and openly charged UMW national officers of misconduct. In
subsequent months, he became the driving force behind the allegations that the officers
had “sold out” and was the reason the charges were investigated at the 1895 UMW
convention. 118 Adams, then, was the ideal leader for miners unhappy with UMW officers
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or their exoneration and the Knights of Labor was the most promising organization to
avoid corruption. 119
Local assemblies’ decisions to abandon the UMW and Independent Order for the
revived NTA 135 Knights of Labor were part of a larger rebellion against the UMW
officers. When miners faced a new wage reduction in spring 1895, UMW miners in Ohio
and Indiana charged that officers had once again “sold out” the miners and demanded
state officers’ resignations. 120 Summit, Indiana, miners called for the resignation of the
national officers in addition to their state leaders, prompting UMW President Penna to
immediately issue a response rejecting their request, claiming the local was three months
behind in dues. 121 If Penna’s claim was true, the Summit local that lodged the charges,
which faithfully paid its state dues, purposefully withheld dues to the national from the
time national officers instructed them to accept a reduction. Summit had allies. When
Indiana District Secretary John Kennedy informed local mine leader W. J. Winterbottom
that some of the locals in his region of southern Indiana were no longer paying their state
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dues, Winterbottom did not deny it; instead he remarked that “in all probability they have
not paid their national tax either.” 122 Other regions experienced similar declines, with
officers everywhere giving listings of locals suspended for not paying dues. 123 “When the
strike ended the union expired,” Illinois District Secretary W. J. Guymon summarized of
the Illinois districts. 124 Miner “Next Week,” agreed, noting that “[t]here are some 32,000
miners in Illinois and not one in ten is organized,” a far cry from how energetic the union
had been just a few months earlier. There was no doubt in his mind to the cause as he
encouraged the miners to revive their locals. If an officer was guilty “of evil doing” they
should “kick him so far that he cannot get back anymore. But stick to the order yourself,”
he insisted. 125
Next Week’s assertions indicated that the atrophy labor organizations experienced
in the mid-1890s did not indicate a lack of faith in unionization as much as it did mistrust
for union leadership. “[H]ad we a Debs,” one miner posited, “we might claim nine-tenths
of the miners of our country as members….” 126 Miners’ cries for “a Moses” who would
“lead us out of this wilderness in which we find ourselves” gave way to new
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organizations comprised of miners frustrated with the UMW. 127 Miners in Ohio formed
the Massillon Independent Movement, Indiana became a base for the American Industrial
Union in Indiana, which planned to make Eugene Debs their president, while Iowa
formed the Iowa Miners’ Protective Association that former Missouri UMW mine worker
“Cornfield Sailor” hoped Missouri would emulate. 128
The anger and desperation that drove the miners to refuse to pay dues, reject
union leadership, or form opposing orders did more than create unrest within
organizational ranks. The most overwhelming and pressing impact that came out of the
1894 suspension, settlement, and seeming officer dishonesty was the dramatic decline in
UMW membership and efficiency. “At our annual convention in 1891 Secretary
Watchorn reported a membership of a fraction over 34,000. Since that time our
membership has been on the decline,” Indiana District Eleven Secretary John Kennedy
wrote angrily. “We have tried for six years to perfect our organization and we are farther
from the goal than we were five years ago.” 129 The fracture and decay of the miners’
movement meant that the UMW no longer had any power to influence scale rates or call
strikes. Although remaining UMW members continued to push for “restriction” or
limiting the amount of coal produced by only working five and a half days a week,
leadership cautioned against it, claiming it would only hurt the union more. Only five
percent of Illinois miners were organized, Indiana barely had one-quarter in the union,
127
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United Mine Workers’ Journal editor John Kane declared. “Take Pennsylvania and the
same condition of affairs exists, even to a worse degree. Take West Virginia, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Virginia and Missouri, yes, even Ohio, and every other state whose relations
to each other are such that what affects one influences the other, and they are all in a
condition in which the crudest methods of warfare are almost impracticable, not to say
anything about such a nice instrument as restriction,” he continued, claiming it would be
better if the miners waited for the union to become strong again.

130

But Kennedy, as well

as hundreds of the remaining UMW miners, disagreed. “True, if an effort was made in
the direction of restriction and if we failed we would lose some members,” Kennedy
observed. “It is equally true if we remain inactive and do nothing we will lose
members.” 131 Miners in Streator, Illinois, agreed, observing that instead of uniting across
district and state lines miners were “making a fight by themselves, the same as in olden
days before we were brought in such close competition with one another by improved
methods of transportation.” Such efforts would only end in failure, they acknowledged,
but they saw no easy fix. While surveying the UMW’s failures since its formation, the
Streator miners claimed that “lack confidence in one another and also our officers,” only
intensified UMW weaknesses, because, they wrote, “instead of building it keeps us
rebuilding.” 132
In the meantime, there was little the union could do to aid the miners, but sit in
what Linton, Indiana, miner and former union leader “Incog” called “masterly inactivity,”
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doing little more than “hoping for better times.” What was the point of being in the union,
he wondered. “Why just think of it, we are all in the habit of speaking of Earlington
district (Kentucky) as a blackleg hole and yet those men have not come below 62 ½ cents
a ton and are now getting 76 cents, and a man can put out as many tons of coal there as he
can at any mine around Linton.” 133 If the miners were going to be masters at inactivity, it
seemed it would be better if they did so outside the union rather than in it.

If the unions were not active, the miners still were. Under the cover of darkness in
the late summer of 1896, several masked men burned down the Old Pittsburg Coal
Company’s mine in Hymera, Indiana. 134 Prior to the flames, the Hymera miners were
locked in a dispute not with the company, but with the neighboring mines over the size of
the screen used to filter the coal. 135 “The lawful screen for this state, or at least the law
recognized, is 1¼ inch diamond bar,” Kennedy explained. “The screen at Hymera was 1
17

56

inches between diamond bars, and they were nearly always in trouble for the last

couple of years with these men because of their unfair screen.” 136 The difference between
the two, which was 3 56 of an inch, drove down coal prices in the Sullivan, Indiana, region
enough to help trigger a five cent per ton wage reduction in mines throughout the area.
133
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But even the formerly thoroughly unionized District Eleven no longer had the power to
enforce its regulations.
The other miners in the region walked out on strike when asked to accept the new
reduction that summer, but Hymera accepted the terms. Most who worked there were
also farmers and saw no reason to fight a reduction in their supplemental income. They
continued mining at the newly reduced rate until the fire destroyed everything from the
tipple to the shaft. “So far, nobody seems to have any idea who done it,” Kennedy
asserted, insisting that the “deplorable” arson would do more harm to an already
depressed region. Yet even as he condemned the vigilantes’ actions, Kennedy wanted
some good to come from the event. Namely, he hoped the company would use its
insurance money to purchase a new screen compliant with Indiana regulations. 137
The Old Pittsburg Coal Company, however, did not share Kennedy’s vision. The
company already experienced financial difficulties before the fire and after surveying the
nearly $50,000 in damages, company executives claimed the mine was not worth
rebuilding and made plans to leave the region altogether. In the following weeks, the
Hymera farmer-miners pleaded with the company not only to remain in Hymera, but to
rebuild the mine as soon as possible. In exchange, some offered money to help cover the
initial building costs while other farmer-miners promised the company six days of work
without wages. To everyone’s surprise, the company complied, rebuilt the mine, and
announced that anyone seeking a spot in the new shaft would first have to give the
company six days of free labor. “[And] that is not the worst of it,” Kennedy railed, “this
is to be the rule for a year. Fellow miners, any of you that have six days’ labor to pay for
137
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a job at a mine where they are paying less than scale rates… and will promise not to
claim any of the rights of citizenship, you might be able to get work at Hymera, Ind.”
Over one hundred men agreed to the company terms. 138
The desperation that ran throughout the southern Midwest corn and coalfields by
the mid-1890s made situations like that in Hymera far too common. Miners in Spring
Valley, Illinois, were irate when the city inspector found that the company’s scales
cheated the miners out of five hundred pounds to each ton. The justice of the peace threw
out the case because the city inspector had no jurisdiction over the rural mines. The
situation turned into a race riot later that week when a group of black men shot an Italian
man while robbing him. In addition to placing a bomb near the mine manager’s home,
two separate miner mobs charged to the company houses reserved for African American
miners. The black miners had not only accepted the cheated weight, but worked under the
scale rate, prompting a mob of “white” miners and a second mob of non-native English
speaking “foreigners” led by the region’s Italians to ransack the black miners’ living
quarters, shooting and beating men, women, and children. For nearly two days, black
miners and their families hid in the woods as the mobs scoured the land with their
shotguns, “hunting for negroes.”139
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The conditions that caused the Hymera miners to burn down the shaft were the
same that caused Spring Valley miners to divide along racial lines. Such actions exposed
the forces that caused rural workers to attack each other as much as their employers. By
then, the southern Midwest was almost solidly non-union because miners did not believe
that union affiliation could help them. 140 Bituminous miners’ annual income had
declined from $292 in 1894 to $282 just two years later, making their earnings sixty-eight
percent of what factory workers earned in 1896. 141 Faced with a crippled economy,
increasing debt and defunct producer organizations, thousands of producers pinned their
hopes for change on the ballot box, but their efforts there were equally frayed. Just as
they remained divided over which organization or leader to follow, neither farmers nor
miners in the South, Midwest, or anywhere could agree on the party or platform that
would improve their conditions while ethnic divisions further prevented rural producers
from voting together. Even with a fusion ticket in 1896, they failed to unite on a national
stage. Instead, miners, like farmers and other rural laborers split their votes between the
parties. 142 Their actions in refusing to vote together, embracing vigilantism, accepting
depreciated terms like six days of free labor or five hundred pounds of cheated weight
exemplified the ongoing thought among producers everywhere. They believed they were
better off looking after their own interests than following an organization or party, even
when they accepted worse terms than they desired.
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Chapter 7: Epilogue
Common Legacies

There was never much reason to visit the tiny coal mining town just outside
“Egypt” until December 7, 1930. On that day, the number of people in Mt. Olive,
Illinois, swelled by 4,000 as visitors came to pay respects to one of the miners’ greatest
champions before she was laid to rest. Mary “Mother” Jones had dedicated sixty years to
the miners’ unions, first as a volunteer in the late-nineteenth century, and then as a paid
UMW organizer in 1901. Over the next decades, “the miner’s angel” became famous for
her involvement in Colorado and West Virginia strikes, but her heart remained with the
Illinois miners. Consequently, at her request, her body was forever interred with the
miners and wives buried at the Union Miners’ Cemetery in Mt. Olive. 1
The union cemetery was first created to hold the bodies of three Mt. Olive miners
killed during a UMW strike in Virden, Illinois, in 1898 when strikers and their wives
waged a gunfight against mine guards. Six miners and five guards were killed and their
bodies were shipped to their hometowns for burial. 2 Seen as “murderers” by community
leaders, the three miners from Mt. Olive were forbidden from being buried in the regular
cemetery. Unlike the miners of Frontenac, Kansas, just ten years earlier, however, the
Virden miners were given a proper burial when the UMW purchased a one-acre tract of
land to place their bodies. By the time Jones made her burial request in 1923, the
cemetery had become a resting place for dozens of union miners and wives, including
1
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“General” Alexander Bradley who marched with Jacob Coxey in 1894 and led the
“soldier-miners” in the1898 march on Virden. 3 Jones wished to be part of this legacy. “I
hope it will be my consolation when I pass away to feel I sleep under the clay with those
brave boys,” she wrote, for in her mind, “[t]hey are responsible for Illinois being the best
organized labor state in America.” 4
Jones’s claim was not wrong. By 1930, the UMW claimed over 160,000
members. 5 Although crippled in 1896, changes in both union and the national economy
in the months following greatly improved union strength. Phil Penna stepped down from
the presidency at the end of his 1896 term, becoming superintendent for the coal
company he partially owned. 6 With the last of the leadership who signed the 1894
agreement out of the UMW executive offices, hundreds of miners who had demanded
officers’ resignations in 1894 and 1895 considered returning to the union again.
Meanwhile, the improving economic conditions made it possible for miners to demand
higher wages for their work. Working as a volunteer UMW organizer, Mother Jones
joined leaders like Eugene Debs and Samuel Gompers in an aggressive 1897 push to
revive the union and organize the non-union coalfields. During those months, young
northern Illinois miner John Mitchell gained fame for brokering peaceful negotiations
between Illinois miners and operators and bringing “discipline” to a rank and file
accustomed to local strikes. The union’s organizing momentum intensified as Mitchell
3
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unofficially assumed the UMW presidency in 1898, with the UMW making strides in
negotiating wage agreements with operators, most notably in the 1902 anthracite coal
strike. 7 These successes continued into the twentieth century and dramatically increased
under the leadership of former southern Iowa grain dealer and miner, John L. Lewis. 8
By the time Jones died, the UMW was one of the strongest labor organizations in
the United States. Less than six years after the miners laid Jones to rest, 50,000 miners
returned to her grave to once again pay tribute to Jones by erecting a monument in her
honor.9 Despite the UMW’s strength in Illinois and in the nation, Illinois miners were far
from content with their organization. Rather, the organized miners were divided between
two vying unions. The miners who built and dedicated the Jones Monument were
members of the newly-formed Progressive Miners of America (PMA) and its women’s
auxiliary, a rebel union founded in 1932 by southern Illinois union miners dissatisfied
with UMW leadership. They claimed that UMW President Lewis “sold out” their
interests by entering into an agreement with coal operators, including Phil Penna, that
unfairly reduced Midwestern miners’ wages. The PMA and UMW spent the next several
years engaged in violent battles throughout the southern Illinois mine fields, breaking
each other’s strikes and attacking each other through legal battles, in newspapers, and in
sporadic gun battles resulting in casualties. 10 By the time the PMA erected the Jones
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monument, twenty new names were listed on the monument with Jones and the 1898
Virden miners who had given their lives for organized labor. According to the
monument’s inscription, these nineteen miners and one miner’s wife gave their lives in
the 1930s PMA mine wars, fighting against both the government and the UMW, for “the
cause of clean unionism in America.” 11
Like Jones herself, the inscription on her grave testified to the complexities of
labor organizing and how divided loyalties, internal divisions, and conflicts are typically
understood and remembered. Jones’s career as a labor organizer began long before she
joined the UMW’s payroll. Like many women involved in the labor movement, she held
no membership in these early years and because of this, her efforts prior to working as an
official organizer are easily overlooked. Likewise, the monument constructed in her
honor was funded and built by union workers who opposed a rival labor organization so
bitterly that they were willing to die fighting against it. In memorializing those killed
fighting the UMW, Jones’s monument was anti-UMW propaganda designed to remind all
who viewed it that organized labor, even in the 1930s, was divided against itself. Even
the strongest unions at the height of their strength alienated workers who believed the
organization did not have their interests at heart.
But inconvenient truths illustrated by Mother Jones and her grave do not find a
place in many narratives of “the labor movement.” By categorizing labor into a neatly
separated division of “union” and “non-union,” those with unofficial connections to the
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labor movement, like women, farmers, or workers in hosts of other occupations that
pulled them in and around the mines, are excluded from historical accounts. In the latenineteenth century, these groups played crucial roles in organizing and strike success or
failure. Without holding a union card, women like Mother Jones or miner wife Laurene
Gardner contributed to leadership and organizing decisions that directly shaped the
course of the UMW. Lacking union membership or even the official title of “miner” did
not stop farmers from entering the mines and working for lower wages than the UMW
scale allowed. The tens of thousands of non-union miners who made the 1894 strike an
initial success, their reasons for honoring a strike while not joining a union, or their
attitudes toward unionism in general are left unconsidered.
In addition, excluding these non-union outliers makes those within union ranks
appear much more solidified than they actually were and, at times draws lines that group
workers in ways more arbitrary than real. It groups together all union members, whether
they were white, black, or a non-English-speaking immigrant as a unified body when
they did not always see themselves as a part of the whole. Strikebreaking and working
below the union scale may be classified as non-union behavior, but in 1888, union miners
broke a non-union strike on union officers’ orders and regularly undermined their own
pay scales. Such instances indicate that unionism could exist outside union ranks just as
easily as non-unionism resided within.
This simplification of labor organizing’s turbulent past makes it more difficult for
modern-day scholars and activists to make sense of the fracture among workers or their
unwillingness to organize. If organizations like the UMW are presented as the only
alternative for workers to improve their lives and the thousands who stood outside its
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ranks are overlooked, it makes the modern day divisions among workers and their nonunionism appear more novel than it actually is. Those who stood outside Gilded Age
unions or acted against them from within, those who refused to unite for a common
“labor ticket” or support mine legislation like anti-screen laws were not acting ‘against
their own interests.’ Rather, workers and their interests were far more diverse than their
critics acknowledged.
Worker lives cannot be simplified and sorted into neat categories of “union,”
“non-union,” “Republican,” “Populist,” or “Democrat.” The ideological battles they
waged extended far beyond the divisions between the Knights and the AFL. Instead, they
were complicated people, with rich lives and hopes that pulled and pushed them in
different directions as they did what they thought was best for their lives and families. It
allowed them to work multiple occupations as farmers, wage earners, and businesspeople.
It pitted them against labor organizers even while they still professed to uphold “honest
principles.” It caused some union miners to strikebreak and others to break away from the
main order and form new unions that rivaled larger ones.
Such findings apply as easily to the 1930s coalfields and present day workers as
they do the workers of the Gilded Age. They share a common legacy of being “run of the
mine” workers, whose interests are mixed and conflicting, but never without reason. It is
only when actions are considered in this full, messy, and unfiltered context that worker
non-unionism begins to make sense.
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Appendices
Lexicon of Mining Terms
Anthracite coal: hard coal typically of high quality and mined primarily in the eastern
Pennsylvania coal fields
Bars: part of the screens used to sort slack from coal. Bars varied in shape and spacing,
both factors determining how much coal fell between the bar gaps and away from
the coal that would be weighed to the miner’s credit. Bar shape and spacing was
therefore citical to any cents per ton wage agreement.
Bituminous coal: most common type of coal mined in the United States. It is softer and
less pure than anthracite
Block coal: coal that broke into large lumps of a higher quality than typical bituminous
coal. In the southern Midwest, it was mined almost exclusively in Clay County,
Indiana.
“Blown shot”/ “rickety shot”/ “windy shot”: an explosion backfire that came from a
miner improperly loading his shot blast out the coal. Instead of firing into the
face, it shot into the room, usually with an enormous boom and an intense flame.
In most cases, blown shots were harmless, but in poor working conditions, they
could cause the entire mine to explode, causing miners to be wary of less
experienced men in the mines.
Car: large wheeled cart miners used to transport coal out of the mine.
Checkweighman: Worker appointed to oversee the weighing process to make sure
miners were correctly credited for the amount of coal they mined. In some mines,
the company appointed and paid the checkweighman but in others, including most
union mines, the checkweighman was appointed by the miners and receied his
salary out of the miners’ wages.
Dead work: Any labor a miner performed in the mine that did not add to the ton of coal
he produced. Placing support beams, laying track, clearing out excess rock, and
bailing out water were all kinds of dead work. Because these tasks did not add to
his tonnage, the miner was usually not paid for them.
Entry: Long corridors that branched throughout most mines from the mine shaft to the
“face” with rooms situated along their sides. Miners who “drove entry” dug the
coal from the face of the entry, extending the corridor deeper.
Face: newer portion of the mine where the coal was extracted and entries and rooms were
dug deeper.
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“Free click” / “free turn”: mining system that allowed miners who drove entry access to
as many cars as they needed to clear away the coal from the entry face without
having to wait for a turn. This allowed the mine to continually expand and
increase production, but slowed the turn for room miners who waited for access to
a car. Miners who drove entry, then, had the best spots in the mine and often
produced more coal than room men.
Lump coal:large chunks of coal miners were paid to extract
Nut coal: smaller pieces of coal that fell through the bars in the screening process that
miners seldom received pay for.
“Cents per ton”: the most common method of miners’ payment, referring to the amount
of cents the miner received for each ton he mined. This meant that the miner’s
wages depended on the weight of his load rather than the effort or the time it took
to extract it.
“Pluck-me” store: name for the company-owned store that employers frequentlly
compelled their employees to shop at, either through scrip payments or the
prospect of losing one’s job if his family did not shop there. Miners frequently
complained that the stores unfairly “plucked” the wages from the miners.
Practical Miner: an experienced miner who depended on the mines as his primary
income.
Room: section of a mine created by walls and supports designed to keep the roof intact.
Rooms were connected by entries and one to four miners were assigned to each
room.
“Run of the Mine” coal/”Mine Run” coal: coal weighed before it was screened to filter
out the slack. This made the miner’s loads weigh more and decreased the value
per ton.
Screen: large mine equipment, usually composed of metal bars and mesh, used to filter
mined coal. Coal was dumped over the screens, allowing nut coal and slack to fall
away from the lump coal before the coal was weighed.
Screened coal: coal that was screened before it was weighed to filter out the slack. This
made the miner’s loads weigh less, but with a higher concentration of coal and
increased its value per ton.
Scrip: form of payment rural companies like coal mines, timber camps, and textile mills
used in place of cash. It was often only redeemable at the company-owned store,
forcing employees to shop there. Scrip was closely tied to wroker debt and
exploitation (see Chapter 1).
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“Slack”: non-coal elements like slate and clay extracted with the coal during the mining
process. Slack decreased coal value and most miners received no pay for
extracting it.
“Turn”: the wait or the line for an available “car” to load the coal. If the mine had more
workers than available cars, the turn ran slow, meaning the miner had longer to
wait for his coal to be hoisted and therefore produced less coal.
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Abbreviations
Organizations
AMA
ATSF
BLS
FAMI
FLUA
HCA
IFI
IMPA
IOKL
NFM
NPU
NTA 135
SBA
SMI
UMW
USDA

American Miners’ Association
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Company
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Federated Association of Miners and Mine Laborers of Indiana
Farmers and Laborers Union of America
House Committee on Agriculture
Illinois Farmers’ Institute
Illinois Miners’ Protective Association
Independent Order of the Knights of Labor
National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers
National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers
Knights of Labor National Trade Assembly No. 135
State Board of Agriculture
State Mine Inspector
United Mine Workers of America
United States Department of Agriculture

Newspapers and Periodicals
BD
BP
CT or CDT
CTJ
DISJ
DIO
DP
EMJ
EC
FSDM or FSM
IF
JKL
JUL
KF
NE
NLT
NYT
OCFP
TSJ
UMWJ

Black Diamond
Bloomington [Illinois] Pantagraph
Chicago [Daily] Tribune
Coal Trade Journal
Daily Illinois State Journal
Daily Inter Ocean [Chicago, Illinois]
Daily Picayune [New Orleans, Louisiana]
Engineering and Mining Journal
Evansville [Indiana] Courier
Fort Scott [Kansas] (Daily) Monitor
Indiana Farmer
Journal of the Knights of Labor
Journal of United Labor
Kansas Farmer
National Economist
National Labor Tribune
New York Times
Osage City [Kansas] Free Press
Topeka [Kansas] State Journal
United Mine Workers’ Journal
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Collections and Locations
ATSF
ALPL
CMP
ILHS
ILSL
IRAD
INHS
INSA
INSL
JAMP
JHP
JMP
KSHS
KBLI
LC
MHJP
SHSM
TVPP
UILSP
UKSP
UMKC
WERP
WJBC
Washington,
WKU
LDLP

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company New York
Executive Department Files, KSHS
Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Illinois
Claude Matthews Papers, INSL
Illinois Historical Society, Springfield, Illinois
Illinois State Library, Springfield, Illinois
Illinois Regional Archives Depository
Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana
Indiana State Archives, Indianapolis, Indiana
Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana
James Atwell Mount Papers
John William Hayes Papers
John Mitchell Papers, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas
Kansas Bureau of Labor and Industry [Industrial Statistics]
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Mary Harris Jones Papers, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri
Terence Vincent Powderly Papers
University of Illinois Special Collections, Champaign, Illinois
University of Kentucky Special Collections, Lexington, Kentucky
University of Missouri Special Collections, Kansas City, Missouri
William E. Rider Papers, UMKC
William Jennings Bryan Collection, Library of Congress,
D.C.
Western Kentucky University Special Collections, Bowling Green,
Kentucky
Lorenzo D. Lewelling Papers, KSHS
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Michael W. Nagle, Justus S. Stearns: Michigan Pine King and Kentucky Coal
Barron, 1845-1933, in Ohio Valley History (forthcoming).
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Peter A. Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in Industrial
America in H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, December, 2015.
Jean-Christian Vinel, The Employee: A Political History in The Register of the
Kentucky Historical Society 112, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 716-718.
W. William Wimberly, Hanna’s Town: A Little World We Have Lost in Ohio Valley
History 11, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 86-87.

Teaching Experience:
University of Kentucky, Teaching Assistant: U.S. History 1877-Present, Fall 2011,
Spring 2014
University of Kentucky, Teaching Assistant: The Making of Modern Kentucky, Fall
2013
University of Evansville (Indiana), First Year Seminar, Pop Culture in the Global
Market, Spring 2011
IVY Tech Community College, Evansville (Indiana) Campus, U.S. History 1500
1877, Spring, Summer 2011
University of Southern Indiana, U.S. History 1865-Present, Fall 2010-Spring 2011
West Virginia University, Graduate Assistant: Latin America Past and Present,
Spring 2009

Editing and Research Experience
Book Review Editor, The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, July 2014December 2015
Research Assistant for Dr. Ronald P. Formisano, University of Kentucky, Spring
2012-Summer 2013, Spring 2014
Research Assistant and Staff Writer, Kentucky African American Encyclopedia,
University of Kentucky, Summer 2013
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Presentations
Roundtable panelist, “Building a History of Twentieth Century Kentucky,” Ohio
Valley Historical Conference, Eastern Kentucky University, October 2015.
“Yoked to Tradition: Kentucky Women and their Histories,” Ohio Valley Historical
Conference, Eastern Kentucky University, October 2015.
“Undermined: Blacklegging Businessmen and the 1888 Strike,” DC Working Class
History Seminar, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., September
2015.
“Coal Miner Wives and the ‘Molly Pitcher Spirit,’ 1890-1900,” North American
Labor History Conference, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, October 2014.
“Making the Daily Bread: Coal Miner Wives and the ‘Molly Pitcher Spirit,’ 18901900,” Futures of American Studies Institute, Dartmouth College, June 2014.
“Conditional Conservatism: Evansville, Indiana’s Reluctant Embrace of the Ku Klux
Klan, 1919-1922,” Ohio Valley Historical Conference, Eastern Kentucky University,
October 2009.
“Holding the Middle Ground: Race, Kidnapping, and the Ambivalent Localism of the
Antebellum Ohio River Valley,” Regional Phi Alpha Theta Conference, West
Virginia University, March 2009.
“Wages, Race, and Morality: Midwestern Coal Miners and the Struggle for Security,”
Regional Phi Alpha Theta Conference, Terre Haute, Indiana, April 2008.
“The 1899 Coal Strike: Coal Miners and Racial Conflict in Evansville, Indiana,”
National Phi Alpha Theta Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 2008.
“The 1899 Evansville Coal Strike: The Clash of Race, Miners, Mine Operators and
the United Mine Workers,” co-presented with Dr. J. Burton Kirkwood, Ohio Valley
Historical Conference, Western Kentucky University, October 2007.

Service
Article Referee, The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 2014-2015
Co-writer for “Legislative Moments” for Kentucky Legislators, Kentucky Legislature
in conjunction with the Kentucky Historical Society, 2014-2015
Conference Planner, Bluegrass Symposium, University of Kentucky, February 2013
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Panelist, “What to do with your degree,” Career Services Symposium, University of
Evansville, September 2010
Guest Speaker, “Evansville Underground: The Coal Mines Beneath Us,” Reitz Home
Museum Historic Preservation Society, Evansville, Indiana, April 2008
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